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weapon.” This statute does not require the use of a gun containing ammunition. In fact, the State does not have to prove that the gun was loaded. See Moody v. State, 216 Ga. 192, 193(2), 115 S.E.2d 526 (1960). Additionally, the statute does not require that the defendant had the intent to commit armed robbery, but merely that the defendant had the intent to commit theft and did so with an offensive weapon ‘or [any] device having the appearance of such weapon.’” 2. CHOP SHOP ACT Maclin v. State, 287 Ga.App. 220, 651 S.E.2d 138 (August 10, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for operating a chop shop. “The accusation charged that Maclin violated OCGA § 16-8-83 by ‘knowingly and with intent [sold] a motor vehicle, to wit: a 1987 Buick Regal from a location ... knowing it to be a chop shop.’ The Motor Vehicle Chop Shop and Stolen and Altered Property Act (‘Chop Shop Act’) prohibits a person from knowingly and intentionally selling, transferring, purchasing, or receiving ‘any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part either to or from a location knowing it to be a chop shop.’ OCGA § 16-8-83(a)(3). The evidence was sufficient to support Maclin’s conviction for violating the Chop Shop Act. By his own admission, Maclin stored a vehicle that he did not own and sold it to another individual. When Maclin obtained the automobile, it had a drive-out tag, the steering column had been replaced, and the door lock was missing. Moreover, the person who provided the vehicle to Maclin had no proof of ownership. When Maclin sold the automobile to Rogowski, multiple parts were missing and there was a discrepancy in the VIN located in windshield and the VIN found on the engine. Finally, Maclin admitted that he removed parts of the engine and failed to replace them before he sold the automobile to Rogowski.” 3. ENTERING AN AUTO State v. Clements, 289 Ga. 640, 715 S.E.2d 59 (September 12, 2011). After convictions for felony murder and related offenses, trial court erred in granting motion for new trial on entering automobile count, based on lack of evidence. “The victim's pocketbook was found in her car, her billfold was missing along with her driver's license and bank cards, and Clements was videotaped using the victim's ATM card to withdraw money from her bank account shortly after her death. This evidence supports the reasonable inference that Clements entered the victim's car and took her billfold from the inside of her pocketbook so as to gain access to her ATM card and make the bank withdrawals .” Neslein v. State, 288 Ga.App. 234, 653 S.E.2d 825 (November 5, 2007). Convictions for entering an auto and theft by taking did not merge as a matter of law or fact. Entering an auto “does not require that property actually be taken; it demands only entry with intent to commit theft or a felony. … Different facts, particularly the removal of various items from outside and inside the car, support the theft by taking charge.” Disinguishing Woods (September 1, 2005), below , where “offense of entering automobile with intent to commit theft merged into theft by taking charge where facts used to establish theft of computer from victim’s vehicle were also used to establish unlawful entry into the vehicle.” Woods v. State, 275 Ga.App. 340, 620 S.E.2d 609 (September 1, 2005). Charge of theft by taking should have merged with related charge of entering an auto. Sledge v. State, 245 Ga.App. 488, 537 S.E.2d 753 (July 24, 2000). Two years after guilty pleas to three counts of entering an auto, trial court properly denied motion to modify sentence; contrary to defendant’s arguments, the offenses didn’t merge, so the sentences weren’t void. “In Kinney v. State, 234 Ga.App. 5, 7(2), 505 S.E.2d 553 (1998), we stated that ‘a trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction to sentence on an offense that has merged into another offense as a matter of law and/or fact. Such a sentence would be a mere nullity because the conviction on a merged offense is against the law.’” Distinguishing Breland v. State, 135 Ga.App. 478, 479(1)(b), 218 S.E.2d 153 (1975) (theft of two trucks at same time from same victim constituted one offense). “Because the definition of entering an automobile is not defined by reference to property of another,[fn] entering more than one automobile owned by the same person can support multiple convictions. As a result, Sledge's convictions for entering three automobiles owned by the same person did not merge, his sentence was not void, and the trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to modify Sledge's sentence.” Palmer v. State , 243 Ga.App. 656, 533 S.E.2d 802 (April 18, 2000). Conviction for entering an auto with intent to commit theft affirmed. “Contrary to Palmer's contention, the state was not required to prove intent to commit theft by showing that valuables were present in the vehicle or that he admitted breaking into an area of the vehicle in which valuables might be stored. While evidence that valuables were present in the area of the auto entered is sufficient to support a finding of the requisite intent, lack of such evidence does not mean that there is no evidence from which intent may be inferred. See Heflin v. State, 183 Ga.App. 149, 150(2), 358 S.E.2d 298 (1987). Certainly, intent may be inferred from evidence that valuables were present or that the defendant admitted breaking into an area of a car in