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which valuables might be stored. See Pound v. State, 230 Ga.App. 467, 468(2), 496 S.E.2d 769 (1998). However, criminal intent may also be inferred from other evidence. Intent may be found by the jury upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is being prosecuted. Smith v. State, 188 Ga.App. 415, 416(1), 373 S.E.2d 97 (1988). Whether a defendant has the requisite intent to commit a crime is a question for the jury. Mills v. State, 198 Ga.App. 527, 529(2), 402 S.E.2d 123 (1991).” 4. INTENT TO CHEAT OR DEFRAUD A RETAILER Cooper v. State, 299 Ga.App. 199, 682 S.E.2d 154 (July 15, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for intent to defraud a retailer under OCGA § 16-8-17(a)(1) despite defendant’s contention that State failed to prove that Wal-Mart is a “retailer.” “Cooper's defense consisted of the testimony of his girlfriend, who admitted that she went to Wal-Mart several days before the incident in question and purchased, for her personal use, a vacuum cleaner, steam carpet cleaner, and carpet cleaning solution. She also acknowledged that Cooper was using her receipt from that transaction to return the items in his cart. The girlfriend claimed, however, that the items Cooper sought to return were, in fact, the very items that she had previously purchased at Wal-Mart . She explained that she had brought those items into the store to return after dropping Cooper off at the garden center entrance, so that he could price bicycles in the store for their daughter. She then met Cooper at the customer service desk and left him with the receipt and the items to make the return, because she needed to do some grocery shopping at Wal-Mart. She further testified that she purchased food while at Wal-Mart before returning to the customer service desk to look for Cooper.” (Italics in original.) 5. PIRATED COPYRIGHT MATERIALS Briggs v. State, 281 Ga. 329, 638 S.E.2d 292 (November 29, 2006). “OCGA § 16-8-60(b), which criminalizes the possession and distribution of sounds or images in violation of copyright protection,” is neither “(1) unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, or (2) preempted by federal copyright law.” As to vagueness: “the phrase ‘transferor of the sounds or visual images,’ found in OCGA § 16-8-60(b),” is not vague, although not defined in the statute. “A ‘transferor’ is one who conveys title or property to another. Black’s Law Dictionary (6 th ed., 1990). In the context of the statute, a ‘transferor of the sounds’ is the individual who conveyed the sounds by transferring them to the article in question. Thus, the statute plainly prohibits the sale, or possession for the purposes of sale, of an article that does not prominently display the name and address of the individual (or entity) who transferred the sounds to the article. The ‘prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness for “in most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” ... All the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden,’” quoting Lindsey v. State, 277 Ga. 772, 773 (596 S.E.2d 140) (2004). As to overbreadth : plurality finds that the statute does not impinge on pure speech. “At most, the statute regulates a combination of commercial conduct and speech.” “‘Under the test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U .S. 367, 376 (88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672) (1968), the government may regulate conduct that may have both speech and ‘nonspeech’ elements if the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest.’ State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (398 S.E.2d 547) (1990). OCGA § 16-8-60(b) meets the O'Brien test. It aims to protect the public and entertainment industry from piracy and bootlegging, a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to free speech concerns. To the extent that it can be said that it curtails an artist’s or transferor’s desire to remain anonymous, [fn] its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is minimal. Compare Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827 (400 S.E.2d 916) (1991) (statute banning motor vehicle decal containing profane words substantially affects protected speech) with State v. Miller, supra (anti-mask law does not affect a substantial amount of innocent behavior). The statute is not, therefore, overbroad.” Hunstein and Carley concur specially to say that the statute as written is overbroad in that it facially applies to protected speech, but the “palpable” intent of the legislature enables the Court to interpret the statute to apply only to pirated, copyrighted materials. Melton, also writing for Sears, dissents, arguing that the statute is overbroad and cannot be rescued by judicial interpretation. As to preemption : “State law rights that are the equivalent of those protected under the federal copyright law are preempted. 17 USCA § 301. To determine whether a state law is the equivalent of the federal copyright law, the courts often apply what has become known as Nimmer’s [footnote: See Nimmer, The Law of Copyright, § 1.01] ‘extra-element’ test: ‘[A] right which is “equivalent to copyright” is one which is infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display.... If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, ... will in itself infringe the state created right, then such right is preempted. But if other elements are required, in addition to or instead of, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state created cause of action, then the right does not lie “within the general scope of copyright,” and there is no preemption.’ Collezione Europa U.S.A. v. Hillsdale House, 243 F.Supp.2d 444, 449 (M.D.N.C. 2003). The statute in question, OCGA § 16-8-60(b), criminalizes the sale, or the possession for purposes