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error, however, in light overwhelming evidence of guilt and trial court’s instruction that closing arguments did not constitute evidence. Overruling a host of prior cases requiring counsel to request curative instructions, apparently including: Morrison v. State , 276 Ga. 829, 834(4), 583 S.E.2d 873 (2003); Kyler v. State , 270 Ga. 81, 82, 508 S.E.2d 152 (1998); Phillips v. State , 230 Ga. 444(1), 197 S.E.2d 720 (1973); Walley v. State , 298 Ga.App. 483, 485(2), 680 S.E.2d 550 (2009); Williams v. Terry , 197 Ga.App. 209, 210(3), 398 S.E.2d 239 (1990); Brooks v. State , 183 Ga. 466, 188 S.E. 711 (1936). Thompson, writing for Hunstein and Hines, dissents, based on stare decisis. Accord, Geiger v. State , 295 Ga. 190, 758 S.E.2d 808 (May 19, 2014) (trial court erred, but harmless, after sustaining objection to prosecutor’s reference to prior bad acts). Tidwell v. State, 306 Ga.App. 307, 701 S.E.2d 920 (October 1, 2010). Conviction for aggravated child molestation reversed on other grounds; defendant waived objection to closing argument by failing to object. “Tidwell argues that OCGA § 17-8-75 requires a judge sua sponte to prevent counsel from making improper arguments. ‘The statute, however, only requires the judge to act where counsel makes a timely objection. In this case, [Tidwell] did not object.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 245(6) (675 S.E.2d 28) (2009). Tidwell argues further that we should review the alleged errors under the ‘plain error’ doctrine. However, ‘[i]t is now well settled that the defendant's failure to object at trial regarding improper comments during closing arguments of a nondeath penalty case precludes this [C]ourt's consideration of alleged errors, even under the plain error doctrine.’ Hernandez v. State, 297 Ga.App. 177, 180(4) (676 S.E.2d 795) (2009).” Accord, Gates v. State , 298 Ga. 324, 781 S.E.2d 772 (January 19, 2016) (contrasting federal cases governed by “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), for which there is no Georgia state equivalent. See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400(II)(C)(4) (11 th Cir., 1997).”). Fradenburg v. State, 296 Ga.App. 860, 676 S.E.2d 25 (March 23, 2009). Defendant waived objection to prosecutor’s argument by failing to object until after argument was concluded. “‘The time to object to improper closing argument is when the impropriety occurs at trial.’ Mullins v. Thompson, 274 Ga. 366, 367 (553 S.E.2d 154) (2001). Our Supreme Court has rejected the notion that such a motion can be made after the closing argument; rather, the ‘motion must be made at the time the improper argument is uttered.’ Id. See also Butler v. State, 273 Ga. 380, 383-384(8) (541 S.E.2d 653) (2001). ‘Our Supreme Court has further held that “(w)hen no timely objection is interposed, the test for reversible error is not simply whether or not the argument is objectionable, or even if it might have contributed to the verdict; the test is whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial.” Todd v. State, [261 Ga. 766, 767(2)(a) (410 S.E.2d 725) (1991).]’ Heard v. State, 291 Ga.App. 550, 555(3) (662 S.E.2d 310) (2008).” Accord, Cowart v. State , 294 Ga. 333, 751 S.E.2d 399 (November 18, 2013). Mann v. State, 264 Ga.App. 631, 591 S.E.2d 495 (December 11, 2003). Kidnapping convictions affirmed on this issue. “‘In the appeal of a non-capital case in either appellate court, the defendant’s failure to object to the State’s closing argument waives his right to rely on the alleged impropriety of that argument as a basis for reversal,’” quoting Mullins (January 19, 1999), below. Accord, Powell (October 15, 2012), above. Overruled on other grounds, Kaiser v. State , 285 Ga.App. 63, 646 S.E.2d 84 (March 28, 2007). Boyd v. State, 275 Ga. 237, 564 S.E.2d 185 (May 28, 2002). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Motion for mistrial based on alleged improper argument by prosecutor was untimely when made after jury had retired to deliberate. Sutton v. State, 245 Ga.App. 881, 539 S.E.2d 227 (September 13, 2000). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; defendant waived objection to prosecutor’s closing argument by failing to make timely objection. “‘It is necessary to object to an alleged irregularity in an attorney’s closing argument at the time it is actually made, and failure to do so amounts to a waiver of any objection that might have been raised.’ (Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 191 Ga.App. 217, 218(2), 381 S.E.2d 399 (1989); see also Robbins v. State, 243 Ga.App. 21, 24(4), 532 S.E.2d 127 (2000).” Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450, 511 S.E.2d 165 (January 19, 1999). Malice murder and relatee convictions affirmed. Defendant’s failure to object to prosecutor’s closing argument waives any objection thereto in a non-capital prosecution. “Mullins nevertheless contends that the principle of waiver does not apply and that we must reverse his convictions if the prosecutor’s argument was improper and, in reasonable probability, changed the result of the trial. This ‘reasonable probability’ test applies only in the context of appellate review of a criminal case in which the death penalty was imposed. [Cits.]” Overrules numerous Court of Appeals decisions applying the “reasonable probability” test in non-capital cases. Accord, Neal v. State , 308 Ga.App. 551, 707 S.E.2d 503 (February 22, 2011).