☢ test - Í

improper, “[a]s the remark appears to express the prosecutor’s personal belief.” Compare Strickland (August 16, 2011), above. Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 502, 591 S.E.2d 784 (January 12, 2004). Murder and related convictions affirmed. “The prosecutor’s argument during closing that eyewitness Kuku had no reason to lie was in response to Allen’s testimony on cross examination that Kuku had lied; the comment did not constitute the prosecutor’s personal opinion regarding the veracity of the witness. [Cits.] Counsel may address during closing argument the possible motives for a witness’s testimony.” Mason v. State, 274 Ga. 79, 548 S.E.2d 298 (June 4, 2001). In his closing argument, the ADA asked the jury to consider the credibility of a certain witness, how that witness had been treated on the stand, and what incentive that witness had to lie. He then stated, “Logic. He’s telling you the truth. He’s telling you the honest truth.” The ADA also told the jury that defendant “must be stopped. It’s apparent that he’s not going to do it unless you stop him…Please, please stop him.” Held: The statements as to credibility “are permissible since they are the conclusion the prosecutor wished the jury to draw from the evidence, and not a statement of [his] personal belief as to the veracity of a witness.” However, the ADA’s “statement to the jury raising the specter of [defendant’s] future dangerousness was improper.” Cited, Simpson (November 17, 2006), above; Accord, Adams v. State , 283 Ga. 298, 658 S.E.2d 627 (March 10, 2008). Brooks v. State , 243 Ga.App. 246, 532 S.E.2d 763 (March 29, 2000). Simple battery conviction affirmed; no improper comment by prosecutor in closing argument. “We find no reversible error in the prosecutor's closing comment, ‘I think the evidence is abundantly sufficient for you to return your verdict to the charge of simple battery guilty against Mr. Dennis Brooks. Thank you.’ While the argument would have been better framed without the use of the pronoun ‘I,’ the prosecutor's comment cannot reasonably be taken as a personal opinion by the prosecutor as to Brooks' guilt. Viewing the prosecutor's closing argument as a whole, the argument about which Brooks complains was an inartful comment on the State's evidence as sufficient to support a finding of guilt, which is appropriate. ‘Although the prosecuting attorney is prohibited from stating his personal opinion, he may make permissible inferences from the evidence.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bowen v. State, 203 Ga.App. 371, 374, 417 S.E.2d 18 (1992); see also Hildebrand v. State, 209 Ga.App. 507, 509-510, 433 S.E.2d 443 (1993).” Accord, Davis v. State , 264 Ga.App. 128, 589 S.E.2d 700 (November 14, 2003). Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (July 6, 1999). Murder and related convictions affirmed. “ The State's argument that ‘no witnesses lied’ was in response to defense counsel's claim during guilt-innocence phase closing argument and sentencing phase opening statement that State witnesses had lied, and the comment did not constitute the prosecutor's personal opinion regarding the veracity of the witnesses. See Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 617(1), 266 S.E.2d 218 (1980) (while improper for counsel to state personal belief as to veracity of a witness, not improper for counsel to urge jury to deduce such a conclusion from the evidence).” Luke v. State, 236 Ga.App. 543, 512 S.E.2d 39 (February 8, 1999). Conviction reversed and new trial ordered where trial court overruled defendant’s objection to prosecutor’s closing argument that, if the defense was meritorious, “the judge would be done dismissed the case and we’d all be done gone home, because that ain’t the law.” Based on “ Washington v. State, 80 Ga.App. 415, 56 S.E.2d 119 (1949), where it was held to be error requiring the grant of a new trial for a trial court simply to overrule, without remedial instructions to the jury, the defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of the following language in his concluding argument to the jury: ‘If a case had not been made out against the defendant, then the court could and would have directed a verdict of not guilty.’” 23. CONTENT – READING THE LAW Brown v. State, 319 Ga.App. 680, 738 S.E.2d 132 (February 5, 2013). Rape and child molestation convictions affirmed; trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from arguing for statutory rape as a lesser-included offense of rape, since it isn’t. “it is the court's responsibility to charge the law. The trial court … properly determined that it would be inappropriate to allow Brown to argue in closing about a separate offense or indictment that was not before the jury for consideration.” Kirkland v. State, 271 Ga. 217, 518 S.E.2d 687 (June 14, 1999). No error where, “[d]uring closing argument, the State showed visual aids on which were written the text of expected legal instructions.” “[C]ounsel have every right to refer to applicable law in argument; it is law that the court will not charge the jury that counsel is prohibited from presenting. Id. at 570-571, 331 S.E.2d 532. See also Minter v. State, 266 Ga. 73, 74(2), 463 S.E.2d 119