☢ test - Í

see also Stowe, 163 Ga.App. at 537(4), 295 S.E.2d 209. In the case sub judice, the trial court found—in its order denying Davis's motion to dismiss—that because the negotiation and execution of the contracts occurred at Pruett's offices in Dodge County, there were ‘significant contacts’ establishing venue there. But as we have previously explained, it is not the residence of ‘the beneficiary or rightful owner of the stolen funds which controls venue[.]’ DeVine v. State, 229 Ga.App. 346, 348(1), 494 S.E.2d 87 (1997). Nor can a nexus or general factual connection with a county, as argued by the State, ‘establish venue in contravention of the clear requirements of the relevant statute.’ Id. at 348–49(1), 494 S.E.2d 87. Indeed, the argument posited by the State and adopted by the trial court below ‘essentially disregards the applicable law: in a theft by deception case, ‘the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property which was the subject of the theft.’ Davis v. State, [322 Ga.App. 826, 828(1), 747 S.E.2d 19 (2013)]; see OCGA § 16–8–11. And here, although the contracts were executed in Dodge County, there is no evidence that Davis exercised any control over the $350,000 until Pruett wired the funds into Davis's bank account located in metro Atlanta. Nor is there any evidence that Davis spent or disbursed any of the funds in Dodge County. Rather, the evidence shows that Davis used the money for his other business ventures, including the failed venture in Jeff Davis County.” Erick v. State, 322 Ga.App. 71, 744 S.E.2d 69 (May 30, 2013). In theft by taking prosecution, venue was properly proven. “In a theft by taking case, ‘the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property which was the subject of the theft.’ OCGA § 16–8–11. Consequently, ‘the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant exercised control over the property taken in the county where the case was prosecuted.’ Williams [ v. State, 297 Ga.App. 150, 151(2), 676 S.E.2d 805 (2009)]. Notably, ‘[i]n a prosecution for theft by taking checks in one county and depositing them into a bank account in another county, venue is proper in either county.’ Gautreaux v. State, 314 Ga.App. 103, 106(1), 722 S.E.2d 915 (2012). See Bearden v. State, 316 Ga.App. 721, 724(2), 728 S.E.2d 874 (2012) (noting that ‘in the prosecution of theft by taking, venue is proper in the county where the checks were taken or deposited’).” Check here was deposited in an ATM in Gwinnett County; circumstantial evidence suggested that defendant deposited it. Clarke v. State, 317 Ga.App. 471, 731 S.E.2d 100 (August 10, 2012). Felony theft by taking convictions affirmed. Evidence supported finding that defendant, an attorney handing indigent defense cases, knew that the fees she received belonged to the law firm she worked for and were not her personal property; thus, jury could find her actions showed criminal intent, rather than “claim of right.” “For example, it is undisputed that Clarke wrote letters to indigent defense clients on Sliz/McKinney letterhead, entered the hours she worked on indigent defense cases into the firm's time and billing software system, and listed the firm's address and/or telephone number on appointment of counsel and first appearance documents for indigent defense clients. [The firm’s] bookkeeper[ ] testified that the firm provided Clarke with color-coded files for her indigent defense cases and that the receptionist opened and managed those files for her.” Defendant lied to the partners, however, about whether she had billed the county for her services, or had been paid. Ward v. State, 312 Ga.App. 609, 718 S.E.2d 915 (November 16, 2011). Theft by taking conviction reversed; trial court’s charge on recent unexplained possession was improper: “‘The recent unexplained or inadequately explained possession of stolen property by a Defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict. This is true without direct proof or other circumstantial evidence that the Defendant committed the theft. However, recent possession of stolen goods will not automatically support a conviction of theft; you as jurors honestly seeking the truth still must judge the case on the totality of the circumstances under the reasonable-doubt standard that I have previously charged you. That is, recent possession is to be viewed as probative evidence of the crime and reviewed along with all of the evidence in the case to determine whether the State has proved the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ The first sentence of this instruction was cast in commanding language. It told the jury that proof of certain facts created an inference or presumption sufficient to convict Ward, not that such proof may be sufficient to give rise to an inference that Ward committed theft by taking. … Later sentences in the challenged instruction, which stated that recent possession of stolen goods would not automatically support a conviction of theft and that the jurors were required to apply the reasonable doubt standard to the totality of circumstances, arguably conflicted with the instruction on the presumption in the first sentence.” Brown v. State, 289 Ga. 259, 710 S.E.2d 751 (May 16, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly charged jury on recent possession in connection with theft by taking charge. “‘If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of theft by taking has been committed as charged in this indictment in that certain personal property was stolen as the result of such crime and if recently thereafter the defendant should be found in possession of the stolen property, that would be a circumstance, along with all of the other evidence, from which you may