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30. REBUKE OF COUNSEL New case! Cheley v. State, S16G0003, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2946385 (May 23, 2016). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in failing to rebuke prosecutor for alleged improper argument “that one of the jailhouse informants may have appeared nervous because ‘everybody’s heard the saying ... “snitches get stitches.”’ Even assuming that this argument was improper under OCGA § 17–8–75, it is well-established that a trial court has no duty to rebuke a prosecutor under that statute unless specifically requested by the defendant. See, e.g., Woodham v. State, 263 Ga. 580, 580(1)(a) ( 439 S.E.2d 471) (1993). Here, the trial court sustained Cheley’s objection to the argument at issue, and Cheley did not request a rebuke (or any other corrective action) after his objection was sustained. As a result, the trial court had no duty to rebuke the prosecuting attorney. Id.” Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed; error but no harm where trial court failed to rebuke prosecutor for sentencing phase argument outside scope of evidence where he suggested that defendant’s family members weren’t present because “they were ‘probably happy that he ain't around the house, and they got a lot of reasons—.‘” Harmless in light of “the brevity of the prosecutor's comment, the overwhelming evidence of Brockman's guilt, the evidence of Brockman's prior crimes, the fact that the trial court specifically pointed out to the jury that the prosecutor was commenting on matters not in evidence, and the fact that the trial court instructed the jury that the closing arguments of counsel did not constitute evidence.” 31. RECORDING Hampton v. State , 272 Ga. 284, 527 S.E.2d 872 (March 27, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court had no obligation to ensure “that opening statements and closing arguments were recorded. … [T]here is no requirement that the court take such action, see OCGA § 17-8-5(a), and it does not appear that Hampton ever requested that the reporter record the statements and arguments.” Accord, Baggs v. State , 265 Ga.App. 282, 593 S.E.2d 734 (January 26, 2004). Cox v. State, 242 Ga.App. 334, 528 S.E.2d 871 (January 28, 2000). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed; where closing argument is not recorded, defendant must supplement the record as provided in OCGA § 5-6-41 to preserve any argument related thereto on appeal. Defendant failed to do so here. Accord, Parrott v. State , 330 Ga.App. 801, 769 S.E.2d 549 (March 2, 2015). 32. RIGHT TO OPEN AND CONCLUDE See also WITNESSES – CROSS EXAMINATION , below Johnson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 724, 644 S.E.2d 544 (March 30, 2007). “Johnson contends the trial court erred by requiring him to introduce a certified copy of the victim’s prior conviction, with the resulting loss of final closing argument, or forego questioning her about her probationary status, thus denying him rights guaranteed by the United States and Georgia Constitutions. We agree, but find that given the overwhelming evidence against Johnson, it is highly probable that this error did not contribute to the judgment.” Chandler v. State, 281 Ga. 712, 642 S.E.2d 646 (March 19, 2007). Provisions of Criminal Justice Act of 2005 changing order of closing arguments could be applied retroactively without violating constitutional ex post facto prohibition. “At the time of Chandler’s crimes, a defendant who did not introduce evidence was entitled to make first and last closing arguments to the jury; now the State does so regardless of whether the defendant presents evidence. See OCGA § 17-8-71; Ga. L.2005, p. 20, § 10. Chandler asserts that the statute thus deprived him of an option he would have enjoyed under the prior law, and notes that this option has been described as ‘an “extremely valuable” right.’ Moreland v. State, 263 Ga.App. 585, 588(4) (588 S.E.2d 785) (2002). However, the formerly-available option to refrain from introducing evidence by the defense in order to gain the order of argument desired has been termed ‘valuable’ in reference to evaluating the reasonableness of defense counsel's strategy when a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been made. Id. See, e.g., Dewberry v. State, 271 Ga. 624, 625(2) (523 S.E.2d 26) (1999). It is not the sort of ‘substantial right’ the deprivation of which the ex post facto clause protects against. Rather, ‘[t]he changes effected by the enactment constituted merely an alteration in the conditions deemed necessary for the orderly and just conduct of criminal trials and did not deprive the defendant of any substantial personal right within the meaning of the constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws.’ Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 752 (187 S.E.2d 831) (1972) (Citation omitted).” Accord, Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). Warren v. State, 281 Ga.App. 490, 636 S.E.2d 671 (August 25, 2006). Trial court properly overruled defendant’s