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infer guilt as to the charge of theft by taking as set forth in this indictment. If you find the evidence merits such an inference, you may not draw an inference of guilt if from the evidence there is a reasonable explanation of the possession of such property consistent with a plea of innocence which is a question solely for you the jury to decide.’ The indictment charged Brown with two counts of theft by taking in that he unlawfully took and appropriated the Chevrolet Cavalier belonging to Buchanan and a purse and its cash contents belonging to Arp. The challenged instruction, taken almost verbatim from the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol II; Criminal Cases, 4 th ed., § 2.62.30 (2007), was a correct statement of the law, and was adjusted to the evidence. It was in essence identical to the one given and approved in Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. 82, 84, fn. 2(2) (586 S.E.2d 306) (2003). See also Thomas v. State, 274 Ga. 156(9) (549 S.E.2d 359) (2001); Johnson v. State, 297 Ga.App. 341, 343 (677 S.E.2d 402) (2009), and cases cited therein. Brown's burden- shifting argument was decided adversely to his position in Johnson, supra 277 Ga. at (3).” Rushing v. State, 305 Ga.App. 629, 700 S.E.2d 620 (August 19, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for theft by taking of a six- car hauling trailer affirmed; evidence supported finding of intent to deprive owners of their property. “[T]he evidence supports a finding that although Rushing may have had lawful possession of the truck initially, he failed to return the truck, or even provide Simms with the location of the truck upon Simms' demands. Rushing's response to Simms' demands showed that he intended to withhold the truck from Simms and Wilkins for an indefinite period of time. [ Tate v. Holloway, 231 Ga.App. 831, 499 S.E.2d 72 (1998).] The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to infer that Rushing acted with criminal intent and to find him guilty of theft by taking. Matthiessen [ v. State, 277 Ga.App. 54, 625 S.E.2d 422 (2005)].” See also Matthiessen (November 21, 2005), below. Cofield v. State, 304 Ga.App. 165, 695 S.E.2d 696 (May 24, 2010). Defendant’s theft by taking conviction affirmed; evidence supported finding of venue. “In theft by taking cases, venue lies in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property. OCGA § 16-8-11.” Defendant claimed he didn’t exercise control over the rental car in question because he was merely a passenger; Court of Appeals disagrees. “Although Cofield was not driving when police spotted the vehicle, the vehicle had been leased to him, not to the driver. And, even by Cofield's account, he got into the vehicle in Clayton County to get the car back from his friend so he could return it to Enterprise. Cofield remained in the car while he allowed Jones, who had paid ‘for a ride,’ to drive the vehicle to his destination.” Oglesby v. State, 301 Ga.App. 589, 688 S.E.2d 384 (December 11, 2009). Defendant’s guilty plea to felony theft by taking “necessarily incorporates the defendant's voluntary admission of the existence of the factual element that the stolen property had a value greater than $500 . Wharton v. Anderson, 270 Ga. 22, 24(2) (504 S.E.2d 670) (1998); see Wright v. Hall, 281 Ga. 318, 319(1) (638 S.E.2d 270) (2006) (by pleading guilty, a defendant waives all defenses except that the indictment failed to charge him with a crime); Cameron v. State, 295 Ga.App. 670, 674(4) (673 S.E.2d 59) (2009) (a plea of guilty generally waives all defenses except those based upon the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, and once a defendant solemnly admits in open court that he is, in fact, guilty of the offense charged, he generally may not raise independent claims that occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea).” Boivin v. State, 298 Ga.App. 411, 680 S.E.2d 415 (May 18, 2009). “Once it is shown that goods were stolen in a theft by taking, absence of or unsatisfactory explanation of the possession of the goods will support a conviction for theft by taking based upon recent possession of the stolen goods. Gibson v. State, 243 Ga.App. 610, 611(2)(a) (533 S.E.2d 783) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Jefferson v. State, 273 Ga.App. 61, 63(1) (614 S.E.2d 182) (2005); Hanson v. State, 229 Ga.App. 205, 206(1) (493 S.E.2d 605) (1997). Whether a defendant's possession of the stolen goods was recent and whether his or her explanation of that possession is satisfactory are questions for the jury. See Gibson, supra; Hanson, supra.” Williams v. State, 297 Ga.App. 150, 676 S.E.2d 805 (March 27, 2009). Evidence established venue in Jackson County as to Williams: co-defendant, conspiring with Williams, transferred funds from victim’s bank account to co-defendant’s account in Jackson County; defendant withdrew it in Banks County. “[Defendant] argues that venue was not proper in Jackson County because she exerted no meaningful control over the funds until she withdrew them in Banks County. We disagree. This argument confuses control with possession, and our law only requires that she control the property, not possess it. In this case, both the victim and Williams had accounts in the same bank in Jackson County. When the money was transferred into her account in Jackson County, Williams exercised control over the funds. She could control the disposition of the funds at her direction through a check, transfer, withdrawal, or other direction. See Gould v. State, 273 Ga.App. 155, 157(2) (614 S.E.2d 252) (2005).” State v. Campbell, 295 Ga.App. 856, 673 S.E.2d 336 (February 9, 2009). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s plea in