☢ test - Í

necessary element of the crime that some clear signal be given that the driver is to stop. [fn] Here, Bailey testified that he did not activate his blue lights, and there is no evidence that he gave any other signal to communicate to the driver of the X-terra that he was required to stop. [fn] Under these circumstances, we agree that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense of fleeing to elude. See Phillips, supra. (defendant entitled to directed verdict on obstruction where officer never turned on emergency lights or otherwise ordered defendant to halt); Williams v. State, 285 Ga.App. 190, 192(1) (645 S.E.2d 676) (2007) (physical precedent only).” State’s argument “that the list of possible signals to stop contained in OCGA § 40-6-395(a) should not be considered exhaustive and that we should look instead to the legislative intent” doesn’t work, as the criminal statute must be strictly construed, and “the plain language of the statute requires that drivers be given a signal to stop before they can be found culpable for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.” Maxwell v. State, 282 Ga. 22, 644 S.E.2d 822 (May 14, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for fleeing and eluding where signal to stop came from officer on foot. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (March 28, 2007). Accusation charging fleeing and eluding was not insufficient despite omitting the word “pursuing” police vehicle found in the code section. “We find that the indictment provided sufficient notice of the charge that the omission of the term ‘pursuing’ did not prove prejudicial to Jackson’s presentation of his defense.” Cooper v. State, 281 Ga.App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (October 13, 2006). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle which stopped, then drove away when pulled over by police. Vehicle wrecked during chase, and occupants fled on foot. “[W]here a passenger flees the scene along with the driver after the police have stopped the vehicle, he becomes chargeable as a party to the crime. See [ Bivins v. State, 166 Ga.App. 580, 581(2), 305 S.E.2d 29 (1983)] (evidence that passenger threw contraband out of car during police chase sufficient to show driver and passenger acted in concert to effect unlawful escape); see generally Peppers v. State, 242 Ga.App. 416, 417(1), 530 S.E.2d 34 (2000) (conduct before and after offense are circumstances from which participation may be inferred); compare Carter v. State, 249 Ga.App. 354, 357(5), 548 S.E.2d 102 (2001) (no evidence that passenger fled or resisted arrest after vehicle stopped).” Accord, Westmoreland v. State , 287 Ga. 688, 699 S.E.2d 13 (June 28, 2010). Michael v. State, 281 Ga.App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790 (August 8, 2006). Trial court properly sentenced defendant on two counts of fleeing and eluding officer where “the first count of eluding an officer by exceeding the posted speed limit by at least 30 mph occurred as the officer was chasing the truck down the local road and clocked the vehicle as exceeding 100 mph in a 55-mph zone. This crime was therefore separate and complete prior to the truck’s driver running the red light and endangering the crossing vehicle in his efforts to elude police, which was the basis for the second count of eluding an officer. Accordingly, the crimes did not factually merge.” Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775, 631 S.E.2d 351 (June 12, 2006). OCGA § 40-6-395, making it unlawful to flee and elude police officers, does not contain an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to [executive branch] police officers. “The failure to include within the statute the amount of time that must elapse or the distance that must be traveled before the driver’s failure to stop becomes criminal conduct is not an improper delegation of legislative power to the law enforcement officer who arrests a driver or issues a citation charging the driver with violating the statute. Compare Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95 (230 S.E.2d 853) (1976) (legislative enactment making criminal a violation of ‘any of the rules or regulations promulgated by [an executive branch] commission’ was held to be an improper delegation of legislative power), with DOT v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699(1) (398 S.E.2d 567) (1990) (legislative authority may be delegated provided the General Assembly has provided sufficient guidelines for the delegatee). By acting on his determination that he had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed, the officer was not called upon to exercise the legislative function of defining what constitutes a crime, but the executive branch function of enforcing the law.” State v. Searcy, 277 Ga.App. 642, 627 S.E.2d 210 (February 16, 2006). Upon defendant’s conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, trial court erred in failing to impose the mandatory 10 days’ imprisonment required by OCGA § 40-6-395(b)(1)(A). Sentence vacated and case remanded for sentencing. Spence v. State, 263 Ga.App. 25, 587 S.E.2d 183 (September 2, 2003). Conviction for fleeing and eluding reversed. “The accusation charged Spence with this offense by alleging that he ‘did ... drive a vehicle and willfully fail or refuse to