☢ test - Í

residential districts, OCGA § 40-6-202, because the State failed to adduce evidence that she was, as the statute requires, ‘outside of a business or residential district .’ We agree. The State adduced some evidence that Darwicki stopped her car within either a business, a residential, or mixed business and residential area. Since OCGA § 40-6-202 applies to improper stopping ‘outside of a business or residential district,’ and the State failed to adduce any evidence on this element, it failed to carry its burden of proof. Consequently, we must reverse this conviction.” Marsengill v. State, 275 Ga.App. 840, 622 S.E.2d 58 (October 13, 2005). “[T]he undisputed evidence that the car was parked in the road so that it ‘was blocking the right lane’ was sufficient to support Marsengill’s conviction for improper stopping in a roadway.” Facts that street was not completely obstructed was not relevant, as vehicle was not legally parked. Likewise, since the vehicle was not legally parked, State was not required to prove that “the car was not visible from 200 feet away” under OCGA § 40-6-202. 23. LAYING DRAGS Hale v. State, 262 Ga.App. 710, 586 S.E.2d 372 (August 12, 2003). Conviction for “laying drags” reversed. Defendant’s skid marks were straight; “there is no evidence that the marks were in a zigzag or circular pattern, and OCGA § 40-6-251 only prohibits ‘causing the vehicle to move in a zigzag or circular course or to gyrate or spin around.’” 24. LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT/ HIT AND RUN Bell v. State, 293 Ga. 683, 748 S.E.2d 382 (September 9, 2013). Convictions for first degree vehicular homicide and related offenses affirmed; hit and run statute’s requirement to stop and identify oneself at scene of an accident doesn’t “violate a person's right against self-incrimination under both the U.S. and the Georgia Constitutions. … With respect to the U.S. Constitution, this issue has been decided adversely to Bell by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9) (1971).” “[L]ike the statute at issue in Byers, Georgia's hit-and run statute does not confront an individual with substantial hazards of self-incrimination through requiring certain disclosures, as the statute is not ‘directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.’ Id. at 429(1). … ‘So far as any available information instructs us, most accidents occur without creating criminal liability even if one or both of the drivers are guilty of negligence as a matter of tort law.... [D]isclosures with respect to automobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved in [cases where such risks are present]. Furthermore, the statutory purpose is noncriminal and self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 430–431(1).” “‘Whatever the collateral consequences of disclosing name and address [and vehicle registration number], the statutory purpose is to implement the state police power to regulate use of motor vehicles.’ Id. at 431–432(2).” Likewise, “we find no violation of Bell's right against self incrimination under the Georgia Constitution.” Dalton v. State, 286 Ga.App. 666, 650 S.E.2d 591 (July 18, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. “Dalton contends that the State failed to prove any injury to person or vehicle damage within the meaning of the Code section. This, however, is foreclosed by our decisions in McKay v. State, 264 Ga.App. 726, 727- 728(1) (592 S.E.2d 135) (2003), and Dworkin v. State, 210 Ga.App. 461, 462 (436 S.E.2d 665) (1993). The State is not required to prove actual damage, because this is not the appropriate statutory test. OCGA § 40-6-270(a)(1) provides that the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to another vehicle ‘shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, shall give his name and address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving, and upon request and if it is available, exhibit his operator’s license to the person struck. In every incident, the law requires a driver to remain at the scene of the accident until fulfilling the requirements of this subsection. Subsection (c)(1) imposes misdemeanor punishment upon a driver who knowingly fails to stop or comply with the requirements of the Code section. To prove the knowledge element of the offense, it is not absolute and positive knowledge which must be shown, but rather only that the circumstances were such that a reasonable person would have believed that an accident had occurred resulting in death, damage or injury to another. ’ (Citations, punctuation, and footnotes omitted.) McKay, supra, 264 Ga.App. at 728.” “[S]ufficient evidence was introduced that Dalton was aware that he had struck a car with his tractor-trailer, that damage in some monetary amount was possible, and that at a minimum he should have stopped and investigated further rather than leaving the scene without communicating with the victim.” Defendant failed to stop at the scene at all. Accord, Sevostiyanova v. State , 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012) (proof of actual damage not required, nor actual knowledge of damage; test is reasonable man standard). Augustin v. State, 260 Ga.App. 631, 580 S.E.2d 640 (March 27, 2003). Trial court correctly charged jury that offenses under “Title 40, Chapter 6, are strict liability offenses, and that the state is therefore not required to prove mental fault as