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Zachery v. State, 241 Ga.App. 722, 527 S.E.2d 601 (January 6, 2000). Robbery conviction affirmed; “‘Robbery is a crime against possession, and is not affected by concepts of ownership. Similarly, one may only rob a person, and not a corporate entity....’ Creecy v. State, 235 Ga. 542, 544(5), 221 S.E.2d 17 (1975). Because Zachery took sums of money belonging to both Little Caesar's and Wilson from only one victim, Wilson, only one robbery occurred .” Trial court thus properly imposed only one sentence, although jury convicted on six different counts arising from single incident/single victim. Felder v. State, 270 Ga. 641, 514 S.E.2d 416 (March 8, 1999). No fatal variance where indictment alleged that the robbery was committed by taking cigarettes “from the person of the victim,” but “the evidence showed only that the cigarettes had been taken from the victim’s immediate presence.” Held, the victim’s “person” and “immediate presence,” as used in the robbery statute, OCGA § 16-8-41(a), are synonymous. “Although the victim’s ‘person’ and his ‘immediate presence’ are separated by the word ‘or,’ the former has always been deemed to include the latter for purposes of proving the elements of a robbery. ‘The meaning of this legal phrase is, not that the taking must necessarily be from the actual contact of the body, but if it is from under the personal protection that will suffice. Within this doctrine, the person may be deemed to protect all things belonging to the individual, within a distance, not easily defined, over which the influence of the personal presence extends.’ Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 246(1), 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975).” “The word ‘or’ ‘is sometimes used to introduce a reiteration of the same idea, and to express it in a somewhat different way.’ Whitaker v. State, 11 Ga.App. 208, 211(5), 75 S.E. 258 (1912).” Accord, Williams v. State , 295 Ga.App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (November 26, 2008) (taking of victim’s shirt after forcing her to remove it, and while she was locked in closet, was from her “immediate presence”). Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 513 S.E.2d 1 (March 1, 1999). “The evidence was sufficient to support Lee’s conviction for armed robbery, despite Lee’s contention that he did not take the victim’s rings until after she was dead. Jackson v. Virginia, [cit.] It is well-settled that a defendant commits a robbery if he kills the victim first and then takes the victim’s property. Francis v. State, 266 Ga. 69, 70-71(1), 463 S.E.2d 859 (1995); Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 594(21), 458 S.E.2d 799 (1995); Prince v. State, 257 Ga. 84, 85-86(1), 355 S.E.2d 424 (1987).” 8. THEFT BY CONVERSION Williams v. State, 328 Ga.App. 898, 763 S.E.2d 280 (August 29, 2014). Evidence supported conviction for misdemeanor theft by conversion. “Williams argues that the owner's testimony regarding the fair market value of the televisions was insufficient to prove fair market value as defined by OCGA § 16–8–4(3)(A). Her argument is unavailing, however, because value is not an element of theft by conversion. OCGA § 16–8–4(a). Williams's conviction does not depend on the value of the stolen property, which is relevant only for purposes of distinguishing between a misdemeanor and a felony. See OCGA § 16–8–12(a); Hight v. State, 221 Ga.App. 574, 575(2) (472 S.E.2d 113) (1996). Here, the owner's testimony that the televisions had some value authorized the jury to find Williams guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of misdemeanor theft by conversion. See Hight, supra, 221 Ga.App. at 575(2).” State v. Benton, 305 Ga.App. 332, 699 S.E.2d 767 (July 21, 2010). Trial court properly rejected defendant’s guilty plea, as State failed to establish factual basis for offense of theft by conversion. “At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor described the facts underlying the accusation as follows: ‘Mr. Benton came to an agreement with his boss to purchase this 1991 Toyota pickup truck. He took that pickup truck and never made any payment on it, and it was actually recovered in Houston County with some other people driving it.’ The prosecutor explained that, at some point, Benton's employer realized that Benton was never going to make the payments and told Benton to return the truck instead. The trial court determined that the State had failed to identify any legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the truck and, therefore, that the State was seeking to impose criminal sanctions for Benton's failure to pay a debt, which is forbidden by Georgia's Constitution.” “To prove that Benton was under a legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the truck … the State was required to prove that Benton explicitly agreed to return the truck to his employer if he could not make the payments. … The prosecutor's recitation of the expected evidence, however, failed to show that, when Benton obtained the pickup truck from the seller, he explicitly agreed to return the truck to the seller if he failed to pay as agreed. Because the State failed to identify any factual basis for the essential element that Benton obtained the pickup truck under an agreement or other known legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the property, the trial court was authorized to reject Benton's guilty plea. Head v. State, 262 Ga. 795, 796(2), 426 S.E.2d 547 (1993).” Hartsell v. State, 288 Ga.App. 552, 654 S.E.2d 662 (November 21, 2007). Trial court’s restitution order was