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20. IMPROPER PASSING Haynes-Turner v. State, 289 Ga.App. 652, 658 S.E.2d 203 (February 18, 2008). Accusation adequately charged defendants with improper passing in a no-passing zone. “OCGA § 40-6-46(a) provides that “every driver of a vehicle shall obey” signs or markings indicating no-passing zones. [fn] A ‘no-passing zone’ is defined as ‘those portions of any highway ... marked by a solid barrier line placed on the right-hand element of a combination stripe along the center or lane line or by a solid double yellow line,’ which portion has been determined by either the Department of Transportation or local authority to be an area ‘where overtaking and passing or driving to the left side of the roadway would be especially hazardous.’ OCGA § 40-6-46(a). The accusation in this case charged each of the [defendants] ‘with the offense of passing in a no passing zone; for that the said [defendants] did ..., on or about the 4th day of June 2006, pass[ ] in an area where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone, contrary to the laws of this state.’” “[T]he [defendants] could not admit, as accused, that they passed in an area defined by markings as a no-passing zone contrary to the laws of this state without being guilty of the crime charged.” Parker v. State, 276 Ga.App. 9, 622 S.E.2d 403 (October 18, 2005). Convicted of passing in a no-passing zone, defendant contends that the garbage truck he was passing was an “obstruction.” OCGA § 40-6-40(a)(2) authorizes one to drive left of center “[w]hen an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center….” Held, the trial court could find that an operating garbage truck is not an obstruction within the meaning of the code section; while “an object need not be stationary in order to be an obstruction,” Smith v. Lott , 246 Ga. 366, 271 S.E.2d 463 (1980), “‘[e]xcept in clear and palpable cases,’ the question of whether a motor vehicle is being operated so as to constitute an obstruction in the roadway is one for the factfinder. Id . at 367.” Smith v. State, 237 Ga.App. 77, 514 S.E.2d 710 (March 17, 1999). 1. “[T]he indictment alleges that Smith committed vehicular homicide by violating OCGA § 40-6-46, passing in a no-passing zone, thereby causing a death. OCGA § 40-6- 46 is a traffic safety statute. This Court has held the violation of such a traffic safety statute regulating the use of highways does not constitute criminal negligence unless such violation is intentional, wilful, or wanton, or unless the violation, though unintentional, is accompanied by recklessness or is committed under circumstances from which probable death or injury to others might be reasonably anticipated. See Abernathy v. State, 191 Ga.App. 350, 351(2), 381 S.E.2d 537 (1989).” 2. “When read together, OCGA §§ 40-6-46(c) and 40-6-40(a)(2) provide that there is no violation of the no-passing zone statute when an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway, provided that any person so doing shall yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard. See OCGA § 40-6- 40(a)(2). It is well established that a motor vehicle may be such an obstruction when it is operated on a public road in a manner which could not be generally or reasonably anticipated, taking into account all of the circumstances and conditions present at the time and place, and thereby hinders or impedes the proper travel on the road. See Smith v. Lott, 246 Ga. 366, 367, 271 S.E.2d 463 (1980). Whether Smith was confronted by an emergency situation and whether the deceased’s automobile posed an obstruction in the roadway which would authorize Smith to cross the double yellow centerline into the left lane were questions for the jury to resolve. [Cits.]” Accord, Przyjemski v. State , 290 Ga.App. 22, 658 S.E.2d 807 (March 4, 2008). 21. IMPROPERLY PASSING AN EMERGENCY VEHICLE Pierce v. State, 322 Ga.App. 145, 743 S.E.2d 438 (May 13, 2013). Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for improperly passing an emergency vehicle: “the evidence shows that Pierce passed the officer in a lane adjacent to the officer while he concluded a traffic stop and had his blue emergency lights activated. The officer testified that Pierce had room to move out of the adjacent lane and into a farther lane.” 22. IMPROPER STOPPING Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (November 17, 2008). Affirms Court of Appeals at 288 Ga.App. 309, 653 S.E.2d 750 (2007). Officer had probable cause for stop based on OCGA § 40-6-200(a), which “makes it improper to park in the middle of a two-way roadway. It provides: ‘[E]very vehicle stopped or parked upon a two-way roadway shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels parallel to and within 12 inches of the right-hand curb or as close to practicable to the right edge of the right-hand shoulder.’ This statute provides a sound basis for Officer Bruton's decision to stop Stafford for parking in the middle of the road.” Darwicki v. State, 291 Ga.App. 239, 661 S.E.2d 859 (April 18, 2008) (physical precedent only). “Darwicki contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for improper stopping, standing, or parking outside of business or