☢ test - Í

Nosratifard v. State, 320 Ga.App. 564, 740 S.E.2d 290 (March 20, 2013). Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated stalking. 1. “Nosratifard's March 9, 2009 bond order prohibited him from communicating with Maxie by telephone or any other means. Text messages clearly would be a prohibited form of communication in violation of the bond order, and the texts at issue were sent after the order was issued. Although the State was not able to connect Nosratifard directly to any of the numbers used to send these texts, Maxie and her children testified that the texts contained phrases often used by Nosratifard, references to information known by Nosratifard, and ‘broken English’ similar to that employed by Nosratifard. Moreover, the text messages stopped when Nosratifard was in jail on the driving charge, resumed when he bonded out and stopped completely when he was arrested on the charges in this case. The jury considered the evidence cited by Nosratifard, which related to actions prior to the entry of the bond order, and determined that Nosratifard sent the text messages in this case.” 2. Convictions for separate text messages on separate days didn’t merge. “Based upon the plain language of the statute, the prohibited conduct is following, placing under surveillance, or contacting another person without consent in violation of one of the enumerated orders or conditions for the purposes of harassing or intimidating that person. Thus, under the facts of this case, the unauthorized act of contacting Maxie in violation of the condition of the bond order forms the proper ‘unit of prosecution’ under OCGA § 16–5–91(a). This interpretation is consistent with this Court's prior decisions holding that ‘[e]ven a single violation of a [bond] order may violate OCGA § 16–5–91(a) if that violation is part of a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior.’ Brooks v. State, 313 Ga.App. 789, 792(1) (723 S.E.2d 29) (2012), citing Louisyr v. State, [307 Ga.App. 724, 729(1) (706 S.E.2d 114) (2011)] (rejecting argument that aggravated stalking requires a pattern of violating a protective order).” Seems to suggest, however, that text messages forming part of a single “ongoing conversation” might have merged. Seibert v. State, 321 Ga.App. 243, 739 S.E.2d 91 (March 8, 2013). Evidence didn’t support conviction for aggravated stalking. Defendant delivered letter to assistant DA, asking him to deliver it to victim/defendant’s ex-wife. DA didn’t deliver the letter, instead using it as basis for indictment. Held, no aggravated stalking occurred where letter was never delivered. “OCGA § 16–5–90(a)(1) defines the term ‘contact’ to mean ‘any communication including without being limited to communication ... by mail....’” “‘To “contact” is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning to get in touch with; communicate with.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590(1) (449 S.E.2d 94) (1994). The state presented no evidence that Seibert ‘got in touch with’ or ‘communicated with’ Swords; the state presented no evidence that she even was aware of the letter.” Distinguishing cases where defendant successfully communicated with victim through a third-party, i.e., “ Davidson v. State, 295 Ga.App. 702 (673 S.E.2d 91) (2009) (defendant convinced victim's friend to use the three-way feature of her telephone service to connect him with the victim, who spoke with defendant).” “Here, however, the state failed to prove that there was actual contact with Swords, whether through a third party or otherwise. Indeed, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that an attempt to contact another person, precisely the conduct with which the state charged Seibert, is to attempt to stalk. State v. Rooks, 266 Ga. 528, 529(2) (468 S.E.2d 354) (1996). The state also failed to prove that Seibert's communication was made at a ‘public or private property occupied by the victim.’” Brooks v. State, 313 Ga.App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (January 27, 2012). Aggravated stalking convictions affirmed; text messages could be deemed harassing and threatening without any overt threat. “The text messages referenced the victim's recent sexual activity and suggested that Brooks was keeping the victim under surveillance, because he knew about her movements . Even if his messages to the victim ‘were not overtly threatening, given the history of [Brook's] persistent, ... actions, and his refusal to leave the victim alone, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that such acts were intended to harass and intimidate and placed the victim in fear for her safety.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Patterson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 780, 784(4)(b) (645 S.E.2d 38) (2007); see also Maskivish v. State, 276 Ga.App. 701, 703(1)(b) (624 S.E.2d 160) [November 3, 2005, below].” Accord, Oliver (January 27, 2014), above. Herbert v. State, 311 Ga.App. 396, 715 S.E.2d 795 (August 15, 2011). Evidence supported aggravated stalking conviction. 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, all acts used to show “pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior” need not occur after issuance of protective order , citing Louisyr (February 4, 2011), below. 2. Several acts committed during a single incident may be “enough to authorize a finding of such a pattern. ‘A “course of conduct” refers to a series of successive actions, and, as such, is equivalent to a “pattern of behavior.”’ Daker v. Williams, 279 Ga. 782, 785, 621 S.E.2d 449 (2005). When Herbert contacted the victim in the Wal–Mart, Herbert approached the victim, whispered her name, made accusations about her, attempted to remove their baby from her stroller, attempted to strike the victim twice, threatened to ‘knock her block off,’ and ultimately threatened to kill her. This conduct amounts to a series of successive actions that would authorize the jury to find a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior.”