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State must prove value of items stolen on each occasion for felony sentencing. See Gorham v. State , 287 Ga.App. 404, 651 S.E.2d 520 (September 4, 2007). Chastain v. State , 244 Ga.App. 84, 535 S.E.2d 25 (May 18, 2000). Theft by taking conviction affirmed; evidence supported finding of theft. “Whether Chastain subsequently got ‘cold feet’ after being advised that authorities had been contacted and so returned the vehicle is irrelevant. Also, when the police arrived, Chastain fled immediately. See Hogans v. State, 251 Ga. 242(1), 304 S.E.2d 699 (1983) (jury may consider whether flight constitutes some evidence of guilt).” 16. THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE Collymore v. State, 298 Ga. 355, 782 S.E.2d 7 (January 19, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly sentenced defendant for felony theft by taking of victim’s working Ford Taurus. “The theft of Gates’s vehicle occurred on September 6, 2011, and the version of OCGA § 16–8–12(a)(5)(A) that was effective from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2012, provided, in relevant part: ‘if the property which was the subject of the theft was a motor vehicle or was a motor vehicle part or component which exceeded $100 .00 in value ... [the theft may be punished] by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years or, in the discretion of the trial judge, as for a misdemeanor.’” “Effective July 1, 2012, the reference to motor vehicles was removed from the statute, which generally limited felony punishment to the theft of property exceeding $1,500 in value.” Harris v. State, 328 Ga.App. 852, 763 S.E.2d 133 (August 20, 2014). Theft by taking conviction affirmed, but evidence didn’t establish value of stolen car parts over $100 (to support felony sentence). “This case proceeded under former O.C.G.A. § 16–8–12(a)(5)(A), [FN: The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, deleted the clause ‘if the property which was the subject of the theft was a motor vehicle or was a motor vehicle part or component which exceeded $100.00 in value.’] which provided that a person shall be convicted of felony theft by taking if he unlawfully takes motor vehicle parts which exceed $100 in value.” “[W]itnesses observed five or six radiators in the back seat of Harris's car immediately after Harris exited the premises.” Victim testified that the radiators had an average value of $15 apiece. Defendant also admitted to stealing a battery, but no evidence established the value of a battery. Harris v. State, 286 Ga. 245, 686 S.E.2d 777 (November 23, 2009). Reversing Court of Appeals at 295 Ga.App. 727, 729- 730 (673 S.E.2d 76) (2009), majority concludes that a riding lawn mower is not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of “the statute punishing theft of a motor vehicle, OCGA § 16-8-12(a)(5)(A).” “A ‘motor vehicle’ is commonly understood to mean a self-propelled vehicle with wheels that is designed to be used, or is ordinarily used, to transport people or property on roads. That is the dictionary definition of the term. See Webster's Dictionary (defining ‘motor vehicle’ as ‘a vehicle on wheels, having its own motor and not running in rails or tracks, for use on streets or highways; esp., an automobile, truck, or bus’ (emphasis added)).” Also concludes, in dicta, that a riding mower would be “special mobile equipment,” not a “motor vehicle,” as defined in OCGA § 40-1-1. “With this definition [of special mobile equipment in OCGA § 40-1-1(59)], the General Assembly recognized that some ‘vehicles which are self-propelled’ are not designed for or ordinarily used to transport persons or property and are not ordinarily used on the road – even if such vehicles are able to do so or are used incidentally to do so. A riding lawnmower fits easily within this definition, as a riding lawnmower is closely akin to a ‘tractor’ with a mowing attachment; moreover, like much of the construction equipment listed in § 40-1-1(59), riding lawnmowers are used primarily to work along and around highways, not to move people or goods on highways. Accordingly, if in interpreting OCGA § 16-8-12 we look to OCGA § 40-1-1, the definition there that most closely applies to riding lawnmowers is ‘special mobile equipment’ rather than simply ‘motor vehicle.’” Kollie v. State, 301 Ga.App. 534, 687 S.E.2d 869 (November 19, 2009). Evidence supported defendants’ conviction for theft by taking of a motor vehicle although the owner did not testify that defendants didn’t have permission to take it (by gunpoint from the lawful occupant). “[W]e have held that ‘while it is necessary for the State to prove that the stolen property belonged to someone other than the defendant in order to support a theft by taking conviction, the identity of the owner is not a material element of the crime that must be alleged and proved.’ (Citation omitted.) Brandeburg v. State, 292 Ga.App. 191, 193(1) (663 S.E.2d 844) (2008). The evidence presented here was sufficient to show that the vehicle belonged to someone other than Brandt and Kollie. See id.” Xiong v. State, 295 Ga.App. 697, 673 S.E.2d 86 (January 27, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for theft by receiving stolen car. “ A missing VIN should put a reasonable person on notice that the car could have been stolen. See Ingram v. State, 160 Ga.App. 300 (287 S.E.2d 304) (1981) (sufficient evidence of knowledge that car was stolen where two cars found on defendant's property had been stripped of many parts, the VIN had been scraped from the doors of one, and the motor from one car was in defendant's personal car.).”