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Accordingly, Kersey's conviction for no proof of insurance cannot stand.” Davidson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 580, 516 S.E.2d 90 (April 9, 1999). “The circumstance that Officer Kreher was unable to find any proof of insurance in the glove compartment, on the seat, or on the floor, coupled with defendant’s reliance on proof of insurance for a different vehicle, is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), to authorize the jury’s verdict that beyond a reasonable doubt defendant knowingly operated the vehicle in question without keeping proper proof of minimum insurance coverage therein. Nunn v. State, 224 Ga.App. 312, 313 (1)(b), 480 S.E.2d 614 (1997); Branch v. State, 182 Ga.App. 818-819(1), 357 S.E.2d 136 (1987).” 8. FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE Winston v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 607 S.E.2d 147 (October 29, 2004). “Under OCGA § 40-6-93, ‘every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway [and] shall give warning by sounding his horn when necessary ...’ Our Supreme Court has held that this statute requires drivers to exercise ordinary care to ‘discover and avoid persons in the roadway.’ Fountain v. Thompson, 252 Ga. 256, 257 (312 S.E.2d 788) (1984).” 9. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN LANE Evans-Glodowski v. State, 335 Ga.App. 484, 781 S.E.2d 591 (January 14, 2016). Vehicular homicide and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported conviction for failure to maintain lane, underlying offense to second-degree vehicular homicide: “[t]he evidence is undisputed that the collision occurred outside Evans–Glodowski’s lane of travel, and no alternative explanation for the collision arises from the evidence. We conclude the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Evans–Glodowski failed to maintain her lane of travel and, therefore, was guilty of second degree homicide by vehicle. OCGA §§ 40–6–393(c), 40–6–48(1); Camacho v. State, 292 Ga.App. 120, 123(2), 663 S.E.2d 364 (2008) (evidence that defendant drove into pothole outside lane of travel sufficient to sustain conviction for failing to maintain lane).” King v. State, 317 Ga.App. 834, 733 S.E.2d 21 (October 9, 2012). Evidence supported conviction for failure to maintain lane where “the officers testified that King failed to maintain her vehicle within a single lane when making a wide right turn and then again after completing the turn. The jurors were also shown a video from the officers' patrol car showing the maneuvers made by King's vehicle. This evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. See Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 650, 651 (613 S.E.2d 170) (2005) (noting that there was sufficient evidence of failure to maintain lane when officer ‘observed that [the defendant] was failing to maintain his lane in that the passenger side tires of the vehicle would break the double white lines of the lane’).” Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only. “OCGA § 40-6-48(1) provides that ‘[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.’ The fact that Schlanger’s vehicle exited the roadway before coming to rest upside down in the adjacent gore area provided sufficient evidence that he failed to maintain his lane of traffic. Id; Crenshaw v. State, 280 Ga.App. 568, 569 (634 S.E.2d 520) (2006).” Stewart v. State, 288 Ga.App. 735, 655 S.E.2d 328 (December 4, 2007). Conviction for failure to maintain lane reversed; no evidence that Georgia Highway 15 was marked for lanes of travel. Walker v. State, 280 Ga.App. 393, 634 S.E.2d 177 (July 11, 2006). Defendant was charged by accusation with improper lane change (OCGA § 40-6-123(a)), but the court charged the jury on failure to maintain lane (OCGA § 40-6-48). “ Improper lane change differs from failure to maintain a lane in that it requires, in addition to changing lanes without being able to do so safely, failure to give ‘an appropriate and timely signal. ’” Held, trial court’s charge based on wrong code section requires reversal. “Our decision here is governed by the holding in Threatt v. State, 240 Ga.App. 592, 599(4) (524 S.E.2d 276) (1999). In Threatt, the accusation charged the defendant with a violation of OCGA § 40-6- 48, but the trial court instructed the jury on OCGA § 40-6-123(b). See id. We held that: ‘[b]ecause these instructions were inconsistent and likely confused the jurors to the extent that they could not render an intelligent verdict on the charge alleged in the accusation, reversal and a new trial are required on the charge of improper lane change. Id. Similarly, the accusation read to the jury charged Walker with improper lane change, but the jury was twice instructed on the elements of failure to maintain a lane. These inconsistent instructions require us to reverse Walker’s conviction for improper lane change. See id.” Kuehne v. State, 274 Ga.App. 668, 618 S.E.2d 702 (July 27, 2005). Evidence was sufficient to convict of failure to