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the difference between the total monthly payments under the rental agreements and the amount Williams paid—plus interest on the unpaid balance. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in awarding only $2,198.07 in restitution.” Sherrod v. State, 280 Ga. 275, 627 S.E.2d 36 (February 27, 2006). “OCGA § 16-8-4(c)(2) is unconstitutional” because it “imposes an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.” “OCGA § 16-8-4(c)(2) states: ‘[a]ny person having any personal property in such person’s possession or under such person’s control by virtue of a lease or rental agreement who fails to return the personal property within five days ... after a letter demanding return of the personal property has been mailed to such person ... at such person’s last known address by the owner of the personal property or by the owner’s agent shall be presumed to have knowingly converted such personal property to such person’s own use in violation of such lease or agreement.’ Under OCGA § 16-8-4(a), it is a crime to knowingly convert the property of another to one's own use in violation of a lease agreement. Thus, by proving that the demand letter was properly sent and that the property was not returned within five days, the presumption of OCGA § 16-8-4(c)(2) establishes guilt of the crime of theft by conversion of leased property.” “‘In Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 735(35b) (386 S.E.2d 316) (1989), we distinguished permissive inferences or presumptions from those which are unconstitutionally mandatory: A permissive inference is an evidentiary device that permits, but does not require, the [fact-finder] to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic fact. By contrast, a mandatory presumption instructs the [fact-finder] that it must infer the elemental fact once the state has proved the basic fact. The difference between the two may be found in the presence or absence of ‘language of command’ such as ‘shall be.’ An instruction containing a mandatory presumption commands that the [fact-finder] reach a particular conclusion, while an instruction couched in terms of an inference merely suggests, but does not command, that the [fact-finder] do so.’ Wallace v. Higgs, 262 Ga. 437, 438 (421 S.E.2d 69) (1992) (Internal punctuation omitted). Clearly, the statutory presumption in OCGA § 16-8-4(c)(2) is mandatory; if the State proves that the demand letter was sent in accordance with the statute, the defendant ‘shall be presumed’ to have committed the elements of the crime of theft by conversion of leased property. The United States Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional similarly-worded statutes regarding theft and embezzlement of leased or rented vehicles. Carella, [ v. California, 491 U.S. 263, (109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218) (1989)]. OCGA § 16-8-4(c)(2) differs in no significant manner from those statutes, and its mandatory presumption is unconstitutional.” Points out that predecessor statute was ruled unconstitutional on same basis in State v. Russell , 256 Ga. 503, 350 S.E.2d 430 (1986). 10. THEFT BY DECEPTION Harris v. State, 324 Ga.App. 411, 750 S.E.2d 721 (October 30, 2013). Theft by taking, RICO and related convictions affirmed. Defendant and his co-defendants took over vacant homes and leased out to tenants, representing that they had the right to do so. Convicted of theft by deception of the tenants, defendant argues “that the people to whom he rented the homes received full value for the money they paid him. … Here, the evidence showed that Harris deceived the tenants by claiming that he had authority to rent the premises when he did not, and this claim led the tenants to make payments to Harris under a false impression. Accordingly, this argument fails.” Stratacos v. State, 293 Ga. 401, 748 S.E.2d 828 (July 11, 2013). Reversing 312 Ga.App. 783, 786–787 (720 S.E.2d 256) (2011), and one of defendant’s convictions for theft by deception based on failure to perform services paid for. “Where a defendant is charged under § 16–8–3(a) and (b)(5) for deceitfully promising to perform services, the State must prove the value of any services he performed in order to prove that he intended to ultimately deprive the victim of property. … [I]f the State seeks only misdemeanor punishment for a § 16–8–3(b)(5) violation, it need prove only that the value of the services the defendant actually provided was less than the value of the property he obtained from the victim. In other words, it is necessary to show a shortfall to the victim, but not the particular amount. However, where the State seeks to impose felony punishment for a § 16–8–3(b)(5) violation, and thus to increase the maximum statutory penalty for the crime, it must prove that the value of the property the defendant obtained from the victim, less the value of the services he actually performed, exceeded the felony threshold. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) (2000).” “Our holding applies only to theft-by-deception charges under OCGA § 16–8–3(b)(5). We do not consider whether the State must prove a pecuniary loss to the victim to establish other types of § 16–8–3 violations. Compare, e.g., Harrell v. State, 192 Ga.App. 876, 877 (386 S.E.2d 676) (1989) (holding that § 16–8–3 contains ‘no requirement of proof of pecuniary loss’ in a case where the defendant purchased an automobile with a fraudulent bank draft).” Evidence here allowed the jury to calculate the value of the construction services performed, compared to the amount paid by victim, on three of four disputed counts, but not on the fourth count. On the fourth count, “[t]he evidence showed that Stratacos performed some portion of the contract labor and delivered most or all of the materials covered by the contract, and the State did not present any evidence that allowed the jury to determine whether the services the Company received were worth less than the $6,687 it paid Stratacos. Thus, there was no direct evidence that the materials Statacos delivered were worth less than $6,867. Nor did the evidence that the new contractor charged