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crimes charged.” No prejudice, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “OCGA § 17-8-76 ... provides that an attorney in a criminal case shall not argue in front of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not suffer the full penalty imposed by the court because he might be granted a pardon, parole or clemency.” 22. CONTENT – PERSONAL OPINION OF ATTORNEY/COURT See also subheading BOLSTERING WITNESS CREDIBILITY, above Horne v. State, 333 Ga.App. 353, 773 S.E.2d 467 (June 23, 2015). Aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to prosecutor’s closing argument. Prosecutor’s comment in closing was improper, but no prejudice shown. Argument here: “We seek justice. We seek justice, and we're not trying to punish innocent people.” The improper remark was made in the context of rebutting the defense argument that the State’s investigation unfairly targeted defendant; in response, “the prosecutor pointed out that several impartial witnesses, including police officers and hospital staff, who made contact with the victim following the August 18 incident testified at the trial.” “Given the context of the prosecutor's statements, ‘[w]e conclude that ... the improper remarks of the prosecuting attorney did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial, and any potential harm was mitigated by the jury's understanding that the prosecutor was countering defense counsel's attack on the prosecution's integrity.... Moreover, at the close of the case, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that neither the indictment nor closing arguments should be considered as evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Powell [ v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 749(2), 733 S.E.2d 294 (2012)].” McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 750 S.E.2d 314 (October 21, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s comment in closing argument that she “detested” defendant was improper, but not grounds for mistrial, given trial court’s immediate curative instruction and admonition to prosecutor. “Moreover, to the extent that McKibbins was, in fact, culpable in the abduction, killing, and dismemberment of Robbins, no one could reasonably dispute that his actions were ‘detest[able].’ Although the prosecuting attorney ought not have shared with the jury that she ‘detest[ed]’ McKibbins, it was not likely to surprise anyone.” Jordan v. State, 293 Ga. 619, 748 S.E.2d 876 (September 23, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied mistrial based on prosecutor’s closing argument stating that “the State believes the evidence has proven beyond a reasonable doubt…” Although “the statement to which appellant objected definitely implies [the prosecutor’s personal belief in the defendant’s guilt],” denial of mistrial was appropriate because “[a]ny improper impression was removed from jurors’ minds when the trial court instructed the prosecutor to restate his argument based on what the evidence established and the prosecutor, through his own comments to the jury, reminded jurors they were the ones who were to decide appellant’s guilt or innocence and that argument of counsel is not evidence.” Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument during guilt/innocence phase, impugning defense counsel’s motives for representing defendant, is frowned upon but not grounds for reversal. Prosecutor argued that defense counsel was “not paid to find justice,” but was “out mercy [sic] or he is out for you to forgive his client.” “[W]e have considered the allegedly improper arguments in determining whether Brockman's death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, see OCGA § 17–10–35(c)(1), and ‘we find distasteful any argument that unnecessarily impugns the integrity of opposing counsel, even if obliquely.’ Gissendaner [ v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 713(10)(a), 532 S.E.2d 677 (2000)]. Nevertheless, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the prosecutor's allegedly improper arguments changed the jury's exercise of discretion in choosing between life imprisonment or death (see id. at 714(10)(b)), as the trial court charged the jury that evidence does not include the attorneys' closing arguments.” Wright v. State, 319 Ga.App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (February 11, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Prosecutor’s closing argument, referencing failure of defendant’s family to ever tell police about alibi to which they testified at trial, and casting doubt on their credibility, was not improper. “As the prosecutor put it during closing argument: ‘They never did that once. The first time this [alibi] information ever surfaced was when it was time for this case to come to court. And why? Because it's fabricated. It's not true.’ ‘It is improper for counsel to state to the jury counsel's personal belief as to the veracity of a witness; however, it is not improper for counsel to urge the jury to draw such a conclusion from the evidence.’ Humphrey v. Lewis, 291 Ga. 202, 215(V)(A)(ii), 728 S.E.2d 603 (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). Taken in context, the flagged remarks fall in the latter category, as the gravamen of this argument was to urge the jury to find from the circumstances that the alibi witnesses had lied. See Robinson [ v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 597 S.E.2d 386 (2004)] , supra (determining that, where complained-of statements by prosecutor were preceded by a lengthy list of inconsistencies presented by the witness's testimony, which brought witness's veracity into question,