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testified that Shell's driving caused the traffic behind him to back up and created a hazard.” Rowe v. State, 314 Ga.App. 747, 725 S.E.2d 861 (March 12, 2012). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress evidence arising from traffic stop. “The officer observed Rowe's vehicle in the left lane traveling slower than every other motorist on the interstate and slower than the posted maximum speed limit of 70 miles per hour. The officer observed that other motorists did not appear to be speeding and were attempting to pass Rowe's vehicle by moving into the right-hand lane, creating the potential for an accident. … See OCGA § 40–6–184(a)(2) (prohibiting a vehicle from traveling in the left-most lane at less than the maximum speed limit when the driver knows or reasonably should know he is being overtaken by another vehicle); Gabbidon v. State, 184 Ga.App. 475, 475, 476(2) (361 S.E.2d 861) (1987) (holding that an officer's testimony that the defendant's vehicle was impeding the flow of traffic in violation of OCGA § 40–6–184 was sufficient evidence to justify an investigatory stop).” State v. Parke, 304 Ga.App. 124, 695 S.E.2d 413 (May 18, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress; officer lacked articulable suspicion to stop defendant for “impeding the flow of traffic.” Evidence showed that, while defendant was driving in fast lane of I-75, at least two other vehicles – exceeding the speed limit – passed defendant on the right. “It is true that OCGA § 40-6-184(a)(2) ‘prohibits traveling in the leftmost lane at less than the maximum speed limit when the driver knows or reasonably should know that he is being overtaken by another vehicle.’ Gossett v. State, 199 Ga.App. 286(1)(a) (404 S.E.2d 595) (1991). But we do not construe this statutory subsection to apply where, as here, the driver is being overtaken by another vehicle that is exceeding the maximum speed limit. In such a context, the other vehicle is not overtaking the driver because the latter is impeding the flow of traffic by traveling unreasonably slow, but rather because the other vehicle is traveling unreasonably fast in violation of the traffic laws.” Darwicki v. State, 291 Ga.App. 239, 661 S.E.2d 859 (April 18, 2008) (physical precedent only). “Darwicki contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for impeding the flow of traffic, OCGA § 40-6-184(1)(a). We agree. It is axiomatic that one cannot impede the flow of traffic when there is no traffic to impede. Id. (‘No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation.’) (emphasis supplied); see also Raulerson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 556, 557-558(2) (479 S.E.2d 386) (1996) (‘defendant could not have been impeding the flow of traffic ... [because] there was no traffic on the road for defendant to impede’). Here, there is no evidence Darwicki was driving unusually slowly, or that any other cars attempted to pass her while she was stopped. Consequently, we must reverse this conviction.” Accord, Green v. State , 323 Ga.App. 832, 748 S.E.2d 479 (September 11, 2013). Dunn v. State, 289 Ga.App. 585, 657 S.E.2d 649 (February 13, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for impeding flow of traffic: “Dunn’s truck was ‘traveling at a low rate of speed,’ approximately 25 to 30 m.p.h., on an interstate highway with a minimum posted speed limit of 40 m.p.h. The officer also testified ‘that traffic was getting backed up behind’ Dunn’s truck.” State v. Whelchel, 269 Ga.App. 314, 604 S.E.2d 200 (July 23, 2004). Officer testified at motion to suppress hearing that he stopped defendant for impeding traffic. Defendant was traveling in fast lane of I-85, going 10 miles per hour less than the speed limit. “The officer testified that he was five or six car lengths behind Whelchel. He further testified that the other vehicles slowed down behind the officer’s vehicle, admitting he did not know if the other vehicles slowed down because of the presence of his police vehicle, or because the defendant impeded their progress. The officer stated that the vehicles were at a safe distance behind Whelchel’s vehicle and there was nothing preventing the vehicles from maneuvering into the far right lane in order to pass Whelchel. Although Whelchel was traveling 10 miles per hour under the posted speed limit, the closest vehicle was more than six car lengths behind his vehicle. Under these facts, the officer’s belief that Whelchel was impeding the flow of traffic was an insufficient basis for initiating an investigative stop. Therefore, the trial court was correct in finding there was no articulable suspicion for the stop and properly granted the motion to suppress.” Distinguished, Shell (April 12, 2012), above. 18. IMPROPER BACKING Collier v. State, 282 Ga.App. 605, 639 S.E.2d 405 (November 29, 2006). “OCGA § 40-6-240(a) provides: ‘A driver shall not back a vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.’ The facts here constitute some evidence of unsafe backing regardless of whether vehicles other than police cars were in the roadway. The fact that Collier managed to perform this maneuver without actually striking another vehicle does not demand a finding that ‘this maneuver was made with safety as OCGA § 40- 6-240(a) requires.’ Roberson v. State, 230 Ga.App. 179, 180 (495 S.E.2d 643) (1998).