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Hicks v. State, 321 Ga.App. 773, 743 S.E.2d 458 (May 16, 2013). Evidence supported misdemeanor, but not felony, fleeing and eluding “because there was insufficient evidence showing that there were traffic conditions that placed the general public at risk of serious injury.” “The transcript contains no testimony related to risk to the general public, and the video of the chase, as recorded by the camera mounted on the police cruiser, shows empty roadways containing no other vehicles or pedestrians during the pendency of the pursuit.” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768, 723 S.E.2d 915 (March 23, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence that defendant fled from five different police vehicles in a single chase supported five separate convictions for attempting to elude a police officer. “Based on the plain language of the statute, the act or conduct that is prohibited by OCGA § 40–6–395 is the ‘willful[ ] ... fail[ure] or refus[al] to bring [one's] vehicle to a stop or otherwise to flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle or police officer when given a visual or an audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, it is the act of fleeing from an individual police vehicle or police officer after being given a proper visual or audible signal to stop from that individual police vehicle or officer, and not just the act of fleeing itself, that forms the proper “unit of prosecution” under OCGA § 40–6–395.” Bledson v. State, 294 Ga.App. 772, 670 S.E.2d 223 (November 21, 2008). Conviction for fleeing from officer reversed for lack of evidence. Defendant pulled over her vehicle pursuant to deputy’s siren; deputy executed traffic stop because defendant’s passenger/boyfriend was wanted on numerous warrants. Boyfriend fled on foot, firing at officer as he ran. Deputy was injured by falling to the ground. “Bledson immediately drove away from the scene after [boyfriend] Quinones fired the shots.” Evidence failed to support conviction for fleeing because “there is no evidence that the deputy was in pursuit of Bledson when she left the scene. Bledson had already complied with the officer's signal that she bring her vehicle to a stop; thus, the purpose of the traffic stop had been completed. The record clearly demonstrates that Quinones was the object of the deputy's pursuit, given that the officer chased him when he ran from the vehicle, never instructed Bledson to remain at the scene , and never charged her with any crime other than fleeing and obstruction based upon her departure from the area.” Three judges dissent : “Although Bledson initially stopped her vehicle in response to the pursuing deputy, the pursuit did not end at that point. A violation of OCGA § 40-6-395(a) can occur if the defendant initially stops his or her vehicle in response to the pursuing officer, but then flees before the stop has ended, because at that point the pursuit has not yet come to an end. See, e. g., Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775, 777(1) (631 S.E.2d 351) (2006); Davidson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 580, 581(2) (516 S.E.2d 90) (1999). ‘[A] traffic stop ends when the officer finishes responding to the ... violation and releases the motorist.’ Hendrix v. State, 273 Ga.App. 792, 794(1) (616 S.E.2d 127) (2005).” Cochran v. State, 288 Ga.App. 538, 654 S.E.2d 458 (November 21, 2007). 1. Indictment was insufficient to allege felony fleeing and eluding where it failed to include element of “flee[ing] in traffic conditions such that the general public is placed at risk of serious injuries.” Other counts of DUI, failure to maintain lane, and stop sign violation, were not sufficient to supply this element, distinguishing Howard v. State, 252 Ga.App. 487 (555 S.E.2d 884) (2001) (predicate offense such as reckless driving may supply missing element of another offense – vehicular homicide – if fully set forth in a separate count). “In the instant case, unlike Howard, nowhere in the indictment is the predicate offense “flees in traffic conditions such that the general public is placed at risk of serious injuries” mentioned. Where the indictment does not contain one of the four predicate offenses required for conviction of a felony under the fleeing or attempting to elude statute, the trial court may not sentence the defendant for the felony offense. Thomas v. State, 255 Ga.App. 777, 780 (567 S.E.2d 72) (2002).” Distinguished, Hinton v. State , 297 Ga.App. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (April 17, 2009) (indictment alleged “traffic conditions which placed the general public at risk of receiving serious injuries.”). 2. “The evidence at trial was insufficient to convict Cochran of felony fleeing from an officer. The State offered no evidence at trial of any traffic conditions and no evidence of any cars or pedestrians that may have been at risk due to Cochran’s driving while he was fleeing from the officer.” Distinguished, Hinton v. State , 297 Ga.App. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (April 17, 2009) (police video allowed jury to view both defendant’s driving and traffic conditions “and determine from that evidence whether Hinton fled ‘in traffic conditions which place[d] the general public at risk of receiving serious injuries.’”). Bradford v. State, 287 Ga.App. 50, 651 S.E.2d 356 (July 31, 2007). Conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude reversed; evidence did not indicate that officer who was following defendant ever signaled him to stop. Responding to a lookout for a stolen vehicle, officer spotted it and “turned his marked patrol car around to pursue the vehicle. The X-terra accelerated rapidly and ran a traffic light before the driver made a sudden left turn into an apartment complex.” “The statute at issue expressly prohibits a driver from fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer after having been given some signal – either ‘by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren.’ OCGA § 40-9-395(a). Thus, it is a