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(1995); Kinsman v. State, 259 Ga. 89, 92(11), 376 S.E.2d 845 (1989). The practice of ‘reading the law’ has been abolished in Georgia, but ‘counsel may still discuss, or even argue, during closing arguments the law that will be included in the court's charge.’ Minter, supra. Kirkland does not contend that the law shown on the visual aids was misstated or different from that which the court charged to the jury.” Carley, writing for Fletcher and Sears, concurs specially: “Georgia case law also prohibits counsel from ‘reading the law’ to the jury, even if it is correct and applicable. ‘“Simply stated, the jury should receive law from the court and not from the attorneys.” [Cit.]’ Robinson v. State, 215 Ga.App. 125, 127(3), 449 S.E.2d 679 (1994). See also Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 570(10)(b), 331 S.E.2d 532 (1985).” Carley agrees that no error occurred here, however, because counsel’s visual aids contained no citations to statute or caselaw. Accord, Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010) (trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from arguing “the consequences if the jury was unable to reach a unanimous sentencing verdict.”); Amaya v. State , 308 Ga.App. 460, 708 S.E.2d 28 (March 16, 2011) (trial court properly denied objection to State’s closing argument, referring to applicable law). 24. CONTENT – REASONABLE DOUBT Allen v. State, 292 Ga.App. 133, 663 S.E.2d 370 (May 12, 2008). No abuse of discretion “in prohibiting [defendant’s] trial counsel from stating during his closing argument that ‘[u]nless you can honestly say, “yes, he did it,” without any reservations or any qualifications, then you must acquit.’ A trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine when arguments made by trial counsel are improper. See Woodham v. State, 263 Ga. 580(1)(a) (439 S.E.2d 471) (1993). Here, the trial court allowed Allen’s trial counsel to include a statement during his closing argument that ‘[u]nless you can honestly say without any reservations or qualifications that the State has proven [Allen] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must acquit.’ (Emphasis supplied). Given that the latter was closer to the applicable law (see OCGA § 16-1-5), we find no abuse of discretion.” Hayes v. State, 236 Ga.App. 617, 512 S.E.2d 294 (February 9, 1999). Trial court erroneously sustained prosecutor’s objection to defense closing argument, which contended that reasonable doubt existed in the case. “The prosecutor objected to the argument when Hayes’ counsel stated: ‘These are discrepancies and these items, these things are reasonable doubt.’ The court sustained the prosecutor’s objection that reasonable doubt is a determination to be made by the jury after instruction from the court and not to be made by defense counsel. While it is true that the trial court’s role is to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt and that the jury’s role is to determine whether guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the argument made by Hayes’ counsel was appropriate and did not invade the province of either the judge or the jury. ‘Counsel have every right to refer to applicable law during closing argument (i.e., law that the court is going to give in [the] charge.)’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 213 Ga.App. 113, 115(3), 443 S.E.2d 638 (1994). Here, Hayes’ counsel referred to the law of reasonable doubt and argued that the evidence proved the existence of such doubt. See Hendry v. State, 177 Ga.App. 439, 440(2), 339 S.E.2d 650 (1986). The trial court’s sustaining of the state’s objection to the argument was error.” Harmless, however, in light of “substantial evidence” of guilt and absence of transcript of entire argument. 25. CONTENT – SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY/”SEND A MESSAGE” Compare cases under subheading CLOSING ARGUMENT – CONTENT – FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS, above Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 770 S.E.2d 610 (March 16, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument wasn’t improper. Prosecutor argued that “‘[c]rime is a cancer that eats away at society,’ and that the jury should ‘stand in the way of injustice.’ [fn] Prosecutors are prohibited from injecting extrinsic and prejudicial statements which have no basis in the evidence into closing arguments. See Bell v. State, 263 Ga. 776, 777 (439 S.E.2d 480) (1994). However, general appeals to enforce the criminal law for the safety of the community have long been held by this Court to be within the bounds of permissible argument. See Spencer v. State, 287 Ga. 434, 439–440 (696 S.E.2d 617) (2010); Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 801, 804(8) (471 S.E.2d 191) (1996). Judged in the context in which they were made, we find the alleged offending remarks merely reflected the State's theory that the motive for the crime was vigilante justice and generally and properly appealed to the jury to enforce the law for the safety of the community.” Jones v. State, 318 Ga.App. 342, 733 S.E.2d 400 (October 19, 2012). Convictions for rape, aggravated sodomy, false imprisonment, and escape affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument wasn’t improper. Prosecutor told jurors “‘[y]ou were kind of put on the front lines in dealing with real life brutality, real life acts of violence. You can't just sit there[.]’ We do not interpret these statements as an impermissible comment on Jones's future dangerousness. Instead, the comments were proper because they were intended to appeal to the jury to convict Jones for the safety of the community or to curb an epidemic of violence in the community, and to emphasize to the jury its responsibility to enforce the law. See Clark v. State, 285 Ga.App. 182, 184(2) (645 S.E.2d 671) (2007).”