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the parties presented the matter of the possible disqualification of Martin’s original counsel to the presiding judge as an all-or-nothing proposition. In that vein, we note that there is an important difference between a situation where a lawyer is prohibited from serving as a witness and an advocate and a situation where a lawyer has some complete disqualification from a case, such as that caused by a conflict of interest. See McLaughlin v. Payne, 295 Ga. 609, 611, 761 S.E.2d 289 (2014).” 5. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, OCGA § 24-9-25 has no bearing here, because that code section only prohibited counsel from testifying as to “any matter or thing, the knowledge of which he may have acquired from his client by virtue of his employment as attorney or by reason of the anticipated employment of him as attorney.” McLaughlin v. Payne, 295 Ga. 609, 761 S.E.2d 289 (July 11, 2014). Following conviction for child molestation and related offenses, habeas court properly granted relief; district attorney’s personal interest in the prosecution disqualified his entire staff, not just the DA himself. DA disqualified himself because the victim was a friend and classmate of his daughter’s; DA then testified at trial as a witness for the State. 1. DA’s role as a witness, alone, did not disqualify the rest of his staff. “It has been recognized that, if an attorney will appear at trial as a ‘necessary witness’ under Rule 3.7(a), disqualification of that attorney as trial counsel is appropriate. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga.App. 129, 132–133(1), 616 S.E.2d 888 (2005).” But [w]hen an attorney is precluded from ‘act[ing] as advocate at a trial’ under Rule 3.7(a) because he is a necessary witness, his status is not automatically imputed to other attorneys in his office, although the circumstances may leave the other attorneys with their own disqualifications. ‘A lawyer may act as an advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.’ Ga. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(b).” This rule generally applies to District Attorneys, according to Brown v. State , 261 Ga. 66, 72(9), 401 S.E.2d 492 (1991): “The trial court did not err by denying Brown's motion to recuse the entire office of the district attorney simply because the district attorney himself, who was a witness in the case, was disqualified. Holiday v. State, 258 Ga. 393(9), 369 S.E.2d 241 (1988); Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690(9), 362 S.E.2d 351 (1987).” 2. District Attorney’s personal involvement in the case did disqualify his staff. “When the elected district attorney is wholly disqualified from a case, the assistant district attorneys—whose only power to prosecute a case is derived from the constitutional authority of the district attorney who appointed them—have no authority to proceed. While the statutory law permits the chief assistant district attorney to temporarily accept the powers and duties of the elected district attorney in the event that the elected district attorney is physically disabled, mentally disabled, or temporarily absent from the circuit, see OCGA § 15–18–15(b)(1)–(3), in the event that the elected district attorney is wholly disqualified, the statutes contemplate something else,” namely, appointment of a substitute prosecutor by the Attorney General. “This Court has recognized that ‘a Georgia district attorney is of counsel in all criminal cases or matters pending in his circuit. This includes the investigatory stages of matters preparatory to the seeking of an indictment as well as the pendency of the case. [Cit.]’ King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 389(7), 271 S.E.2d 630 (1980). And, for a prosecutor to have a conflict in such a case is contrary to public policy, and can warrant a new trial. See Lane v. State, 238 Ga. 407, 408– 410(4), 233 S.E.2d 375 (1977). See also Clifton v. State, 187 Ga. 502, 504(1), 2 S.E.2d 102 (1939).” “The habeas court's finding that McDade had a personal interest in the prosecution was supported in the record. As the habeas court noted, McDade testified before the jury that his conversation with his daughter was ‘very troubling,’ and that his daughter's conversation with the victim was emotional. McDade described his relationship with his daughter as very close, and her as an emotional person; he testified that his daughter's concern caused him to pay particular attention to the situation, and that he was ‘concerned that she's concerned.’” Ferguson v. State, 294 Ga. 484, 754 S.E.2d 76 (January 21, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to disqualify district attorney’s office “from participating in [defendant’s] motion for new trial hearing because one of the attorneys who worked in that office at the time of the motion for new trial hearing had previously represented Ferguson in 2005. … [T]he record reveals that Ferguson ended [attorney] Whitaker’s brief representation of him by hiring new defense counsel for his 2005 and 2006 trials. Moreover, there is no evidence of record that Whitaker had any involvement with Ferguson’s case after being hired by the District Attorney’s office, nor that the attorneys who worked on the case at the District Attorney’s office ever discussed any aspect of the case with Whitaker. We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Ferguson failed to provide any basis for excluding the [District Attorney’s] office from participating in the motion for new trial hearing. See, e.g., Frazier v. State , 257 Ga. 690 (9), 362 S.E.2d 351 (1987). See also Ga. R. & Regs. St. Bar 1.11, Comment 9 (Although State Bar Rule 1.11(c)(1) prohibits ‘a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee [from] participat[ing] in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice,’ the Rule ‘does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated’).” Heidt v. State, 292 Ga. 343, 736 S.E.2d 384 (January 7, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in disqualifying defense counsel who also represented co-defendant. “Although Heidt claims that both he and Robin