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procedure the detective used. Harmless error, however, in light of “overwhelming evidence” of defendant’s guilt. Heller v. State, 234 Ga.App. 630, 507 S.E.2d 518 (October 5, 1998). No improper “golden rule” argument in defendant’s DUI trial where prosecutor asked jurors, ““Seeing what you see here now, do you think he was less safe? Do you want to expose the people of Cobb County to the risk that he presented ... southbound on U.S. 41?” “This Court has held that asking jurors to put themselves as passengers in the car the accused was driving while he was impaired was not impermissible because ‘[t]here had been no passengers in fact.’ Gray v. State, 222 Ga.App. 626, 633(5), 476 S.E.2d 12 (1996). The same reasoning applies here. … The State did not ask the jurors to view the facts from any perspective except their own. They were asked to judge Heller by what they had seen and heard at trial. The mere fact that they were all citizens of Cobb County does not, as Heller contends, make this a ‘golden rule’ argument .” 19. CONTENT – MISSTATEMENT OF LAW Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, but defendant failed to preserve the error. “Martin argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument repeatedly misled the jury regarding the effect of a sentence of guilty but mentally ill. While it was not improper for the prosecutor to state that it would not be justice for the jury to impose a sentence of guilty but mentally ill if it was not supported by the evidence, we agree that it was improper to refer to such a verdict using the phrases, ‘a break’ and ‘a pass,’ and by making similar arguments. We note, however, that such language would have been permissible in the sentencing phase where, regardless of whether the jury had found Martin guilty or guilty but mentally ill, the jury would be choosing between imposing a death sentence or granting mercy. See Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 764(12), 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005) (holding that ‘the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict’).” Lopez-Vasquez v. State, 331 Ga.App. 570, 771 S.E.2d 218 (March 26, 2015). Methamphetamine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in preventing misleading closing argument by defense counsel, who “asserted that there was a distinction between giving safe haven to drugs and merely benefitting from the knowledge that someone else in the residence was giving safe haven to the drug. Defense counsel had argued that in the first instance, a party was guilty of a crime, but in the second, he was not. The trial court advised defense counsel that in either case, the party was guilty and could not ‘take the benefit of ill-gotten goods’ and that he should ‘get away’ from that argument. … It is not error for a trial court to restrict an argument that misleads or confuses the law. See Johnson v. State, 186 Ga.App. 891, 892(1), 369 S.E.2d 48 (1988) (trial court did not err in interrupting defense counsel's closing argument when counsel misstated law); Brown v. State, 319 Ga.App. 680, 683(3), 738 S.E.2d 132 (2013) (‘In limiting Brown's closing argument, the trial court correctly determined that it is the court's responsibility to charge the law.’)” Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 725 S.E.2d 280 (March 23, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument wasn’t improper. “Davis complains that the prosecutor misstated the law when she told the jury that ‘if you go on a marijuana drug deal and someone dies, you are responsible for their death.’” Trial court could reasonably conclude that “the prosecutor's comments were directed at the jury's deliberations and were not a statement of the law.” Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009). At defendant’s capital murder trial, prosecutor’s closing argument was error, but not harmful: “When Arrington objected to the prosecutor's argument that an acquittal ‘would say that Arrington was honest and had nothing to hide,’ the trial court required the prosecutor to acknowledge to the jury that this was not what a verdict of ‘not guilty’ meant, and the prosecutor voluntarily moved on from the argument. We find no harm.” Noellien v. State, 298 Ga.App. 47, 679 S.E.2d 75 (May 19, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial court prohibited defense counsel from drawing an analogy in closing argument that it deemed not comparable to the facts of the case at hand “concerning equal access, his sole defense in the case. The State objected that the example concerned drugs in a backpack, whereas the bottle at issue here was not in any other container. The trial court sustained the objection, commented that “[t]he law comes from the Court, and not from the lawyers,” and then instructed counsel to abandon the example.” “Although counsel is permitted wide latitude in closing argument, limitation on that argument is in the court's discretion. See Hudson v. State, 273 Ga. 124, 127(5) (538 S.E.2d 751) (2000). The trial court did not abuse its discretion here when it determined that counsel's example was more likely to confuse than to enlighten the jury.” Perkinson v. State, 279 Ga. 232, 610 S.E.2d 533 (March 14, 2005). “While discussing sentencing options during the