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mother, when he took the pot of boiling water off the stove and stood a short distance in front of her holding the pot while staring at her. Under these circumstances, T.Y.B.’s actions constituted both a substantial step toward committing a battery and a demonstration of violence against his mother, and showed a present ability to inflict injury which placed his mother in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. [Cits.]” Lunsford v. State, 260 Ga.App. 818, 581 S.E.2d 638 (April 10, 2003). “Because reasonable apprehension of injury is not the same as simple fear, the testimony that the victim was not afraid of the defendant does not preclude conviction.” Gordian v. State, 261 Ga.App. 75, 581 S.E.2d 616 (April 3, 2003). “To prove whether a victim has been placed under reasonable apprehension of injury, the State may use indirect or circumstantial evidence. Regarding the assault against the ex-wife, the evidence showed that the police found both women to be very upset, with evidence of emotional trauma including quivering, shaking, crying, looking fearful, and being very nervous. Despite the ex-wife’s later testimony that she was not fearful during the incident, this police testimony was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the ex-wife had a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury.” In re: C.S., 251 Ga.App. 411, 554 S.E.2d 558 (August 28, 2001). Simple assault “is defined as either attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of another or committing an act that places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” A necessary element of simple assault is that one “commits an act … [which] requires a demonstration of violence.” Here, C.S., a juvenile, was standing three to five feet from a police officer, holding a knife. The knife was not pointed at the police officer, but defendant failed to put the knife down on the officer’s command, even after the officer drew his gun and ordered him to do so. Defendant’s father eventually took the knife without resistance. The court found that the police officer was apprehensive of immediately receiving harm, but there was no act or demonstration of violence, therefore the elements of simple assault were not met. Brinson v. State , 272 Ga. 345, 529 S.E.2d 129 (May 1, 2000). Conviction for felony murder based on aggravated assault affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, State didn’t have to prove that victim was “conscious and this, in ‘reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury,’ an element of simple assault. See OCGA § 16– 5–20(a)(2). … Brinson ignores the fact that a simple assault also occurs when a person ‘[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another.’ OCGA § 16–5–20(a)(1); see also Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 591(2), 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998). Therefore, ‘[a] victim's “apprehension” of receiving a violent injury is not an essential element of an assault in which it is alleged that the defendant actually attempted to commit a violent injury to the person of the victim.’ Love v. State, 268 Ga. 484, 485(1), 490 S.E.2d 88 (1997). Brinson was charged with the underlying felony of aggravated assault by stabbing Glenn with a knife, a deadly weapon. Thus, it was unnecessary for the State to show Glenn's apprehension of the violent injuries inflicted on him.” 7. ASSISTING SUICIDE Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 290 Ga. 508, 722 S.E.2d 722 (February 6, 2012). OCGA § 16-5-5(b), outlawing publically offering to assist another’s suicide, unconstitutionally infringes on defendants’ free speech. “By its plain language, … § 16–5–5(b) proscribes speech based on content in that it restricts anyone who ‘publicly advertises, offers, or holds himself or herself out as offering that he or she will intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide.’ It is not all assisted suicides which are criminalized but only those which include a public advertisement or offer to assist. This distinction takes the statute out of the realm of content neutral regulations and renders it a selective restraint on speech with a particular content.” Statute fails to stand up to strict scrutiny, as it is not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling interest. “While a State's interest in preserving human life would be compelling, § 16–5–5(b) is not narrowly tailored to promote this asserted interest. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728–729, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (assisted suicide ban is an expression of State's commitment to protection of human life). Although the State attempts to portray § 16–5–5(b) as simply a ban on assisted suicide, the clear language of the statute demonstrates otherwise. It is undisputed that § 16–5–5(b) does not ban assistance in all suicides, conduct which by itself is legal in Georgia. Many assisted suicides are either not prohibited or are expressly exempted from the ambit of § 16–5–5(b)'s criminal sanctions. See OCGA § 16–5–5(d). Nor does § 16–5–5(b) render illegal all advertisements or offers to assist in a suicide. Individuals who offer to assist in the commission of a suicide in a less than ‘public’ manner are not covered, despite the fact that such communication might have the same consequences as a public offer. … ‘The consequence is that its regulation is wildly underinclusive when judged against its asserted justification, which in our view is alone enough to defeat it.’ Brown [ v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 08-1848, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2740, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011)].” “Had the State truly been interested in the preservation of human life, … it could have imposed a ban on all assisted suicides with no restriction on