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supported by the record. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft by conversion for misappropriating certain sums paid to build houses. Amount. “Hartsell argues that the State failed to carry its burden of showing the amount of loss sustained by the victims as a result of the offenses of theft by conversion. Citing OCGA § 16-8-4(a), which requires for a theft-by-conversion conviction that the defendant converted the funds ‘to his own use,’ he claims that at the restitution hearing, the State had to show what portion of the earnest money deposits were used to pay for Hartsell’s personal expenses as opposed to expenses of his corporation. Hartsell’s arguments fail on two fronts. First, he overlooks the impact of his guilty plea. By pleading guilty, he admitted to all the allegations of the two counts ( Wright v. Hall, 281 Ga. 318, 319(1) (638 S.E.2d 270) (2006)), waiving any factual inaccuracies ( Kemp v. Simpson, 278 Ga. 439, 439-440 (603 S.E.2d 267) (2004)) and waiving all defenses other than that the accusation charged no crime ( Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 56(3) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995)). Here, he pled guilty to Count One, which alleged that he received $16,874 from Victim No. 1 ‘under an agreement to make a specified application of such funds in that the accused was to construct a new house ... and the accused did knowingly convert the funds to the use of the accused in violation of the agreement....’ (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, he had already admitted to the court that he had converted $16,874 to his own use.”The amount stolen in Count Two was similarly admitted. Use of funds. “Hartsell’s contention that he could only be ordered to recompense the victims for those funds he used for his personal expenses lacks foundation in the law. OCGA § 16-8- 4(a) defines the offense of conversion as a person’s knowingly converting the funds ‘to his own use in violation of the agreement.’ ‘His own use’ does not refer exclusively to using the funds for unapproved personal expenses; rather, it refers to using the funds for a chosen use other than the purpose specified in the agreement. See Cox v. State, 275 Ga.App. 895 (622 S.E.2d 11) (2005). Indeed, Connally v. State, 265 Ga. 563, 564(2) (458 S.E.2d 336) (1995), held that using a portion of the funds received from the victim to pay unapproved expenses of a business partnership in which the defendant was involved met the definition of using the funds for the defendant’s own use. Cf. McMahon v. State, 258 Ga.App. 512, 515(1) (574 S.E.2d 548) (2002) (defendant liable for criminal acts carried out as an officer of the corporation he controlled).” Sinyard v. State, 243 Ga.App. 218, 531 S.E.2d 140 (March 10, 2000). Evidence supported theft by conversion conviction where he took victim’s money, promising to invest it for her, and never returned it despite lavish promises of improbable profits. “There is no question that Sinyard received the money. The only question is whether there was evidence that he converted the money to his own use. Although it would be better practice to present specific evidence showing where the money went, we hold that the evidence in this case was sufficient to authorize the jury to infer that Sinyard converted the money to his own use. It is true that Nelson admitted she had no proof that Sinyard failed to invest her money or that he bought anything for himself with the money. And, she plainly admitted she did not know what he did with the money. But Nelson testified to many facts which could lead a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Sinyard fraudulently converted the money. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). With Sinyard's ‘investments,’ none of the standard paperwork evidencing an investment was furnished to Nelson. In fact, she herself had to handwrite receipts for Sinyard to sign. And although Sinyard guaranteed highly improbable returns, he refused to sign a receipt to that effect. He even told her to write on one check that it was payment for a fence. Further, he had her make the checks out to him personally, not to an investment company or his life insurance company. He deposited at least two of the checks into a personal account, and although this was consistent with the fact that the checks were made out to him, that fact too raises an inference of wrongdoing under the circumstances.” Conviction reversed on other grounds, however. 9. THEFT BY CONVERSION OF LEASED PROPERTY Williams v. State, 328 Ga.App. 898, 763 S.E.2d 280 (August 29, 2014). Evidence supported conviction for misdemeanor theft by conversion of leased property, and award of victim restitution. “With regard to restitution, OCGA § 16–8–4(c)(3) pertinently provides: ‘[i]n the event that any personal property is not returned as provided for in the lease or rental agreement and the court orders the lessor or renter to pay replacement costs, replacement costs shall include but not be limited to: (A) The market value of the personal property. The market value shall be established by the owner of the property by providing from a supplier of such or reasonably similar personal property a current quotation of the value of the personal property which is of like quality, make, and model of the personal property being replaced....(B) All rental charges from the date the rental agreement was executed until the date of the trial or the date that the property was recovered, if recovered; and (C) Interest on the unpaid balance each month at the current legal rate from the date the court orders the lessor or renter to pay replacement costs until the date the judgment is satisfied in full.’ (Emphasis supplied). … [T]he evidence showed that the rental agreements required Williams to either make monthly payments on the televisions or return the televisions to Rent & Buy; the rental agreements provided for a total $2,797.90 in monthly payments on the televisions; Williams made only $573.60 in payments; and Williams never returned the televisions. Pursuant to OCGA § 16–8–4(3)(B), the trial court could have awarded as much as $2,224.30—