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knowingly receiving stolen property. Johnson v. State, 122 Ga.App. 769, 178 S.E.2d 772 (1970); Gaskin v. State, 119 Ga.App. 593, 594, 168 S.E.2d 183 (1969); Bird v. State, 72 Ga.App. 843(4), 35 S.E.2d 483 (1945).’ Heard v. State, 126 Ga.App. 62, 68(10), 189 S.E.2d 895 (1972). But guilty knowledge may be inferred from such possession in conjunction with other evidence. Abner v. State, 196 Ga.App. 752-753(1), 397 S.E.2d 36 (1990). [Evidence here showed] that defendant possessed [victim’s] stolen car within seventy-two hours after the loss was reported and the car at that time had a shattered windshield and was missing all four hubcaps. In addition to the strange appearance of the vehicle, defendant abandoned the car after being spotted by the police, apparently in such haste that he left behind his wallet containing his identification. Someone had attempted to conceal the nature of the property as stolen by substituting an Alabama license plate for [victim’s] North Carolina tag. The next day, defendant was driving a different vehicle, also with a stolen Alabama tag. This evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, [cit.] to authorize the jury’s verdict that defendant possessed the motor vehicle under circumstances where he knew or, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, should have known the vehicle was stolen. Fair v. State, 198 Ga.App. 437, 438(4), 401 S.E.2d 626 (1991).” Belton v. State, 270 Ga. 671, 512 S.E.2d 614 (February 22, 1999). “Theft by receiving … is not an offense included in either theft by taking ( Lee v. State, 259 Ga. 230(3), 378 S.E.2d 855 (1989)) or burglary. Breland v. Smith, 247 Ga. 690(2), 279 S.E.2d 204 (1981).” Accord, Middlebrooks v. State , 241 Ga.App. 193, 526 S.E.2d 406 (December 1, 1999) (theft by receiving not lesser included offense to motor vehicle hijacking). Johnson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 356, 511 S.E.2d 921 (February 9, 1999). Evidence was sufficient to support defendants’ conviction for theft by receiving a stolen vehicle, specifically, to prove that the vehicle was stolen. “Although the owner of the defendants’ getaway car did not testify, defendants … admitted to a law enforcement officer that the getaway car had been stolen. These admissions, evidence that the getaway car’s steering column was ‘busted’ in such a way as to indicate to an investigating law enforcement officer that the vehicle had been stolen and proof that defendants used the getaway during an armed robbery and then abandoned the car after a high-speed chase is sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding that defendants are guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of theft by receiving a stolen vehicle.” 13. THEFT BY SHOPLIFTING See also EVIDENCE – VALUE, above Allen v. State, 325 Ga.App. 752, 754 S.E.2d 795 (February 18, 2014). Evidence supported shoplifting conviction. “The evidence showed: a person was observed on the store video monitoring system putting several items in a bag; the person then walked out of the store without paying for the items; when told to ‘stop’ the person, identified as Allen, fled toward a wood line; and when apprehended he had in his possession a store bag containing several items from the store with price tags attached and no receipt. This evidence is sufficient to sustain Allen's conviction for shoplifting. See Agony v. State, 226 Ga.App. 330, 331–332(2) (486 S.E.2d 625) (1997) (flight is circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt; unexplained recent possession of stolen goods supports inference that accused committed theft); see also Ekanger v. State, 279 Ga.App. 421, 422–423 (631 S.E.2d 459) (2006) (evidence overwhelming where shoplifting witnessed in person and on video camera and video played for jury).” In re: J.C., 308 Ga.App. 336, 708 S.E.2d 1 (February 4, 2011). Evidence supported delinquency adjudication based on shoplifting where juvenile concealed an item in his pants, but apparently didn’t leave the store with it – when stopped by store security after leaving the store, he no longer had the item. “OCGA § 16-8-14(a)(1) provides that a person commits the offense of shoplifting when he conceals merchandise with the intent of appropriating it to his own use without paying for it or depriving the owner of its possession. ‘[C]riminal intent may be inferred from the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted,’ and removing the merchandise from the store is not required to establish criminal intent. K-Mart v. Coker, 261 Ga. 745, 747(2), (3), 410 S.E.2d 425 (1991) (examining criminal intent in a malicious prosecution case).” Wester v. State, 294 Ga.App. 263, 668 S.E.2d 862 (October 27, 2008). 1. Evidence supported defendant’s conviction as party to crime of shoplifting. “Here, Wester entered the store with his son, and the jury could have concluded that his actions in stopping directly in front of [store owner] Allen and asking her questions was an attempt to distract her while his son hid the products on his person. When Allen accosted Wester's son, Wester told him to run. Wester also ran from the store to his car and drove them both away. Even his son conceded that when they drove away, Wester knew he had stolen merchandise from the store. Under these circumstances, the jury could have concluded that Wester ‘knowingly agreed to act, and did act, as a getaway driver to facilitate [his son's] commission of theft by shoplifting.’ Stewart v. State, 243 Ga.App. 860, 861-862(1) (534 S.E.2d 544) (2000).” 2. Specific recidivist shoplifting provision prevailed over general recidivist statute where all defendant’s prior convictions were for shoplifting. Based on Goldberg v. State , - 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007) (specific recidivist statute would control if all convictions were of that type – in