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either theft by taking ( Lee v. State, 259 Ga. 230(3), 378 S.E.2d 855 (1989)) or burglary. Breland v. Smith, 247 Ga. 690(2), 279 S.E.2d 204 (1981).” 15. THEFT GENERALLY Harris v. State, 324 Ga.App. 411, 750 S.E.2d 721 (October 30, 2013). Theft by taking, RICO and related convictions affirmed. 1. Asportation not an element of theft. Convicted of theft of real property – vacant homes that defendant and his co-defendants took over and leased out – defendant wrongly argues that the State was required to prove asportation as an element of theft. Defendant “argues that he actually ‘took’ nothing because the property involved was real property which remained in its original place at all times. But this argument is belied by the statutory definition of the offense, which may be committed ‘ regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16–18–2. Thus, we have held that ‘[t]he word “theft” is not, like “larceny,” a technical word of art with narrowly defined meaning, but a word of general and broad connotation, covering any criminal appropriation of another's property to the taker's use. ‘ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ruppert v. State, 284 Ga.App. 456, 458(1)(a) (643 S.E.2d 892) (2007). The statute does not define the term ‘appropriate,’ but we note the definition in Black's Law Dictionary: ‘[t]o make a thing one's own ... to exercise dominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one's own proper use or pleasure.’ Black's Law Dictionary (6 th ed., 1990). See also Doe v. State, 290 Ga. 667, 668 (725 S.E.2d 234) (2012) (‘In construing [a] statute, we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe the statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning....’). In this case, the evidence authorized a finding that Harris, without permission from the rightful owner, made use of real property by charging rent to tenants. This unauthorized exercise of dominion over the real property was sufficient to support his conviction for theft by taking.” 2. Intent. “Harris also argues that, based on evidence that he was willing to return the property if the rightful owner ever inquired, he lacked intent to steal the properties. But ‘regardless of whether [Harris] intended to take the [properties] and withhold [them] permanently, his intent to take [them] for his own temporary use without the owner[s'] authorization evinces an intent to commit a theft. Once criminal intent at the time of taking is proved, it becomes irrelevant whether the deprivation is permanent or temporary.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 172 Ga.App. 356, 357(2) (323 S.E.2d 257) (1984).” In re: R.W., 315 Ga.App. 227, 726 S.E.2d 708 (March 27, 2012). Evidence supported delinquency adjudication based on burglary of store and theft of guns therefrom; accomplice’s testimony was adequately corroborated. “[G]iven the peculiar nature of the crime, in which numerous guns were stolen, and the evidence that very shortly after the burglary R.W. was seen in possession of between three and ten guns, the trier of fact could infer that R.W. was in unexplained possession of the proceeds of the crime. See, e. g., Inman v. State, 182 Ga.App. 209 (355 S.E.2d 119) (1987) (recent possession of stolen property, not satisfactorily explained, is sufficient basis for the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony).” Dudley v State, 287 Ga.App. 794, 652 S.E.2d 840 (October 10, 2007). Police set up a drug buy from defendant, but defendant tried to steal the $21,500 used by the police for the buy. In addition to the drug charges, defendant was charged with theft by taking of the money. “Dudley … argues that he could not be convicted of theft by taking because the government informant was not an ‘innocent and legitimate’ owner of the money taken and because ‘there can be no intent to steal contraband.’ We disagree. … It avails nothing to question the informant’s title to the money. ‘[T]hose who steal will not be permitted to raise nice and delicate questions as to the title of that which is stolen.... So far as the thief is concerned, he cannot question the title of the apparent owner.’ Bell v. State, 276 Ga. 206, 208(4) (576 S.E.2d 876) (2003).” Branan v. State, 285 Ga.App. 717, 647 S.E.2d 606 (June 6, 2007). Defendant’s convictions for theft and securities violations did not merge as a matter of fact or law. “[B]ased upon the plain language of the statutes, we conclude that violation of OCGA § 10-5-12(a)(1) and theft by taking are separate offenses as a matter of law.” Likewise, “the prohibited act under OCGA § 10-5-12(a)(2)(C) is the intent to defraud; the crime does not require that the victim sustain a loss. [Cit.] Thus, because proof of theft by taking contains an element not contained in the offense of violation of OCGA § 10-5-12(a)(2)(C), the offenses cannot merge as a matter of law.” And “because the State had to prove separate facts to find Branan guilty of the theft by taking offenses and the violations of the Georgia Securities Act, the crimes do not merge as a matter of fact. [Cits.]” Parham v. State, 275 Ga.App. 528, 621 S.E.2d 532 (September 16, 2005). “The State accused Parham of stealing, in the aggregate, over $500 between January 2001 and November 2003. In a count in an accusation, the State may aggregate the amount of money an employee steals from an employer over time; the State is not required to charge a defendant with each separate incidence of theft in separate counts. [Cits.]” But where separate thefts are charged in separate counts,