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19. IMPROPER LANE CHANGE/TURN Sevilla-Carcamo v. State, 335 Ga.App. 788, 783 S.E.2d 150 (February 23, 2016). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for cocaine trafficking; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Traffic stop was proper based on failure to signal for lane change on busy interstate. “Sevilla–Carcamo argues that it was not necessary for her to utilize a turn signal while merging onto I–85 because drivers traveling southbound had ‘already been notified by a conspicuous merge sign with arrows indicating ... that vehicles will be merging into their lane of travel, thus obviating the need for southbound merge lane drivers to signal’ and because, at the relevant on-ramp, ‘merge lane drivers have no legal option but to share the same lane [in which] they are already traveling.’ But we agree with the trial court that because, during a period of heavy traffic, Sevilla–Carcamo failed to use a turn signal when she crossed over a dashed lane line [cits.] into the lane in which the on-ramp would have eventually fully merged, the officer indeed had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop for violating OCGA § 40–6–123. See Morgan v. State, 309 Ga.App. 740, 745–46, 710 S.E.2d 922 (2011) (holding that the trial court was ‘authorized to find that the evidence placed vehicles in close spatial and temporal proximity to the Hyundai when it made its turn such that the officer had probable cause to believe that the driver of the Hyundai had violated OCGA § 40–6–123 by turning without signaling’); Salinas–Valdez v. State, 276 Ga.App. 732, 732–33(1), 624 S.E.2d 278 (2005) (holding that deputy had a ‘sufficiently specific basis to justify the initial stop’ when driver changed lanes without signaling in ‘medium heavy to heavy’ traffic); Johnson v. State, 249 Ga.App. 29, 30, 546 S.E.2d 922 (2001) (holding that stop of vehicle was authorized when officer observed driver abruptly change lanes without signaling three times when ‘three or four’ other cars were on the roadway). Cf. State v. Goodman, 220 Ga.App. 169, 171(2), 469 S.E.2d 327 (1996) (holding that driver’s legal u-turn at intersection from left-turn-only lane without signaling did not justify traffic stop for making improper left turn).” State v. Mincher, 313 Ga.App. 875, 723 S.E.2d 300 (February 2, 2012). In DUI prosecution, affirming grant of motion to suppress; evidence supported trial court’s finding that officer lacked articulable suspicion for stop. “[T]he State argues that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the traffic stop because Mincher made an illegal right turn in violation of OCGA § 40–6–120(a)(1), which provides that: ‘[b]oth the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway ....’ However, after hearing the officer and Mincher's testimony and reviewing the exhibits, including the video of the traffic stop, the trial court found that Mincher used her turn signal, checked for traffic behind her to ensure that no one's safety was at risk, and ultimately made her turn from the dedicated right turn lane. And based on these findings, the trial court concluded that Mincher's right turn was not illegal, and thus, there was no objective basis for a reasonable suspicion that she was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. See State v. Morgan, 260 Ga.App. 263, 264–65(1) (581 S.E.2d 296) (2003) (holding that trial court was authorized to find that defendant's right turn was not illegal and thus officer had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify traffic stop).” McNair v. State, 285 Ga. 514, 678 S.E.2d 69 (June 8, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for violating “OCGA § 40-6- 120(a)(2), the traffic statute addressing left-hand turns,” reversed, and the code section declared void for vagueness. Unanimous Supreme Court rules that the language of the code section is subject to two possible meanings when it directs that “the left turn shall be made … so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being entered.” Court finds that the word “leave” has two possible, diametrically-opposed meanings: “The first interpretation is that a driver who wants to make a left turn onto a roadway with multiple lanes must make the turn in a manner that leaves the intersection or other extreme left-hand lane location lawfully available, i.e., open or clear, to traffic moving in the same direction on the roadway the driver has just entered. [fn] This interpretation applies ‘leave’ in the context of its definition as ‘to permit to remain undisturbed ... to permit to remain unoccupied ... to let be without interference.’ Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3rd ed.), p. 1287.” “The second interpretation of OCGA § 40-6-120(a)(2) is that a driver who wants to make a left turn onto a roadway with multiple lanes must make the turn so that, when the driver departs from or ‘leaves’ the intersection or other location, the turning vehicle is itself located in the lane farthest to the left that is lawfully available to traffic moving in that same direction. The interpretation applies ‘leave’ in the context of its tertiary definition as ‘to go away or depart from.’ Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra.” Defendant here was accused of violating the code section by turning left onto a road with two lanes of traffic for east-bound traffic, and into the right lane. State contended that the code section required Defendant to choose the left lane. Walker v. State, 280 Ga.App. 393, 634 S.E.2d 177 (July 11, 2006). Defendant was charged by accusation with improper lane change (OCGA § 40-6-123(a)), but the court charged the jury on failure to maintain lane (OCGA § 40-6-48). “Improper lane change differs from failure to maintain a lane in that it requires, in addition to changing lanes without