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being able to do so safely, failure to give ‘an appropriate and timely signal.’” Held, trial court’s charge based on wrong code section requires reversal. “Our decision here is governed by the holding in Threatt v. State, 240 Ga.App. 592, 599(4) (524 S.E.2d 276) (1999). In Threatt, the accusation charged the defendant with a violation of OCGA § 40-6-48, but the trial court instructed the jury on OCGA § 40-6-123(b). See id. We held that: ‘[b]ecause these instructions were inconsistent and likely confused the jurors to the extent that they could not render an intelligent verdict on the charge alleged in the accusation, reversal and a new trial are required on the charge of improper lane change. Id. Similarly, the accusation read to the jury charged Walker with improper lane change, but the jury was twice instructed on the elements of failure to maintain a lane. These inconsistent instructions require us to reverse Walker’s conviction for improper lane change. See id.” Salinas-Valdez v. State, 276 Ga.App. 732, 624 S.E.2d 278 (December 8, 2005). “[O]ne of two sheriff’s deputies traveling on a highway observed a car behind them change lanes without signaling and then pull in front of their patrol car. Traffic was ‘medium heavy to heavy’ with approximately 20 vehicles nearby traveling in the same direction. In the officer’s opinion, the lane change was unsafe.” Held, deputy’s stop for improper lane change without signal was appropriate; “[t]he deputy’s testimony indicated that [driver]’s driving was not “reasonably safe”within the meaning of the statute. [Cits.]’ Huynh v. State, 239 Ga.App. 62, 63(1) (518 S.E.2d 920) (1999).” McBride v. State, 246 Ga.App. 151, 539 S.E.2d 201 (September 12, 2000). Convictions for cocaine and marijuana possession affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Stop based on failure to signal turn was supported by probable cause. “There is here no dispute that defendant turned right without signaling into the southbound lane of the road that the arresting deputy was preparing to turn onto. The vehicles were in close proximity to each other. It was dark, the time being late. While defendant correctly argues that there was no traffic to his rear and, in a literal sense, no oncoming traffic to his front, the circumstances were such that there was real and palpable danger-this given the potential for sudden ‘oncoming traffic’ upon defendant’s failure to use his turn signal in tight quarters, significantly reducing the margin for attendant operator error. We conclude that under these circumstances, defendant’s use of his turn signal was required under OCGA § 40-6-123(b).” Woodward v. State, 245 Ga.App. 409, 537 S.E.2d 791 (July 28, 2000). Cocaine possession and related traffic convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress as traffic stop was supported by articulable suspicion where “the evidence shows that police officers were observing and following Woodward's truck when he made ‘an abrupt right turn into a driveway’ without signaling.” Distinguishing Clark v. State, 208 Ga.App. 896, 432 S.E.2d 220 (1993) (physical precedent only): “the police officer in that case was 300 feet behind the defendant's vehicle. … Here, however, it is undisputed that the officers' car was immediately behind Woodward's vehicle, and Woodward himself testified that he was aware that the officers were behind him. … In accordance with OCGA § 40–6–123, Woodward was required to use his signal to alert the officers behind him of his intention to turn right. [Cit.] Upon observing Woodward commit a traffic offense, the officers were authorized to stop him. [Cit.] Harris v. State, 239 Ga.App. 537, 540(2)(a), 521 S.E.2d 462 (1999); Buffington v. State, 229 Ga.App. 450, 451, 494 S.E.2d 272 (1997) (‘if the arresting officer witnessed the driver breaking even a relatively minor traffic law, a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment arguing that the stop was pretextual must fail.’) (citation omitted).” Huynh v. State, 239 Ga.App. 62, 518 S.E.2d 920 (June 4, 1999). “The statute’s language indicates that a turn signal is not required if changing lanes without a signal is reasonably safe. The deputy’s testimony indicated that Huynh’s driving was not ‘reasonably safe’ within the meaning of the statute. Cf. Bowers v. State, 221 Ga.App. 886, 473 S.E.2d 201 (1996); see also State v. Reddy, 236 Ga.App. 106(1), 511 S.E.2d 530 (1999).” Stop based on failing to signal was thus authorized. State v. Reddy, 236 Ga.App. 106, 511 S.E.2d 530 (January 12, 1999). Defendant’s left turn at a three-way stop, with police vehicle five-to-seven feet behind him, justified traffic stop for improper turn, notwithstanding trial court’s finding that no one was endangered by the otherwise-legal maneuver. Distinguishing Clark v. State, 208 Ga.App. 896, 897, 432 S.E.2d 220 (1993) (officer’s vehicle 300 feet behind defendant, no other vehicles nearby), Bowers v. State, 221 Ga.App. 886, 473 S.E.2d 201 (1996) (same). “[I]n this case, the other vehicle, i.e., the police car, was only five to seven feet to the rear, well within the ambit of the Act’s ‘zone of reasonable safety,’ when such signals are required. Bowers v. State , supra at 888, 473 S.E.2d 201. Further, while the principle of these cases may apply equally between lane changes and left or right turns, the distances would not be comparable. … The distance zone of ‘reasonable safety’ must be much greater for turning vehicles, because of distances and speeds necessary to safely complete a turn in relation to approaching vehicles.”