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Goldberg , burglary – but where defendant had other types of convictions as well, general recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 17-10-7 would apply). Patrick v. State, 284 Ga.App. 472, 644 S.E.2d 309 (March 23, 2007). Unanimous whole court opinion; trial court did not err in imposing general recidivist sentencing of defendant under OCGA § 17-10-7(c) on his shoplifting offense rather than using the specific shoplifting recidivist code section, OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1)(C). “[T]here is nothing in OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(c), which specifically governs fourth-time shoplifting offenders, that blocks the application of the general recidivist provisions set forth in OCGA § 17-10-7(c). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Patrick under OCGA § 17-10-7.” Overrules Williams v. State , 261 Ga.App. 176, 582 S.E.2d 141 (2003), based on Butler v. State , 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688 (November 20, 2006). Taylor v. State, 270 Ga.App. 637, 607 S.E.2d 163 (November 8, 2004) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). “The question whether Taylor’s placement of the goods in her purse showed an intent to commit theft by shoplifting was one for the jury. See OCGA § 16-8-14(a)(1) (defendant who ‘conceals or takes possession’ of goods with intent to appropriate for own use without paying for them commits theft by shoplifting). There was evidence to support the guilty verdict. See Parham v. State, 218 Ga.App. 42, 43(1), 460 S.E.2d 78 (1995) (concealing goods in store sufficient to establish intent).” Romano v. State, 267 Ga.App. 250, 599 S.E.2d 234 (May 5, 2004). Defendant was properly charged with shoplifting by taking possession of merchandise under OCGA § 16-8-14(a)(1) although evidence would also have supported a charge of shoplifting by interchanging price tags under (a)(4). Distinguishes Nesmith v. State , 183 Ga.App. 529, 359 S.E.2d 421 (1987) (“interchanging” price tags under (a)(4) not the same as “altering” price tags under (a)(2)). State v. Sterling , 244 Ga.App. 328, 535 S.E.2d 329 (June 5, 2000). State court properly dismissed shoplifting prosecution upon being advised by State that defendant had three prior convictions, making the offense on trial a felony. 1. Out-of- state offenses properly counted as prior offenses leading to felony designation. 2. NCIC printout showing prior offenses, presented by State and not disputed by either party, was sufficient to cause the trial court to inquire into its own jurisdiction. 3. Although jury was then deliberating and announced that it had reached a verdict, trial court properly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction, refused to allow the jury to return its verdict, and dismissed the prosecution for want of prosecution. Gilliam v. State, 237 Ga.App. 476, 517 S.E.2d 348 (April 1, 1999). 1. No error where trial court’s charge described all three different intent elements from shoplifting statute, although only one was alleged in the accusation. Defendant pick up a jacket in a store, presented it to a clerk, and said he’d received it as a gift and wanted a refund. “In K-Mart Corp. v. Coker , 261 Ga. 745, 746-747(2), 410 S.E.2d 425 (1991), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a person commits theft by shoplifting when he takes possession of store merchandise with any of the following three intents: ‘“(1) to appropriate the property to (one’s) own use without paying for it; (2) to deprive the owner of the possession of it or (3) to deprive the owner of the value of it.”’” Trial court charged on all three although only the first was alleged. “The categorization of these intents as three discrete mens rea may be misunderstood, in that they may overlap and they are not always mutually exclusive. For example, the first intent (intending to appropriate merchandise to one’s own use without paying for it) in certain cases coincides with the other two intents. In Coker the Court found the evidence allowed a finding that the defendant ‘intended to deprive the store of both the possession and value of’ the merchandise. 261 Ga. at 747(3), 410 S.E.2d 425. In Secrist v. State , [145 Ga.App. 391, 392, 243 S.E.2d 599 (1978)], defendant could be found to have intent both to appropriate merchandise for his own use and to deprive the owner of possession of the merchandise. Andrews v. State , 143 Ga.App. 791(1), 240 S.E.2d 142 (1977), also illustrates that a theft by taking scheme can be driven by a multiple of the statutorily described intents. The court ruled that the defendant’s conduct supported a finding that she ‘intended to appropriate it to her own use or to deprive [the store owner] of possession of it.’” N o error here because “the evidence did not create a reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Gilliam of taking possession of the jacket with the second or third intent only. Under the undisputed facts of this case, the jury necessarily found that Gilliam intended to appropriate the jacket to his own use, the intent charged in the accusation. Although the jury may have found Gilliam intended to deprive Parisian’s of possession or of the value of the jacket, in doing so (under the facts of this case) the jury also necessarily would have had to find he intended to appropriate the jacket to his own use by using it to get a refund to which he was not entitled.” 2. Trial court was not required to charge on lesser included offense of attempt where the evidence showed “either the commission of the completed offense as charged, or the commission of no offense.” “Even though the body of evidence may factually support a conviction on the lesser crime, the charge need not be given unless ‘that body of evidence includes