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countervailing evidence of the lesser included offense.’ Oliver v. State, 232 Ga.App. 816, 819(2), 503 S.E.2d 28 (1998). There is no countervailing evidence here. ‘A jury does not have the discretion to find defendant guilty of a lesser crime when it finds the elements which support the crime charged.’ Holland v. State, 205 Ga.App. 695, 699(5), 423 S.E.2d 694 (1992). Otherwise ‘this would leave up to the jury whether to convict of a felony or of a misdemeanor ..., under the same set of facts.’ Burgess v. State, 204 Ga.App. 766, 770, 420 S.E.2d 590 (1992) (Beasley, J., dissenting), rev’d , 263 Ga. 143, 429 S.E.2d 252 (1993).” 3. “One need not leave the store to take possession of merchandise. Mathis v. State, 194 Ga.App. 498-499(1), 391 S.E.2d 130 (1990). False statements that merchandise has already been paid for and carrying the merchandise around the store alone evince an intent to appropriate the merchandise to one’s own use, Id. ; attempting to obtain a ‘refund’ or merchandise voucher is simply additional evidence of this intent. The jury could find that ‘his own use’ was using the jacket to obtain a fraudulent refund.” Accord, Grady v. State , 319 Ga.App. 894, 743 S.E.2d 22 (February 25, 2013). Lynn v. State, 236 Ga.App. 600, 512 S.E.2d 695 (February 22, 1999). 1. Defendant could be tried on accusation for felony shoplifting pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a). “On the date the accusation was filed, OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) provided, inter alia, that in felony cases involving theft by shoplifting, in which defendants either have been bound over to the superior court or have expressly waived a commitment hearing, the district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and the defendant shall be tried on such accusations according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. On December 11, 1997, Lynn posted bond on the shoplifting and criminal trespass counts. In State v. Gilstrap, 230 Ga.App. 281, 282, 495 S.E.2d 885 (1998), this Court held that Gilstrap waived his right to a preliminary hearing by posting bond and, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70.1, was not entitled to indictment by a grand jury on the offense of habitual violator. We find that Gilstrap, which involved an interpretation of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 prior to its amendment effective March 27, 1998, is persuasive. The state could have proceeded to trial on the accusation because Lynn had posted bond. Id. at 282-283, 495 S.E.2d 885. … Lynn also waived any right of indictment when she originally entered a plea of not guilty to all counts, without first having filed a written objection to proceeding under the accusation. Crowder v. State, 218 Ga.App. 630, 631(1), 462 S.E.2d 754 (1995).” 2. Amendments to OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1) in 1997 allow all prior shoplifting convictions of a defendant to be considered in imposing felony punishment for a subsequent shoplifting conviction. “Before OCGA § 16-8- 14(b)(1) was amended in 1997, only prior misdemeanor shoplifting convictions could be considered in seeking felony for a fourth shoplifting conviction. See generally Fuller v. State, 230 Ga.App. 219, 221(3), 496 S.E.2d 303 (1998). The 1997 statutory amendment to OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1)(C), provided that, ‘[u]pon conviction of a fourth or subsequent offense for shoplifting, where the prior [shoplifting] convictions are either felonies or misdemeanors, or any combination of felonies and misdemeanors ..., the defendant commits a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years; and the first year of such sentence shall not be suspended, probated, deferred, or withheld.’ (Emphasis supplied.)” Defendant here argues, unsuccessfully, that only felony convictions after the effective date of the amendments could be used to enhance sentence. “[W]e have no difficulty in concluding that the General Assembly intended that as to convictions of shoplifting occurring after the effective date of the 1997 amendment, any prior shoplifting conviction shall be considered in determining if the defendant has committed felony shoplifting.” 14. THEFT BY TAKING/SUDDEN SNATCHING Kiser v. State, 327 Ga.App. 17, 755 S.E.2d 505 (March 7, 2014). Evidence supported conviction for false imprisonment, but not the related theft by taking charge. Victim testified that he fled on foot from the mobile home where defendant and others attempted to hold him, leaving his truck behind; when he returned with the police, the truck was gone. “In this case, no evidence suggests whether one or more individuals took the victim's truck or that Kiser, as opposed to one of his co- defendants, did so. Additionally, other reasonable explanations for the disappearance of the victim's truck exist, because the victim left the keys in open view on the console. We therefore conclude that the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter of law and reverse Kiser's theft by taking conviction.” McFadden concurs specially, also pointing out that the truck was left in a neighborhood, not an isolated area. Davis v. State, 326 Ga.App. 279, 754 S.E.2d 815 (March 6, 2014). Theft by taking conviction reversed; evidence failed to establish venue. “[I]n cases such as this, where the unlawfully appropriated property is money, the State has two options for proving venue. See Naylor [ v. State, 257 Ga.App. 899, 900, 572 S.E.2d 410 (2002)]; Stowe v. State, 163 Ga.App. 535, 537(4), 295 S.E.2d 209 (1982). The State can proceed ‘in the county where the accused received the money,’ Naylor, 257 Ga.App. at 900, 572 S.E.2d 410 (punctuation omitted); see also Stowe, 163 Ga.App. at 537(4), 295 S.E.2d 209, or it can produce evidence ‘tracing funds disbursed ( i.e., spent) in one county (where the case is being prosecuted) back to the account or other source in the origin county, showing further that the funds were not disbursed in accordance with the contract provisions governing the use of the funds.’ Naylor, 257 Ga.App. at 900, 572 S.E.2d 410 (punctuation omitted);