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Felder v. State, 260 Ga.App. 27, 579 S.E.2d 28 (February 12, 2003). “[B]y playing for the jury an audiotape of his complete statement to police, Felder waived his right to open and close final arguments.” Citing Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 403-404(4), 480 S.E.2d 1 (1996). Tanner v. State, 259 Ga.App. 94, 576 S.E.2d 71 (January 9, 2003). Defendant “lost the right to open and conclude closing argument by calling witnesses to rebut the similar transaction testimony introduced by the state… ‘The right to open and conclude closing argument is the constitutional right of the State. It is not a right of the defendant, but is only a privilege, or a compensation so to speak, which is given when he chooses not to introduce evidence. The criminal defendant of course has no burden of proof and no obligation to introduce evidence, and the fact that he has a right to introduce evidence does not allow him both to introduce evidence and to claim a right to open and conclude closing argument; and the particular reason he chooses to invoke his right to introduce evidence, including the necessity of rebuttal, does not control whether he may open and conclude argument under OCGA § 17-8-71’” (emphasis in original). Harrison v. State, 251 Ga.App. 302, 553 S.E.2d 343 (August 1, 2001). During presentation of the state’s case, defense counsel asked the police officer to read portions of the defendant’s statement that were not impeaching of the officer’s direct testimony. The trial court ruled that this cost defendant the right to opening and concluding argument. Court of Appeals affirmed based on Smith v. State , 272 Ga. 874, 878 (3) (2000): “(1) If, under the guise of cross-examination, a defendant reads from the portions of a prior written statement of a witness that are not related to impeaching the witness, the defendant has effectively introduced evidence to the jury that should have been formally offered into evidence and the defendant therefore loses the right to open and close final arguments; (2) if a defendant reads only the portions of the prior written statement of a witness that are relevant to impeaching the witness, the defendant has not introduced evidence and does not lose the right to open and close; (3) if a defendant, in impeaching a witness with a prior inconsistent statement, voluntarily introduces the statement into evidence in order to make it a part of the record, the defendant has introduced evidence and has lost the right to open and close final arguments.” Williams v. State, 236 Ga.App. 351, 511 S.E.2d 910 (February 9, 1999). “‘If one defendant offers evidence in the trial of co-defendants, the right to make the closing argument is lost to all defendants, even those introducing no evidence, for the reason stated in Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331(10), 271 S.E.2d 478 (1980),’” quoting McDuffie v. Jones, 248 Ga. 544, 546(2), 283 S.E.2d 601 (1981). “In our view, when the co-defendant in the case sub judice attempted impeachment of the co-indictee during cross-examination by tendering into evidence the entire written statement of that witness, this amounted to the introduction of substantive evidence by the co-defendant for purposes of OCGA § 17-8-71. Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 403(4), 480 S.E.2d 1 (1996).” E. CONFLICT NOTICES Trimble v. State, 274 Ga.App. 536, 618 S.E.2d 163 (July 21, 2005) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). “The trial court did not err when it denied Trimble’s motions [without hearing] on the ground that new counsel’s conflict letter failed to comply with Uniform Superior Court Rule 17.1. See Withrow v. Withrow, 278 Ga. 525, 525-526(1) (603 S.E.2d 276) (2004) (prioritization of cases under Rule 17.1 cannot be changed without agreement of presiding judge in each case); Jones v. State, 276 Ga. 171, 173 (575 S.E.2d 456) (2003) (unauthorized request for leave of absence amounts to waiver of right to hearing on motion for new trial).” F. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST See subheading INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – Edwards v. State, A16A0532, ___ Ga.App. ___, 784 S.E.2d 924, 2016 WL 1237364 (March 30, 2016). Physical precedent only. In defendant’s prosecution for rape and child molestation, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on double jeopardy. Trial court properly disqualified trial counsel and granted mistrial based on manifest necessity after concluding that defense counsel had a conflict of interest. Counsel had previously represented victim’s mother, who was expected to testify for the State. Counsel advised the court that he had confidential information as a result of that representation which would seriously impeach the mother’s credibility. Defendant consented to waive the conflict, but former client wasn’t consulted. “The record supports the trial court’s refusal to accept Edwards’s attempted waiver of his defense counsel’s conflict of interest, and the court’s conclusion that an actual or serious potential conflict of interest required disqualification of defense counsel. Although Edwards had an interest in continuing to be represented by his public defender defense counsel, who investigated and prepared his case for trial, ‘a defendant does not have a right to be represented by an attorney who is ethically prohibited from doing so, most commonly due to a conflict of interest.’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, below G. DISQUALIFICATION/REMOVAL