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In re: J.B.M., 294 Ga.App. 545, 669 S.E.2d 523 (November 14, 2008). Delinquency adjudication based on theft of motor vehicle reversed: “there was no trial evidence that J.B.M. had taken the truck or was a party to that crime. Rather, the evidence showed that J.B.M. was a mere passenger of the truck being driven by R.B. with his father's keys. J.B.M. testified that he was not aware that R.B. did not have permission to drive the truck, and the state failed to present any evidence establishing otherwise.” Barron v. State, 291 Ga.App. 494, 662 S.E.2d 285 (May 13, 2008). A “skid steer” is not a motor vehicle for theft purposes, but is “special mobile equipment” as defined in OCGA § 40-1-1(59). Accord, Harris (November 23, 2009) (riding lawn mower is special mobile equipment, not a motor vehicle). Cooper v. State, 281 Ga.App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (October 13, 2006). Passenger’s conviction for theft by receiving motor vehicle reversed; although defendant fled the scene and told officers he knew the vehicle was stolen, and the ignition had been by-passed, there was no evidence that defendant “possessed or controlled” the vehicle. “‘[R]iding in a stolen van or automobile as a passenger does not support a conviction for theft by receiving unless the accused also, at some point, acquires possession of or controls the vehicle, i.e., has the right to exercise power over a corporeal thing[.] Therefore, one cannot be convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property absent exercise of control over the stolen goods, or if one is a passenger, intentionally aiding and abetting the commission of the crime under OCGA § 16-2- 20(b),’” quoting In re: C.W., 226 Ga.App. 30, 31-32, 485 S.E.2d 561 (1997) (citations omitted). Here, as in In re: C.W. , “there was no evidence that the passenger had ever exercised control of the vehicle, such as by determining where it would go or whom it would transport; nor was there any evidence that the passenger had actively aided and abetted the crime. Id. The evidence, therefore, showed nothing more than that the defendant ‘was simply along for the ride.’” Also citing Harris v. State , 247 Ga.App. 41, 543 S.E.2d 75 (2000). Distinguishing Hurston v. State , 202 Ga.App. 311, 414 S.E.2d 303 (1991) (ignition by-passed, “driver had left [defendant] alone in the car with the motor running when he went into a convenience store) and Slaughter v. State , 240 Ga.App. 758, 525 S.E.2d 130 (1999) (defendant along with his accomplices had used the truck as a getaway vehicle in a bank robbery.) Accord, Morgan (July 25, 2006), below; In re: J.B.M. (November 14, 2008), above; Tigner v. State , 332 Ga.App. 808, 775 S.E.2d 180 (July 7, 2015). Compare to King (July 29, 2004), below. Morgan v. State, 280 Ga.App. 646, 634 S.E.2d 818 (July 25, 2006). Defendant’s conviction for theft by receiving of stolen van reversed. Defendant was a passenger in the van when stopped by police; “there was not sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that Morgan controlled or possessed the vehicle or aided or abetted the crime.” Compare King (July 29, 2004), below; Cooper (October 13, 2006) and In re: J.B.M. (November 14, 2008), above. Campbell v. State, 275 Ga.App. 8, 619 S.E.2d 720 (August 8, 2005). Convictions for theft by taking and theft by retaining of same motor vehicle were mutually exclusive, requiring reversal and new trial. Accord, Ingram v. State , 268 Ga.App. 149, 601 S.E.2d 736 (2004). King v. State, 268 Ga.App. 811, 603 S.E.2d 88 (July 29, 2004). “A passenger in a stolen vehicle may be convicted of theft by receiving if other circumstances exist from which guilty knowledge may be inferred, such as some evidence, either direct or circumstantial that the accused was a party to the crime by aiding and abetting its commission. [Cits.] In this case, [co-defendant] testified that King was with him when he stole the truck. In addition, [second co-defendant] testified that it was obvious the truck was stolen because ‘[t]he ignition was messed up.’ Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that King knew, or should have known, that the truck was stolen.” Compare Morgan (July 25, 2006), Cooper (October 13, 2006) and In re: J.B.M. (November 14, 2008), above. Norwood v. State, 265 Ga.App. 862, 595 S.E.2d 537 (February 11, 2004). Theft of a four-wheeler, “an ‘automatic transmission, key-operated, gasoline engine, recreation device,’” was sufficient to convict of motor vehicle theft , using definition of motor vehicle from OCGA § 40-1-1(33) (“every vehicle which is self-propelled other than an electric personal assistive mobility device”). Travis v. State , 243 Ga.App. 77, 532 S.E.2d 430 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for theft by taking of an automobile affirmed. “Travis contends that the evidence showed that he did not have the requisite control [fn] over the vehicle because the car was rolling in the parking lot. He further claims that because he had no keys to the car and the steering wheel column was not damaged, the evidence did not support the conviction for theft by taking. We disagree … The statute states that a theft is committed when a person, with the requisite intent, unlawfully takes the property of another;