☢ test - Í

maintain lane: “As Officer Northrop followed Kuehne, he witnessed Kuehne driving completely from one side of his lane to the other numerous times. In doing so, Kuehne’s wheels at least partially crossed over the center of the white line separating his lane from the next. As a result, portions of his car actually crossed over into the adjacent lane of traffic. Officer Northrop explained that, although the wheels of Kuehne’s car never fully crossed the centerline, the body of the car and the rear view mirrors were ‘actually over the lines’ and into the next lane.” Viau v. State, 260 Ga.App. 96, 579 S.E.2d 52 (February 21, 2003). Offense of failure to maintain lane does not require that any other vehicle be endangered. Accord, Allenbrand v. State , 217 Ga.App. 609, 458 S.E.2d 382 (1995). 10. FAILURE TO OBEY TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICE Brogdon v. State, 299 Ga.App. 547, 683 S.E.2d 99 (August 5, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for failure to obey traffic control device where defendant rear-ended another vehicle waiting at a red light. “We agree with the state that a reasonable reading of the statute requires that a driver facing a red traffic light stop behind the stop line or cross walk and also behind those vehicles stopped in observance of the traffic light.” Affirmed on other grounds, 287 Ga. 528, 697 S.E.2d 211 (July 12, 2010). 11. FAILURE TO REPORT ACCIDENT Harvey v. State, 277 Ga.App. 435, 626 S.E.2d 623 (January 31, 2006). Conviction for failure to report accident reversed for lack of evidence of damage to vehicle. “the only evidence proffered by the State was that the front bumper was pushed down in the ditch, and ‘it had grill damage and stuff like that.’ No other evidence regarding the amount of damage the car sustained was presented. No photographs were introduced, and the deputy did not testify that the bumper was damaged as a result of being pushed into the ditch or explain what ‘stuff like that’ meant. Moreover, Harvey testified that his car ‘already had front-end damage,’ and he did not hit any ‘fixed objects or an animal.’ Harvey further testified that he ‘didn’t feel that [he] was going to have to worry about claiming it on [his] insurance or any other thing,’ and that he felt the car could be pulled out of the ditch and taken home.” “While there is no specific statutory mandate that the amount of damage be certain, there must be some evidence presented that the factfinder, in this instance the trial judge, can use to estimate the cost of damage to the vehicle and conclude that the ‘apparent extent’ of the damage to car at the time of the collision exceeded $500. See generally Cox v. State, 243 Ga.App. 582, 582- 583(1), 532 S.E.2d 697 (2000). Here, there was none. Although the factfinder would be authorized to infer from evidence presented that the damage to a vehicle cost a certain amount to repair, here no evidence was presented to permit such an inference. When, in this circumstance, the onus is on the defendant to make an assessment at the time of the accident about the ‘apparent extent’ of damage to his vehicle, he should not face criminal prosecution for a low estimation without some evidence of the nature and extent of the damage to the car. Accordingly, we find the evidence insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, … to find Harvey guilty of the crime charged.” Steele v. State, 275 Ga.App. 651, 621 S.E.2d 606 (September 28, 2005). “Steele argues that he had no duty to report the accident because Starr’s injuries appeared to be ‘trivial’ after the accident. We disagree. Numerous witnesses testified that Starr fell from the bed of a moving truck and was unconscious after the accident. A fall from a moving vehicle with a subsequent loss of consciousness is clearly ‘an accident resulting in injury’ for which a report to the police is required.” 12. FAILURE TO STOP UPON STRIKING AN UNATTENDED VEHICLE Fairwell v. State, 311 Ga.App. 834, 717 S.E.2d 332 (October 4, 2011). Obstruction and related convictions affirmed; jury charge didn’t improperly expand on indictment by giving the definition of the offense, although the indictment didn’t use all the words of the code section. Defendant was charged with failure to stop upon striking an unattended vehicle. “Fairwell claims the trial court improperly instructed the jury that a violation of OCGA § 40–6–271(a) occurs when an individual fails to ‘immediately’ stop, in light of the fact that the indictment did not allege that Fairwell failed to ‘immediately’ stop and evidence showed that she stopped later. … ‘The trial judge must charge the jury on each crime specified in the indictment or accusation, unless the evidence does not warrant a conviction of such crime....’ Essuon v. State, 286 Ga.App. 869, 872(2) (650 S.E.2d 409) (2007), citing Gardner v. State, 185 Ga.App. 184 (363 S.E.2d 843)(1987). OCGA § 40–6–271(a) does not provide any method of violating the statute (regarding the duty to stop), other than by a failure to stop immediately. [fn] The evidence showed that after striking the unattended vehicle, Fairwell failed to immediately stop. Consequently, the trial court's charge to the jury that the offense is committed by failing to ‘immediately’ stop was not erroneous because it is only in this manner that the statute is violated, regarding the duty to stop.”