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gravamen of argument was to urge jury to find from inconsistencies that the witness had lied); Head [ v. State, 276 Ga. 131, 575 S.E.2d 883(2003)] (‘In making a closing argument, it is counsel's right to ... assail the credibility of witnesses by circumstances.’) (punctuation and footnotes omitted). Compare Bolden v. State, 272 Ga. 1–2, 525 S.E.2d 690 (2000) (determining that the solicitor improperly commented on the credibility of the state's witness by stating, ‘You look at what you heard from the [state's witness], who I thought was very credible.’).” Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed, although death sentences reversed on other grounds; prosecutor’s argument was improper expression of opinion about witness, but not reversible error. Prosecutor explained that he dismissed witness’s pending felony charges after determining that witness “was no more than a patsy.” Harmless, however, in light of “strong” evidence of defendant’s guilt. Strickland v. State, 311 Ga.App. 400, 715 S.E.2d 798 (August 16, 2011). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument, contending that victims’ testimony “had the ring of truth,” was not improper statement of attorney’s opinion, but, in context, “was urging the jury to draw conclusions from evidence in the case.” Argument was a response to defense closing, which asserted that victims’ testimony was fabricated. Jackson v. State, 309 Ga.App. 450, 710 S.E.2d 649 (April 28, 2011). Convictions for child molestation and aggravated child molestation affirmed; no improper expression of prosecutor’s opinion of victim’s truthfulness “when he argued as follows: ‘Now, how do we know that the act that we are alleging was to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant and the victim in this case? ... Well, what did [victim G.W.] testify to? ... [G.W.] ... said the defendant gave me specific instructions. He said put some lotion on, but just on the tip. He said just put a little bit on the tip, and then go ahead and penetrate me.... [T]hat is what we call a contextual detail. If [G.W.] is going to stand up there and lie, how is he going to think to lie specifically about where the defendant told him to put the lotion?’ … The prosecutor's argument during closing that G.W. could not have been lying due to the level of detail in his testimony merely urged the jury to make a deduction about his veracity based upon the evidence adduced at trial. See Moody v. State, 273 Ga. 24, 27(4) (537 S.E.2d 666) (2000).” Burden v. State, 296 Ga.App. 441, 674 S.E.2d 668 (March 5, 2009). Trial court properly sustained State’s objection to defense counsel’s statement of personal opinion in closing argument: “the reason I have doubt is because the police investigation was…” Hartley v. State, 283 Ga.App. 388, 641 S.E.2d 607 (February 1, 2007). No improper expression of personal opinion by prosector in closing argument: “Here, the prosecutor told the jury to not ‘be confused by the presumption of innocence. Each of you is actually innocent of these various crimes, [co-defendant Waters and Hartley are] not, they’re guilty ...’ In the previous sentences, the prosecutor told the jury that ‘[t]he State has to prove to you that they are guilty.’ In context, the prosecutor was permissibly reiterating the State’s position that Hartley was guilty, not stating his personal belief in Hartley’s guilt. See Bishop v. State, 268 Ga. 286, 294(14) (486 S.E.2d 887) (1997).” Simpson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 456, 638 S.E.2d 900 (November 17, 2006). “While ‘[i]t is improper for counsel to state to the jury counsel’s personal belief as to the veracity of a witness ..., it is not improper for counsel to urge the jury to draw such a conclusion from the evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mason v. State, 274 Ga. 79, 80(2)(b) (548 S.E.2d 298) (2001). Inasmuch as the prosecutor here argued no more than that the State’s evidence was worthy of belief, rather than his personal belief in the credibility of such evidence or the infallibility of his witnesses, the trial court did not err in denying trial counsel’s motion for a new trial on this account.” Accord, Brown v. State , 293 Ga.App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899 (September 23, 2008) (ok for prosecutor to argue that State’s witnesses “were not lying”); Wright v. State , 284 Ga. 406, 667 S.E.2d 611 (October 6, 2008); Tucker v. State , 313 Ga.App. 537, 722 S.E.2d 139 (January 12, 2012) (“it is proper for a prosecutor to urge the jury to draw inferences from the evidence regarding the credibility of witnesses.”). Navarro v. State, 279 Ga.App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (May 11, 2006). “According to Navarro, the prosecutor’s use of such phrases as ‘I think,’ ‘I can promise you,’ and ‘in my experience’ is tantamount to vouching for the truthfulness of the witnesses. But the prosecutor never actually said he thought that any witness was telling the truth. Although the better practice may be for a prosecutor to avoid using a turn of phrase that may appear to implicate his own beliefs, we simply cannot find that the use of these words warrants reversal in the current context. [Cit.] Navarro also complains about the prosecutor’s argument that he thought ‘the most outrageous and the most incredible version of [Navarro’s] story is that he said he swung this bat and he had no idea that it made contact with Andy Espinal’s skull.’ Navarro claims that this statement constituted the prosecutor’s personal belief regarding Navarro’s veracity and guilt. But we find this statement