☢ test - Í

Shaheed v. State, 245 Ga.App. 754, 538 S.E.2d 823 (August 31, 2000). Evidence supported conviction for theft by receiving of a motor vehicle, and fleeing and eluding an officer. “‘Unexplained possession of recently stolen property, alone, is not sufficient to support a conviction for receiving stolen property but guilt may be inferred from possession in conjunction with other evidence of knowledge.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Daras v. State, 201 Ga.App. 512, 514(1), 411 S.E.2d 367 (1991). But ‘the fact that a suspect flees the scene of a crime points to the question of guilt in a circumstantial manner. Flight is circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt; the weight to be given such evidence is for the jury to decide.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Green v. State, 206 Ga.App. 42, 44(3), 424 S.E.2d 646 (1992). The requirement of scienter in the offense of theft by receiving may be fulfilled by evidence of flight. See Wilkie v. State, 216 Ga.App. 557, 455 S.E.2d 103 (1995). … In addition, Shaheed had no proof of insurance, and lack of proof of ownership of a vehicle at the time of arrest is ‘very relevant to the issues at trial’ of theft by receiving a stolen vehicle. Mullinax v. State, 242 Ga.App. 561, 562(1), 530 S.E.2d 255 (2000).” Syms v. State , 244 Ga.App. 21, 534 S.E.2d 502 (May 4, 2000). Denial of motion to vacate void sentence reversed; “Syms could not be guilty both of theft by taking the credit cards and theft by receiving the same credit cards after they were stolen by someone else. Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854, 855(1), 413 S.E.2d 196 (1992). Therefore, as a matter of law, the crimes are mutually exclusive, and Syms could not be sentenced on both crimes, even if he pled guilty to both. Id. Since such sentences were void ab initio, the trial court had both the jurisdiction and the obligation to grant Syms' motion to vacate the sentences. See Manry v. State, [226 Ga.App. 445, 446, 487 S.E.2d 80 (1997)].” Slaughter v. State, 240 Ga.App. 758, 525 S.E.2d 130 (November 10, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for theft by receiving truck. “The owner of the truck testified that it was stolen about three days before the robbery and that, when the truck was recovered after the robbery, about $1,000 worth of tools had been stolen from the truck, and ‘my jack and everything else was gone inside.’ The State presented evidence that Slaughter and his co-defendants used the truck in the armed robbery, fled from police in the truck, then abandoned it and fled on foot. Slaughter also gave a false name to police when he was caught. This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Slaughter was guilty of theft by receiving the stolen truck. Johnson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 356, 357, 511 S.E.2d 921 (1999); Hurston [ v. State, 202 Ga.App. 311, 312-313, 414 S.E.2d 303 (1991)]; Perry v. State, 180 Ga.App. 273-274, 349 S.E.2d 25 (1986).” Denson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 207, 523 S.E.2d 62 (September 29, 1999). Defendant’s theft by receiving conviction affirmed; evidence “authorized the jury's finding that Denson knew or should have known the trailer was stolen,” where “Denson brought a flatbed trailer to the home of John Privette and asked for help in transporting the trailer to his own home. Denson told Privette the flatbed trailer had been taken from a parking lot. Denson also asked Privette for some paint so he could paint the trailer to disguise it.” Harris v. State, 239 Ga.App. 723, 521 S.E.2d 864 (August 30, 1999). Conviction for theft by receiving reversed where tools and equipment stolen by defendant’s husband “were found in a storage room at the back of the house, with the exception of a full tool box found in the living room of the house. The only witness to testify to Harris' knowledge of the items was her husband, who testified she knew nothing about them.” “Assuming such showed Harris possessed the goods, ‘evidence of unexplained possession of recently-stolen goods, standing alone, will not support a conviction for theft by receiving stolen goods, in that it is insufficient in itself to infer guilty knowledge.’ Weldon v. Barnes, 251 Ga. 689, 691(3), 309 S.E.2d 137 (1983).” “Here the State presented no evidence that Harris knew her husband was a burglar. The wrenches, socket sets, tool and die set, welder, sledge hammer, and car jack were not so inherently unusual or expensive ( State witnesses estimated the combined value at $1,600) as to excite the suspicions of an ordinarily prudent person about their origin. Compare Dunbar [ v. State, 228 Ga.App. 104, 107(1)(b), 491 S.E.2d 166 (1997)]. To the contrary, Harris' husband had worked in various types of construction and finishing work, which could explain an innocent knowledge by her about his possessing various tools and equipment.” Graham v. State, 236 Ga.App. 673, 512 S.E.2d 921 (February 26, 1999). At defendant’s trial for theft by receiving, evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s knowledge that the car was stolen. “‘Knowledge that goods are stolen is an essential element of the crime of receiving stolen goods, and this knowledge on the part of the accused must be proved, to warrant a conviction under the Penal Code (OCGA § 16-8-7(a)); but it may be inferred from circumstances, where the circumstances would excite suspicion in the minds of ordinarily prudent persons.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Leachman v. State, 226 Ga.App. 98, 100, 485 S.E.2d 587 (1997). ‘The fact that the car was a stolen car and that the defendant had possession of same is not alone sufficient to authorize a conviction for the offense of theft by