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Matthiessen had persuaded people to invest in a different invention years before that never panned out. Whether Matthiessen intended to fulfill his contractual obligations when he took the buyers’ money was a question for the jury. [Cit.] Although Matthiessen testified that the buyers had implicitly authorized him to use their money for other purposes until [co-conspirator]’s plant began functioning, the jury was not required to believe his testimony. [Cit.] Based on the trial record as a whole, the jury was entitled to infer that Matthiessen acted with criminal intent and to find him guilty of theft by taking. [Cit.]” Accord, Patterson v. State , 289 Ga.App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (February 20, 2008) (evidence supported seven of defendant’s theft by taking convictions where it showed that defendant took victims’ funds with no intention to perform agreed-upon mortgage services in return.); Rushing (August 19, 2010), above (“although Rushing may have had lawful possession of the truck initially, he failed to return the truck, or even provide Simms with the location of the truck upon Simms' demands”). Woods v. State, 275 Ga.App. 340, 620 S.E.2d 609 (September 1, 2005). Charge of theft by taking should have merged with related charge of entering an auto. Hydock v. State, 275 Ga.App. 122, 619 S.E.2d 807 (August 15, 2005). Conviction for theft by taking reversed; evidence showed only that defendant salesman took money on contracts for fence installation, gave it to owner, and owner of company then absconded with funds. No evidence that salesman “‘“knowingly converted’ the money to himself,’” quoting Myrick v. State , 210 Ga.App. 393, 436 S.E.2d 100 (1993). Campbell v. State, 275 Ga.App. 8, 619 S.E.2d 720 (August 8, 2005). Convictions for theft by taking and theft by retaining of same motor vehicle were mutually exclusive, requiring reversal and new trial. Accord, Ingram v. State , 268 Ga.App. 149, 601 S.E.2d 736 (2004). Jefferson v. State, 273 Ga.App. 61, 614 S.E.2d 182 (April 20, 2005). Unlike theft by receiving, “we have repeatedly held that ‘[e]vidence of recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods is sufficient to support a conviction for theft by taking.’ Robinson v. State, 150 Ga.App. 261, 262 (257 S.E.2d 352) (1979). See, e.g., Pless v. State , 247 Ga.App. 786(1) (545 S.E.2d 340) (2001) (‘absence of ... explanation of the possession of the (stolen) goods will support a conviction for theft by taking based upon recent possession of the stolen goods’); Buchannon v. State, 199 Ga.App. 609, 610 (405 S.E.2d 583) (1991) (‘[a] defendant may be convicted for theft with neither direct proof nor circumstantial evidence, aside from this inference, that he committed the theft’) (emphasis supplied); Callahan v. State, 148 Ga.App. 555, 556(4) (251 S.E.2d 790) (1978) (‘[t]he evidence of recent unexplained possession of the stolen vehicle was sufficient in itself to support a conviction for theft by taking’).” “Here, Jefferson possessed some of the stolen items within hours of the theft. Even if this were not enough, the strong inference of guilt arising from possession within hours of the theft (‘“[t]he nearer the possession to the time of the (theft), the stronger will be the inference of guilt”’ Williamson [v. State, 248 Ga. 47, 48, 281 S.E.2d 512 (1981)] was compounded by the manner in which Jefferson disposed of the goods, namely pawning them within hours of the theft. [Cit.]” Accord, Drake v. State , 274 Ga.App. 882, 619 S.E.2d 380 (August 3, 2005); Davis v. State , 275 Ga.App. 714, 621 S.E.2d 818 (October 4, 2005). Stack-Thorpe v. State, 270 Ga.App. 796, 608 S.E.2d 289 (December 8, 2004). “‘[W]here there [has been] a continuous series of conversions of property of the owner entrusted to the defendant, the offense may be charged in a single count of the indictment. Such series of transactions constitutes ... a single embezzlement.’ (Citation omitted.) Simmons v. State, 79 Ga.App. 390 (53 S.E.2d 772) (1949) (finding that, otherwise, there might be almost as many counts as dollars embezzled).” Curry v. State, 269 Ga.App. 170, 603 S.E.2d 530 (August 18, 2004). “The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, and there was no fatal variance with the indictment. Contrary to Curry’s arguments, the victim need not own the property that was stolen. See Snelling v. State, 215 Ga.App. 263, 268(2), 450 S.E.2d 299 (1994) (robbery is a crime against possession unaffected by the concept of ownership). The object taken need only have been under the control or responsibility of the victim. Bryant v. State, 213 Ga.App. 301, 302, 444 S.E.2d 391 (1994). And [cashier/victim] testified that part of her job includes protecting against such occurrences. Next, [victim] was not too far distant for the crime of sudden snatching to be applicable. See Perkins [v. State], 256 Ga.App. at 449, 450-451, 568 S.E.2d 601 (2002) (six-feet is close enough).” Evidence also demonstrated that victims were aware of taking when it occurred. In re: S.D.T.E., 268 Ga.App. 685, 603 S.E.2d 316 (July 23, 2004). “Although, as S.D.T.E. argues, there was no evidence that any vehicles were removed from the car lot, the evidence showed that the vehicles had been moved from the place where they were kept, which is sufficient to show a taking. See Henderson v. State, 167 Ga.App. 808, 809(2), 307 S.E.2d