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Distinguishing code sections creating other offenses against officers, which don’t include such restrictive language: OCGA § 16–5–21(c) (aggravated assault of a police officer); OCGA § 16–10–24(b) (obstruction of a correctional officer). 5. AGGRAVATED STALKING Jackson v. State, 334 Ga.App. 368, 779 S.E.2d 427 (November 10, 2015). Evidence supported conviction for aggravated stalking (and other offenses). “Jackson had been arrested for hitting the victim and failing to leave her home when asked. After he bonded out of jail, Jackson went to her house in violation of the terms of his conditions of pretrial release. The victim allowed him to come inside, and she provided no testimony that she ever asked him to leave the house. However, there was also no evidence that the victim invited Jackson to her home or consented to his presence prior to his arrival at her door. The jury could infer that the victim did not consent to Jackson coming back to her house by the fact that she had him arrested the evening prior and immediately changed the locks once he was out of the house.[fn] The jury could also infer by his conduct both before and after he returned to the house that Jackson came to the victim’s house for the purpose of threatening or harassing her.” Irrelevant that victim allowed defendant in the house. “[T]he crime of aggravated stalking was completed when Jackson arrived at the door of the victim’s house, in violation of the conditions of his pretrial release, without her having invited him to do so. Compare Bragg [ v. State, 285 Ga.App. 408, 410(1), 646 S.E.2d 508 (2007)] , (insufficient evidence to support aggravated stalking conviction when victim initiated contact with defendant to suggest that they meet, brought a friend along with her to the meeting, and never withdrew consent).” Lopez v. State, 332 Ga.App. 518, 773 S.E.2d 787 (June 16, 2015). Aggravated stalking conviction affirmed; no error in allowing victim to testify to prior assaults against her by defendant. “[T]his type of prior difficulties evidence is admissible in an aggravated stalking case, where the state must show that the ‘indicted act was committed for the purpose of harassment and intimidation, an essential element of stalking.’ Benton v. State, 256 Ga.App. 620, 622(2)(a), 568 S.E.2d 770 (2002).” Oliver v. State, 325 Ga.App. 649, 753 S.E.2d 468 (January 27, 2014). Aggravated stalking conviction affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant’s contact with victim “was done for the purpose of harassing and intimidating [victim] Goss. … To begin with, a defendant need not engage in ‘unequivocally hostile conduct or make explicit threats in order to be convicted of stalking.’ Placanica v. State, 303 Ga.App. 302, 304, 693 S.E.2d 571 (2010) (punctuation omitted). And even behavior that is not overtly threatening can provide ‘the requisite degree of intimidation and harassment if it is ongoing, repetitious, and engaged in despite the communicated wishes of the victim.’ Id. (punctuation omitted); see Maskivish v. State, 276 Ga.App. 701, 703(1)(b), 624 S.E.2d 160 (2005) (noting that a defendant's conduct need not be overtly threatening to constitute stalking). In this matter, although Oliver testified that she called Goss and went to her home not for purposes of harassment but rather to seek help after she took a number of tranquilizers in an attempt to commit suicide, ‘it was solely for the [trial court], viewing that testimony in light of the other evidence, to assess [Oliver's] credibility and determine whether [her] testimony was truthful.’ Louisyr [ v. State, 307 Ga.App. 724, 730(1), 706 S.E.2d 114 (2011)]. And given that Oliver contacted Goss rather than calling an ambulance herself, and then had a friend drive her to Goss's home instead of to a hospital (at which point she belligerently yelled and screamed at Goss to let her inside the home), there was certainly evidence authorizing the trial court to be skeptical of her testimony.” Accord, Slaughter v. State , 327 Ga.App. 593, 760 S.E.2d 609 (June 17, 2014) (conduct need not be unequivocally hostile or involve explicit threats to constitute stalking or aggravated stalking). Gates v. State, 322 Ga.App. 383, 750 S.E.2d 683 (June 21, 2013). Evidence supported conviction for aggravated stalking, despite “occasions when [defendant] and the victim had consensual contact[. Defendant] argues the evidence was insufficient because this evidence demonstrated that she did not feel harassed or intimidated by him. However, the evidence clearly showed that the victim did not consent to the contact for which Gates was prosecuted and her actions in refusing to admit him once he arrived at her house against her express wishes and her attempt to call 911 showed that she was in reasonable fear for her safety. Thus, viewing this and the other evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the evidence was sufficient to authorize Gates' conviction of aggravated stalking under OCGA § 16–5–91(a). E.g., Crane v. State, 297 Ga.App. 880, 678 S.E.2d 542 (2009) (finding evidence sufficient to support conviction for aggravated stalking notwithstanding that the victim had consensual contact with the defendant on other occasions after restraining or protective order was entered); Revere v. State, 277 Ga.App. 393, 394(1)(a), 626 S.E.2d 585 (2006) (same); Littleton v. State, 225 Ga.App. 900, 903(4), 485 S.E.2d 230 (1997) (same). Compare Wright v. State, 292 Ga.App. 673, 665 S.E.2d 374 (2008) (evidence insufficient to show that victim was in reasonable fear for her safety when there had been a recent pattern of consensual contacts and victim pursued defendant after he left the residence even though he had the hammer he had taken away from her).”