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protected speech whatsoever. Alternatively, the State could have sought to prohibit all offers to assist in suicide when accompanied by an overt act to accomplish that goal. The State here did neither. … Absent a more particularized State interest and more narrowly tailored statute, we hold the State may not, consistent with the United States and Georgia Constitutions, make the public advertisement or offer to assist in a suicide a criminal offense. Distinguishing Christensen v. State, 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188 (1996) (statute prohibiting solicitation of sodomy constitutional “[b]ecause First Amendment protection does not extend to statements made in the solicitation of criminal acts. … In contrast, assisted suicide is not a criminal activity.”). 8. BATTERY See also subheading FAMILY VIOLENCE BATTERY , below Futch v. State, 316 Ga.App. 376, 730 S.E.2d 14 (June 25, 2012). Testimony that defendant “put his hand” on victim’s neck was insufficient to support his conviction for family violence battery. Walker v. State, 315 Ga.App. 821, 728 S.E.2d 334 (May 10, 2012). Conviction for family violence battery affirmed; no merit to defendant’s contention that “that the evidence did not support his conviction in that there was no evidence showing that Walker caused Kari to suffer ‘substantial bruising or substantially swollen body parts’ when he punched her. Walker contends that the repeated use of the word ‘substantially’ in the subsection (b) of the statute [fn] indicates a legislative intent to exclude minor wounds from the definition of ‘visible bodily injury.’ … Indeed, subsection (b) clearly includes nothing more than a non-exhaustive list of examples of visible bodily injuries.” Powell v. State, 304 Ga.App. 221, 695 S.E.2d 736 (May 27, 2010). Defendant’s family violence battery conviction reversed; trial court erred by charging the jury on the entire battery statute, OCGA § 16-5-23.1(a) when only one method of committing the offense was charged, but the evidence supported a conviction by another means. The indictment charged that defendant “intentionally caused substantial bodily harm” to victim by smothering her; the evidence also showed that defendant caused “visible bodily harm” to defendant by choking her with his hands. Error was not waived by failing to object to charge, as “there was a substantial error in the charge that was harmful as a matter of law.” Burrowes v. State, 296 Ga.App. 629, 675 S.E.2d 518 (March 13, 2009). At defendant’s trial for simple battery, trial court properly excluded as irrelevant evidence that victim had cheated on defendant. “The record reflects that the state moved to exclude as irrelevant allegations that [victim] Hysten and Burrowes cheated on each other. The trial court's ruling on the motion was limited in scope, allowing evidence as to the nature of the discussion precipitating the battery, i.e., alleged infidelity, but prohibiting both sides from exploring the details of any alleged affairs and/or delving into the truthfulness of the allegations. … We are not persuaded that delving into the details of an alleged affair and/or questioning Hysten's truthfulness on the issue was relevant to whether Burrowes committed a battery on her.” Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 114, 645 S.E.2d 602 (April 16, 2007). “The offense of battery was included in, and should have been merged with, the offense of kidnapping with bodily injury.” Gilbert v. State, 278 Ga.App. 765, 629 S.E.2d 587 (April 12, 2006). Offense of battery requires proof of visible bodily harm to the victim. “‘As used in this Code section, the term ‘visible bodily harm’ means bodily harm capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim and may include, but is not limited to, substantially blackened eyes, substantially swollen lips or other facial or body parts, or substantial bruises to body parts.’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-5-23.1(b).” Officer’s testimony that victim’s face was reddened where defendant struck her was sufficient to establish “harm capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim.” Cox v. State , 243 Ga.App. 582, 532 S.E.2d 697 (March 27, 2000). Evidence didn’t support battery conviction. “Under OCGA § 16-5-23.1(a) and (f), a person commits the offense of family violence battery when he intentionally causes substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to a spouse. Here the State contended that Cox threw beer in his wife's face, causing her physical pain. Both the victim and Cox testified otherwise, stating only that some beer was splashed on her clothes. [fn: An officer's hearsay testimony that she told him that Cox threw beer in her face was not admitted as part of the res gestae and consequently had no probative value. See Jones v. State, 271 Ga. 516, 517(2), 520 S.E.2d 454 (1999); compare Brinson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 556(1), 430 S.E.2d 875 (1993). ] Because there was no evidence of any pain or harm, the battery conviction fails.” 9. BATTERY AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER Curtis v. State, 285 Ga.App. 298, 645 S.E.2d 705 (May 8, 2007). In defendants’ trial for battery against a police officer, “unlike an obstruction charge, the State need not prove that the officer was in the lawful discharge of his official duties,