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of sale, of recordings which do not carry a label identifying the ‘transferor’ of the sounds, regardless of their copyright status. The statute does not criminalize unauthorized copyrighted works. The federal copyright law, on the other hand, protects the exclusive right of the copyright owner to reproduce, perform, distribute or display the copyrighted work. See 17 USCA § 106. Thus, the Georgia statute contains an extra element – i.e., labeling – which qualitatively distinguishes it from federal copyright law and saves it from preemption. See Anderson v. Nidorf, [26 F.3d 100 (9th Cir., 1994)] (California statute prohibiting sale of recordings without disclosing manufacturer and author was not preempted by federal copyright law).” 6. POSSESSION OF MOTOR VEHICLE WITH ALTERED/REMOVED VIN Jarrett v. State, 299 Ga.App. 525, 683 S.E.2d 116 (August 5, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of motor vehicle with removed VIN. “OCGA § 16-8-83(c)(1) provides that ‘[a]ny person who ... possesses a motor vehicle ... with knowledge that the vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle ... has been altered, counterfeited, defaced, destroyed, disguised, falsified, forged, obliterated, or removed shall be guilty of a felony.’ The crux of the offense is guilty knowledge of the alteration or removal of the VIN number, which may be proved by circumstantial evidence. McJunkin v. State, 160 Ga.App. 30, 32(2) (285 S.E.2d 756) (1981); Dooley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 539(2) (244 S.E.2d 55) (1978). … ‘The circumstances, the time, the secrecy, all the transactions before, at the time and afterwards, may be brought to bear upon what was the knowledge of the [possessor].’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McJunkin, supra. Here there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Jarrett possessed the stolen vehicles with knowledge that the true VIN numbers had been removed.” 7. ROBBERY Smith v. State, 335 Ga.App. 639, 781 S.E.2d 400 (January 25, 2016). Smith’s guilty pleas to robbery and theft by receiving stolen property vacated, as the offenses were mutually exclusive, a defense which the guilty pleas didn’t waive. Smith v. State, 333 Ga.App. 256, 775 S.E.2d 735 (July 16, 2015). Convictions for robbery by intimidation affirmed. 1. Evidence proved element of intimidation. “‘Intimidation is that terror likely to create an apprehension of danger, and induce a person to part with his property for the safety of his person. Intimidation is that act by the perpetrator which puts the person robbed in fear sufficient to suspend the free exercise of his will or prevent resistance to the taking. A threat by a perpetrator to inflict harm constitutes the requisite force or intimidation if that threat of harm induces the victim/possessor of property to relinquish possession. ’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis added.) Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 329–330(1)(b), 588 S.E.2d 722 (2003).” Note warning that defendant “was willing to kill everyone in the bank for the money” and that he had a gun was sufficient to establish intimidation. 2. Pattern jury charge on robbery by intimidation is accurate statement of law. Simon v. State, 328 Ga.App. 6, 761 S.E.2d 468 (July 8, 2014) (Physical precedent only). Evidence didn’t support conviction for robbery by intimidation where the victims “were unaware that Simon had taken anything from the store.” “[W]hile the Joneses may have been afraid of Simon based on his threats or actions, the evidence does not show that they parted with the matches on account of such fear.” “‘A conviction for robbery by intimidation requires proof that the theft was attended with such circumstances of terror-such threatening by word or gesture, as in common experience, are likely to create an apprehension of danger, and induce a person to part with his property for the safety of his person.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith [ v. State, 247 Ga.App. 173, 174 543 S.E.2d 434 (2000)].” Copeland v. State, 325 Ga.App. 668, 754 S.E.2d 636 (February 6, 2014). Robbery by sudden snatching and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge on theft by taking as a lesser-included offense. While theft by taking is a lesser-included offense of robbery by sudden snatching, “the defense, as we can discern from the record, was that another individual committed the crime. Where ‘the evidence shows either the commission of the completed offense as charged, or the commission of no offense, the trial court is not required to charge the jury on a lesser included offense.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 577–578(2) (669 S.E.2d 133) (2008).” Cooks v. State, 325 Ga.App. 426, 750 S.E.2d 765 (November 18, 2013). Robbery conviction reversed; trial court erred by denying general demurrer. Indictment failed to allege that defendant took property of another from victim. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga.App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (June 30, 2010). Defendant’s robbery conviction affirmed; evidence was sufficient to convict defendant as party to the crime. 1. “Boggs's admission that he was present at the scene of the robbery, in conjunction with his possession of the recently stolen backpack, which the jury could find was unsatisfactorily explained by Boggs, was sufficient to support his robbery conviction. See Thomas v. State, 256 Ga.App. 712, 713-714(1)