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objection when prosecutor made “nonsubstantive” opening argument . Based on OCGA § 17-8-71 as amended July 1, 2005. Defendant’s argument is based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.1 which reads: “[c]losing arguments proceed in the following order: (1) the government argues; (2) the defense argues; and (3) the government rebuts.” By comparison, the amended Georgia statute reads: “After the evidence is closed on both sides, the prosecuting attorney shall open and conclude the argument to the jury. The defendant shall be entitled to make a closing argument prior to the concluding argument of the prosecuting attorney.” The Court of Appeals panel finds merit in defendant’s argument, but finds binding contrary precedent in Bradham v. State , 243 Ga. 638, 256 S.E.2d 331 (1979). “The state’s strategy of making a nonsubstantive initial closing argument presents a number of problems. First and foremost of these is the language of the statute itself, which mandates that ‘the prosecuting attorney shall open and conclude the argument to the jury,’ not that the prosecutor may choose either or both as she prefers. We also note that the state’s initial closing in this case did not set out a legal argument – that is, ‘at a minimum, a discussion of the appropriate law as applied to the relevant facts.’ Dixon v. MARTA, 242 Ga.App. 262, 266(4) (529 S.E.2d 398) (2000). Finally, we agree that when the party with the burden of proof – the state – is not required to articulate its theory of the case at the close of the evidence, the defendant is put at an unfair disadvantage because he is forced to respond to an argument that has not yet been made by the party with the burden of proof. In Bradham v. State, [cit.] however, decided more than 25 years ago, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it allows the state not only to waive its initial closing argument, but also to ‘make a full presentation regarding the legal and factual facets of [its] case to the jury following the final argument of the adverse party.’ Id. at 639(2) (emphasis added).” Accord, English v. State , 282 Ga.App. 552, 639 S.E.2d 551 (November 27, 2006); Lewis v. State , 283 Ga. 191, 657 S.E.2d 854 (February 25, 2008) ( citing both Warren and Bradham with approval) ; Petty v. State , 283 Ga. 268, 658 S.E.2d 599 (March 10, 2008) ( citing Bradham and Lewis ); Lewis v. State , 292 Ga.App. 257, 663 S.E.2d 721 (May 27, 2008) ( citing English and Warren) . Manders v. State, 280 Ga.App. 742, 634 S.E.2d 773 (June 16, 2006). No error where trial court arbitrarily gave final closing argument to Manders’s co-defendant, who used it to issue “a veritable torrent of blame that sought repeatedly to incriminate [Manders].” Citing cases holding that co-defendants not entitled to severance merely because of antagonistic defenses: Chapman v. State , 263 Ga.App. 393, 435 S.E.2d 202 (1993); Robinson v. State , 164 Ga.App. 652, 297 S.E.2d 751 (1982). Long v. State, 271 Ga.App. 565, 610 S.E.2d 74 (December 6, 2004). Defendant lost right to open and conclude closing argument by passing up the chance to cross-examine the arresting officer during the State’s case, then recalling the officer for purposes of cross-examination after State rested. “‘The defendant in a criminal case may under some circumstances recall to the stand a witness who has been introduced and has testified in behalf of the State, without forfeiting his right to conclude the argument; but to avoid a forfeiture of the right to conclude, he must distinctly inform the presiding judge as to the reason why he did not conclude his examination of the witness while the witness was on the stand. The court must have an opportunity of determining the validity of the reason given, and of ruling thereon,’ (Punctuation omitted.)” quoting Maddox v. State , 174 Ga.App. 728, 730-731, 330 S.E.2d 911 (1985). “Long concedes that the trial court had discretion to deny her request to call Wells for the purpose of cross-examination, but contends that once the court granted the request, it abused its discretion by denying her the right to concluding argument.” Defendant, however, misunderstands Maddox : “That holding applies to cases in which counsel had a reason to recall a witness to the stand because he ‘did not conclude his examination of the witness while the witness was on the stand;’ it has no application to cases such as the present one in which a defendant calls a witness to the stand and first questions that witness in the presentation of her own case.” Thompson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 696, 595 S.E.2d 377 (February 19, 2004). “Thompson’s attorney used a number of witnesses’ prior statements in cross-examination, but he did not read or direct a witness to read any portion of the statements into the record. Rather, he used the statements to question witnesses about what they had and had not told police at the time of the incident. In one instance, for example, Clifton Hall testified in connection with a separate aggravated assault charge on which Thompson’s jury deadlocked. Before asking Hall any questions on cross-examination, Thompson’s attorney asked him to read his prior written statement to himself ‘to refresh your recollection.’ Hall read the document silently without reading it aloud to the jury. The attorney then had Hall verify the date of the statement and questioned him as to whether he had included any descriptive information – such s height, weight, clothing or complexion – about the man who had allegedly committed the assault. The attorney marked the statement as a defense exhibit for identification purposes, but never introduced it into evidence. Although Thompson contends that the use of Hall’s statement was for impeachment purposes only, we find that trial counsel used the statement for more than mere impeachment. He used it to introduce substantive evidence about what was not included in the written document. Hall never testified that he gave a description of the alleged assailant to police. By having Hall read the statement in its