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permissible since it constitutes a ‘conclusion the prosecutor wished the jury to draw from the evidence, and not a statement of the prosecutor’s personal belief as to the veracity of a witness.’ [Cit.]” Accord, Jackson v. State , 281 Ga. 705, 642 S.E.2d 656 (March 19, 2007) (“I think” and “I know” do not “amount to an impermissible statement of personal opinion”); Walker v State , 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (October 9, 2007) (same as Jackson ); Wilson v. State , 306 Ga.App. 827, 703 S.E.2d 400 (November 17, 2010); Christopher v. State , 314 Ga.App. 809, 726 S.E.2d 411 (February 17, 2012) (Physical precedent only) (“I don’t think” not an expression of personal opinion); Coghlan v. State , 319 Ga.App. 551, 737 S.E.2d 332 (January 16, 2013) (“I think [the officer] did the responsible thing.”). Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Prosecutor’s argument that “we know [defendant] did it” was “arguably” an improper expression of personal opinion, but defense counsel’s decision not to object to it was strategic, as it highlighted the defense argument that law enforcement failed to investigate other possible perpetrators. Byers v. State, 276 Ga.App. 295, 623 S.E.2d 157 (November 8, 2005). 1. “ [A] prosecutor’s use of phrases such as ‘we do know,’ ‘I do believe,’ and ‘I don’t believe’ during argument does not amount to an impermissible statement of personal opinion. Even a statement in argument that ‘“I am asking you to find him guilty because he is guilty. He’s honestly guilty”’ was held not to be an impermissible expression of personal opinion,” citing Hildebrand v. State , 209 Ga.App. 507, 433 S.E.2d 443 (1993). “‘Considered in context, the most reasonable interpretation of these comments is that the prosecutor was asking jurors to draw inferences from evidence. Inferences drawn from facts adduced at trial are acceptable argument, and the fact that the inferences may have been improperly couched in the framework of a personal opinion does not render them reversible error. (Citation omitted.) Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547, 556(7)(b) (480 S.E.2d 553) (1997).” 2. “Byers also complains of an illustrative analogy used by the prosecutor concerning a picture puzzle of a sailboat with some pieces missing. But ‘the State may argue to the jury ... with considerable latitude in imagery and illustration.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hildebrand, supra, 209 Ga.App. at 510(3)(b). We agree with the trial court that ‘figurative speech is a legitimate weapon in forensic warfare if there are facts admissible in evidence upon which it may be founded.’ (Citations omitted.) Stancil v. State, 158 Ga.App. 147, 148(2) (279 S.E.2d 457) (1981).” Emberson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 773, 611 S.E.2d 83 (February 24, 2005). “Although it would have been improper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury that he personally believed a witness was a liar or was lying, ‘it is entirely proper for counsel to urge the jury to deduce such a conclusion from proven facts.’ Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 36 (597 S.E.2d 386) (2004) (punctuation and citation omitted).” Accord, Hill v. State , 290 Ga.App. 140, 658 S.E.2d 863 (March 7, 2008); Mathis v. State , 298 Ga.App. 817, 681 S.E.2d 179 (June 18, 2009) (argument about who were “best witnesses” or “not quite as good,” not improper); Smith v. State , 300 Ga.App. 220, 684 S.E.2d 354 (September 24, 2009) (argument phrased as “I believe [one statement] but I don’t believe [another]” “was poorly worded,” but “it was not impermissible.”). Watkins v. State, 278 Ga. 414, 603 S.E.2d 222 (September 27, 2004). “[N]o manifest abuse of discretion” “to permit the ADA to sit in the witness chair as he addressed the jury during closing argument[.] [W]e note ‘counsel is permitted wide latitude in closing argument, and any limitation of argument is a matter for the court’s discretion.’ Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 354(8) (490 S.E.2d 75) (1997). See also Singleton v. State, 231 Ga.App. 694(3) (500 S.E.2d 411) (1998). ‘“No principle is better settled than that in the conduct of trials, both civil and criminal, a broad discretion is vested in the judge below, and that that discretion will not be controlled by this court unless it is manifestly abused.” [Cit.].’ Furlow v. State, 272 Ga. 795(2) (537 S.E.2d 61) (2000).” Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 597 S.E.2d 386 (June 7, 2004). “The assistant district attorney stated in regard to the testimony of the inmate that Robinson called to the stand, ‘I submit to you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that that piece doesn’t fit, because it’s absolutely a lie. Not only is he a thief himself, but he’s a liar, and he’s lied to you today from the witness stand. His story about what happened just does absolutely not fit, and you are authorized by the law to discount anything he has to say, based on the complete -- completely no corroboration for that fact. No one else in the jail was with him who heard that conversation, and it’s totally out of line with everything else that has gone on in this case. While it is improper for counsel to state to the jury his personal belief as to the veracity of a witness, it is entirely proper for ‘counsel to urge the jury to deduce such a conclusion from proven facts.’ Alexander v. State, 263 Ga. 474, 477(1)(d), 435 S.E.2d 187 (1993), quoting Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 618, 266 S.E.2d 218 (1980).” Accord, Fulton v. State , 278 Ga. 58, 597 S.E.2d 396 (June 7, 2004); Wright (February 11, 2013), above. Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004). Prosecutor’s “telling the jury during closing argument that the testimony of a state’s witness ‘sounds just like the truth to me. It’s got the ring of truth to it,’” was