☢ test - Í

Registe v. State, 287 Ga. 542, 544, 697 S.E.2d 804 (2010).” Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 requires consent to the representation by both the current and former clients. “There was no consent from the victim’s mother. Apart from the lack of consent from defense counsel’s former client, the consent obtained from Edwards was not ‘informed consent’ pursuant to the requirements in subsection (b)(1)-(3), which require that consent be confirmed in writing, after consultation with the lawyer, after receiving in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and available alternatives to the representation, and after being given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. Although the record before the trial court showed that Edwards consulted with his defense counsel about the conflict prior to the trial court’s ruling, nothing was presented to the court prior to the ruling showing that Edwards consented in writing, received the required information in writing about risks and alternatives, or had the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. Evidence that, during Edwards’s initial consultation with his public defender defense counsel, he consulted with another public defender from the same office, did not satisfy the requirement for an opportunity to consult with independent counsel. See In re Formal Advisory Opinion 10–1, 293 Ga. 397, 398, 744 S.E.2d 798 (2013). The written waiver filed by Edwards over five months after the trial court rejected the oral waiver and disqualified defense counsel was untimely and failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 1.7(b).” Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in removal of defendant’s original appointed counsel. Defendant originally pled guilty and waived jury trial for sentencing purposes, but when trial judge then sentenced him to death, counsel moved for a new trial and recusal of the original judge on grounds that she had promised counsel that she wouldn’t impose death. The original judge was then recused and the new judge, on State’s motion, removed defense counsel in consideration of the need for them to testify regarding their conversation with the original trial judge. The need for counsel’s testimony was mooted by grant of the defense motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but no motion to restore them to defendant’s representation was ever made. 1. “‘An indigent defendant has no right to compel the trial court to appoint an attorney of his own choosing. The choice of appointed counsel is a matter governed by the trial court’s sound exercise of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless abused. However, when a defendant’s choice of counsel is supported by objective considerations favoring the appointment of the preferred counsel, and there are no countervailing considerations of comparable weight, it is an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant’s request to appoint the counsel of his preference.’ Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 222, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991) (citations omitted). One of the objective considerations favoring the appointment of a defendant’s counsel of choice is counsel’s ‘long-standing relationship with the defendant, who they contend is in a fragile state of mental health.’ Id. (addressing a defendant’s desire to retain counsel who had represented him in his previous trial in the same matter). See also Amadeo v. State, 259 Ga. 469, 384 S.E.2d 181 (1989) (same). Here, it is clear that Martin wished to have his original trial counsel continue representing him, and Martin’s long previous relationship with them, which included their investigating and litigating the issue of his alleged mental illness, was clearly an objective consideration favoring their continued representation.” 2. Countervailing considerations of comparable weight existed here, however, in the apparent need for counsel to testify at motion for new trial. The attorneys were necessary witnesses, in fact, “the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers.” 3. This was not a circumstance where counsel could testify while continuing to represent defendant. “This Court has recognized that a lawyer is more likely to act ethically in serving as both a witness and an advocate if his or her testimony relates to merely formal matters, but this factor clearly did not weigh in Martin’s favor, because the lawyers’ anticipated testimony concerned a critical and disputed matter,” citing McLaughlin v. Payne, 295 Ga. 609, 611, 761 S.E.2d 289 (2014). “A lawyer is more likely to be allowed to testify and remain as an advocate where the need for his or her testimony is unexpected or occurs when a change in counsel would be disruptive to the proceedings. See id. at 611 n. 2; Pulte Home Corp. v. Simerly, 322 Ga.App. 699, 702–703, 746 S.E.2d 173 (2013) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until ‘only weeks prior to trial’). … A lawyer is also more likely to be allowed to serve as a witness and an advocate where his or her testimony concerns collateral matters heard outside the main trial, such as rebuttal testimony regarding a deal allegedly made by a prosecutor. See Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 26(36), 560 S.E.2d 663 (2002). This case involved the extraordinary circumstance where the presiding judge anticipated that he would have the duty to ensure the proper advocacy of Martin’s original lawyers as they took turns questioning one another as witnesses, to ensure the proper advocacy of those lawyers as they argued in favor of their own credibility as witnesses on a crucial issue, and to assess the credibility of those lawyers as witnesses against the credibility of a superior court judge. In light of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling, … that the relevant ethical rule justified the disqualification of Martin’s original lawyers.” 4. “FN8: The possibility that Martin’s original counsel could be disqualified solely for the purpose of the litigation of Martin’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on the alleged promise was also never raised by either his original counsel before their disqualification or by his new counsel. Instead,