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bar; statute of limitation in theft cases runs from time of victim’s subjective knowledge of theft, regardless of whether victim should have known of the theft earlier. “Under OCGA § 17-3-1(c), a prosecution for felony theft by taking must commence within four years after the commission of the crime. However, under OCGA § 17-3-2(2), this statutory limit is tolled during any period in which ‘[t]he person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown.’ The crime victim's knowledge of the crime is imputed to the State.” Although trial court found “that [the alleged thefts] could have easily been noticed by anyone paying attention that the defendant was continuously ‘double billing’ the company for the same expenses,” “this speculation misconstrues the burden on the State. The tolling period is not extinguished when the injured party should have known; rather, it ends when the injured party has actual knowledge of the crime.” Peoples v. State, 295 Ga.App. 731, 673 S.E.2d 82 (January 27, 2009). Theft by taking and theft by receiving of same gun didn’t merge on sentencing, where different victims alleged – one the owner, the other the possessor. Notes that the two offenses are usually mutually exclusive, but defendant expressly declined to raise this issue. Patterson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (February 20, 2008). Evidence supported seven of defendant’s theft by taking convictions where it showed that defendant took victims’ funds with no intention to perform agreed-upon services in return, but not eighth conviction, where evidence only showed that victim expected defendant to get a credit history for him, and defendant did so. “Even though the state presented evidence that a credit report cost only $14.50, and that Patterson promised to return Kennedy’s money, Kennedy testified that Patterson performed the service for which he was hired. … See, e. g., Gordon v. State, 257 Ga. 335, 336 (359 S.E.2d 634) (1987) ( theft by deception conviction reversed where invoices showed inflated, but not false, charges for film processing and printing services ).” Neslein v. State, 288 Ga.App. 234, 653 S.E.2d 825 (November 5, 2007). Convictions for entering an auto and theft by taking did not merge as a matter of law or fact. Entering an auto “does not require that property actually be taken; it demands only entry with intent to commit theft or a felony. … Different facts, particularly the removal of various items from outside and inside the car, support the theft by taking charge.” Dudley v State, 287 Ga.App. 794, 652 S.E.2d 840 (October 10, 2007). Although theft by taking and theft by appropriation (after lawful possession) are different offenses, trial court did not present an impermissible alternative theory to the jury when it recited the pattern charge on theft by taking: “‘A person commits the offense of theft by taking when that person unlawfully takes any property of another with the intention of depriving the other person of the property regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. ’ (Emphasis added.) See Council of Superior Court Judges, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (4th ed.2007), vol. 2, § 2.64.20. Dudley insists that the inclusion of the last two words of this charge amounted to the presentation of both taking and appropriation theories to the jury. See Walker v. State, 146 Ga.App. 237, 239 (246 S.E.2d 206) (1978) (distinguishing between statute’s final use of ‘taken’ and ‘appropriated’ just as between theft by taking and by appropriation).” Charge as a whole accurately conformed to the indictment for theft by taking. “[C]ompare Dukes v. State, 265 Ga. 422, 423-424 (457 S.E.2d 556) (1995) (where indictment charged defendant only with theft by taking, jury charge on both taking and appropriation theories violated due process).” Gorham v. State, 287 Ga.App. 404, 651 S.E.2d 520 (September 4, 2007). Trial court erred in imposing felony sentence where State failed to prove value of items stolen. Accord, Stinson v. State , 294 Ga.App. 184, 668 S.E.2d 840 (October 22, 2008). Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 114, 645 S.E.2d 602 (April 16, 2007). Theft of three items in one transaction should have merged into one theft conviction. Citing to cases relating to robbery: “See Bland v. State, 264 Ga. 610, 612(4) (449 S.E.2d 116) (1994) (taking of multiple items from one victim in single transaction supports only one conviction of armed robbery); accord Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga.App. 177, 180(3) (581 S.E.2d 286) (2003).” Matthiessen v. State, 277 Ga.App. 54, 625 S.E.2d 422 (November 21, 2005). Evidence authorized defendant’s conviction for theft by taking based on fraudulent investment scheme. “‘[W]hen the alleged taking occurs when a defendant fails to perform under a contract with the victim, the “real issue” is whether the defendant accepted or retained the victim’s money with no intention to satisfy his obligations under the contract.’ Smith v. State, 265 Ga.App. 57, 59(1) (592 S.E.2d 871) (2004) (citation omitted); see also Tukes v. State, 250 Ga.App. 117, 121(1)(b)(i) (550 S.E.2d 678) (2001). The evidence showed that Matthiessen promised – orally and in writing – to use the buyers’ money to acquire tire hauling containers, but instead used it for other purposes that the buyers had not authorized. In addition, there was evidence that