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for such a condition to have effect. The fact that the instruction was given and received, not that it was physically memorialized, is the focal point,’” quoting Hooper v. State , 223 Ga.App. 515, 478 S.E.2d 606 (1996). ““[T]he only additional proof required by the aggravated stalking statute is that the defendant violate a court order. OCGA § 16-5- 91(a). Cf. Withers v. State, 254 Ga.App. 833, 835(2) (563 S.E.2d 912) (2002) (proof that defendant violated court order element of aggravated stalking). As a result, it would be inappropriate for this court to engraft onto the statute an additional element for the offense. Finally, even if notice of the order were required, proof of the written order alone is sufficient to prove notice to Revere based on the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings. Merrill v. State, 201 Ga.App. 671, 672(1) (411 S.E.2d 750) (1991); Johnson v. Cleveland, 131 Ga.App. 560, 561(1) (206 S.E.2d 704) (1974).” Maskivish v. State, 276 Ga.App. 701, 624 S.E.2d 160 (November 3, 2005). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking for sending victim letters after entry of TPO. “Even though the letters were not overtly threatening, given the rambling nature of the letters, which included disparaging references about the victim’s appearance, references to Maskivish’s infidelities, and a suggestion that the victim be tested for HIV, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that such acts were intended to harass and intimidate and reasonably placed the victim in fear for her safety. See Jagat v. State, 240 Ga.App. 822, 823(1) (525 S.E.2d 388) (1999).” Accord, Brooks (January 27, 2012), above ; Oliver (January 27, 2014), above. Daker v. State , 243 Ga.App. 848, 533 S.E.2d 393 (April 11, 2000). Aggravated stalking convictions affirmed; each separate unauthorized contact between defendant and victim supported a separate conviction for aggravated stalking. “Daker argues that he was chargeable with no more than one count of aggravated stalking because this was all part of one course of conduct. In pertinent part, OCGA § 16–5–91(a) states that ‘[a] person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when such person, in violation of a ... condition of pretrial release, ... contacts another person ... without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.’ … Here, the defendant engaged in a course of conduct as described in OCGA § 16–5–90(a) which culminated in unauthorized contacts between him and Spencer on two separate dates. Consequently, his conviction on two separate counts of aggravated stalking under OCGA § 16–5–91(a) was authorized. See Fly v. State, 229 Ga.App. 374, 375(1), 494 S.E.2d 95 (1997); Durant v. State, 222 Ga.App. 872, 873(1), 476 S.E.2d 641 (1996).” Jagat v. State, 240 Ga.App. 822, 525 S.E.2d 388 (November 16, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking; evidence showed that defendant went on victim’s property “intending to harass or intimidate the victim,” notwithstanding that she “was unaware of Jagat’s presence when he was arrested near her home.” 6. ASSAULT /SIMPLE ASSAULT Daniels v. State, 298 Ga.App. 736, 681 S.E.2d 642 (July 6, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for simple assault where defendant “shouted at [victim] Harrell in an agitated and angry manner, while standing in close proximity to her and blocking her movement in a narrow hall. These actions constituted a ‘demonstration of violence’ sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Daniels had committed a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission of a battery upon Harrell. See In re: D.B., [284 Ga.App. 445, 447-448(1) (644 S.E.2d 305) (2007)] (defendant removed outer clothing and squared off against victim in confined office space). Further, clearly Daniels had ‘an apparent present ability to inflict injury,’ in light of the fact that he was standing only inches from his victim's face. See Bostic v. State, 289 Ga.App. 195, 197 (656 S.E.2d 546) (2008) (police officer standing in front of car reasonably feared harm from defendant in car who stared at officer while revving his engine); Lewis v. State, 253 Ga.App. 578, 581 (560 S.E.2d 73) (2002) (rational factfinder could find ‘substantial step’ toward harming victims where defendant made threats against victims while standing only inches away from them). Harrell testified that she feared Daniels might harm her, and eyewitnesses also testified that they feared for Harrell's safety. See Wroge [ v. State, 278 Ga.App. 753, 754(1) (629 S.E.2d 596) (2006)] Further, Harrell's fear is demonstrated not only by her testimony as to her mental state, but also by the fact that she was trying to escape Daniels's immediate presence, but was prevented from doing so by Daniels's actions. See Hurt v. State, 158 Ga.App. 722, 724 (282 S.E.2d 192) (1981) (victim's apprehension caused him to seek sanctuary in dwelling). Accord Bearden v. State, 291 Ga.App. 805, 807 (662 S.E.2d 736) (2008) (victim retreated to bedroom). ‘ The focus of a reasonable apprehension of harm under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) is on the apprehension of the victim. There is no specific intent requirement in the statute, which would indicate that only an intent to commit the act which in fact places another in reasonable apprehension of injury is required, not a specific intent to cause such apprehension. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wroge, supra.” In re: T.Y.B., 288 Ga.App. 610, 654 S.E.2d 688 (November 28, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. “ The State presented evidence showing that T.Y.B. was angry, cursing and screaming at his