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Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (November 8, 2004). “Watson argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when it commented on his lack of remorse and made an improper golden rule argument in its closing remarks. However, Watson failed to interpose a contemporaneous objection to the State’s comments and the ‘contemporaneous objection rule cannot be avoided by characterizing trial occurrences as examples of prosecutorial misconduct.’ Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640(9), 398 S.E.2d 179 (1990). See also Ledford v. State, 264 Ga. 60, 67, 439 S.E.2d 917 (1994). Moreover, in context, the State’s ‘lack of remorse’ comments were aimed at Watson’s lack of emotion; [cit.] they did not raise the issue of Watson’s right to remain silent. See Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879(8)(b), 452 S.E.2d 745 (1995). Finally, the State did not violate the golden rule; it merely invited the jurors to ‘speak for [victim] by letting her killer know that you’re not going to let him get away with it.’ It did not ask the jurors to put themselves in the victim’s place at the time the crime was committed. See Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884(2), 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002); Horne v. State, 192 Ga.App. 528, 529, 385 S.E.2d 704 (1989).” Foster v. State, 267 Ga.App. 363, 599 S.E.2d 309 (May 11, 2004). Except in capital cases, where the “plain error” rule applies, violation of the “golden rule” in closing argument must be objected to timely, or else waived. Johnson v. State, 263 Ga.App. 443, 587 S.E.2d 775 (September 10, 2003). Where victim’s apparent calmness after rape was raised as an issue during trial, prosecutor could argue to the jury “that they should consider how a person could appear calm or even relieved after such a heinous attack,” suggesting rather graphically that she might be “happy” the defendant didn’t kill her baby instead, as threatened. As her emotional state was an issue, prosecutor could argue it without making an improper “Golden Rule” argument. Chinn v. State, 276 Ga. 387, 578 S.E.2d 856 (March 27, 2003). Prosecutor may argue that “the victim was entitled to respect as a human being and his day in court,” as long as he doesn’t ask the jury to place themselves in the victim’s position. Carr v. State, 275 Ga. 185, 563 S.E.2d 850 (May 13, 2002). It is not improper for the prosecutor to urge the jury in closing argument to “be the voice of the victim.” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s sentencing phase closing argument was improper, but waived by lack of objection: “The prosecutor told the jury to ‘imagine being asleep, and you wake up to hands tearing off your clothes. You wake up to hands grappling your body.... Something is tied around your neck and you are strangled.’ It is well settled that it is improper to ask the jury to imagine themselves in the victim's place. See Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439(19)(c), 469 S.E.2d 129 (1996); Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777(20), 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994). However, Pace did not object to this improper argument and, given the amount of evidence in aggravation, we do not conclude that this argument changed the result of the sentencing phase.” Hunstein, writing for Fletcher, dissents, would reverse death sentence “[b]ased on the State's deliberate and extensive introduction of a prohibited argument into the closing of Pace's capital sentencing hearing, the absence of any factors to mitigate that impermissible argument, and indicators that the evidence of Pace's guilt did not automatically predispose the jury to consider only a death sentence.” Accord, Braithwaite v. State , 275 Ga. 884, 572 S.E.2d 612 (November 12, 2002). Hayes v. State, 236 Ga.App. 617, 512 S.E.2d 294 (February 9, 1999). Trial court erred in sustaining prosecution’s “golden rule” objection to defense counsel’s closing argument; although this rule applies to both sides of case, it does not prohibit argument urging the jury to place themselves in the position of someone other than the defendant or victim (here, the investigating detective). “‘In a classic “golden rule” argument, jurors are invited to place themselves in the victim’s place in regard to the crime itself. However, any argument, regardless of nomenclature, which importunes the jury to place itself in the position of the victim for any purpose must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that no infringement of the accused’s fair trial rights has occurred.’ Horne v. State, 192 Ga.App. 528, 529(2), 385 S.E.2d 704 (1989). Thus, in a classic ‘golden rule’ argument, the State cannot ask the juror’s to put themselves in the victim’s place. Conversely, we have held that any argument that ‘asks the jurors to consider the case, not objectively as fair and impartial jurors, but rather from the biased, subjective standpoint of a litigant’ would be an improper ‘golden rule’ argument. See Myrick v. Stephanos, 220 Ga.App. 520, 523, 472 S.E.2d 431 (1996), citing 75A AmJur2d, Trial, § 650 (1991). Thus, it would appear equally improper for defense counsel to ask a jury to put themselves in the defendant’s place while deciding a case.” No golden rule argument, however, where defense counsel asked jurors to “put themselves in the place of a witness, i.e., the detective who took Hayes’ statement” and consider whether they would have used the