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corroborated driver’s testimony that defendant demanded that she not stop for police or stop at intersections, resulting in a fatal collision. Canino v. State, 314 Ga.App. 633, 725 S.E.2d 782 (March 7, 2012). In prosecution for reckless driving and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. Although officers had probable cause to arrest for reckless driving, subsequent search of vehicle wasn’t justified as search incident to arrest or impound inventory. Probable cause for arrest. “The officers … testified that Canino accelerated through the busy shopping center parking lot at a high rate of speed; made reckless turns, causing his tires to squeal and his vehicle to fish-tail; did not have control of the car; and came within ten to fifteen feet of striking the officers while he drove. Another officer … testified that Canino ‘came pretty close to striking Sergeant Hart and [me],’ and there were people walking through the parking lot. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the officers had a basis for stopping and arresting Canino for reckless driving. See OCGA § 40–6–3(a)(2) (providing that the Uniform Rules of the Road ‘shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas, which although privately owned, are customarily used by the public as through streets or connector streets.’). See also Patton v. State, 287 Ga.App. 18, 21 (650 S.E.2d 733) (2007) (arrest for reckless driving authorized because the defendant sped through a congested parking lot and on a highway); Swearingen v. State, 255 Ga.App. 85, 86(1) (564 S.E.2d 498) (2002) (traffic stop authorized based on evidence that the defendant was weaving and speeding through a pedestrian-filled mall parking lot).” Travis v. State, 314 Ga.App. 280, 724 S.E.2d 15 (February 22, 2012). DUI and related convictions affirmed; defendant wasn’t “entitled to a jury charge on the statutory presumption of sobriety because her state-administered breath test registered a blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.05 grams. Under OCGA § 40–6–392(b)(1), ‘[i]f there was at that time an alcohol concentration of 0.05 grams or less, the trier of fact in its discretion may infer therefrom that the person was not under the influence of alcohol, as prohibited by [OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(1) and (a)(4).]’ Thus, the presumption applies to violations of OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(1) or (a)(4), for DUI to the extent that the person was a less safe driver (‘DUI less safe’). [fn] See Ricks v. State, 255 Ga.App. 188, 190(1) (564 S.E.2d 793) (2002). Such a presumption does not arise, however, with respect to violations of OCGA § 40–6–391(k)(1), for DUI of more than 0.02 percent blood alcohol content while under the age of 21 [Cit.],” and “did not entitle Travis to a presumption of sobriety with respect to her reckless driving violation. See Cornell v. State, 239 Ga.App. 127, 128(2) (520 S.E.2d 782) (1999) (‘It is clear that OCGA § 40–6–392(b)(1) creates a rebuttable negative presumption in criminal actions arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person in violation of Code Section 40–6–391.’) (citation omitted).” Bautista v. State, 305 Ga.App. 210, 699 S.E.2d 392 (July 13, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for reckless driving and first degree vehicular homicide were supported by evidence; “the evidence authorized the jury to find that Major, while driving east on Selman Drive, had the right of way at the intersection with West Chase Drive, that Bautista had a clear line of sight 800 to 900 feet up Selman Drive in the direction from which Major approached, and that Bautista drove into Major's path when Major was so close to the intersection that he did not have time to apply his brakes before impact. The law does not support Bautista's argument that, as a matter of law, his conduct under these circumstances cannot amount to reckless driving. To the contrary, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bautista drove his vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of others and that he caused Major's death through such reckless driving. Ivie v. State, 151 Ga.App. 496, 496-497(1) (260 S.E.2d 543) (1979) (evidence that the defendant drove his vehicle in a reckless disregard for the safety of others by failing to yield the right of way to oncoming traffic was sufficient to convict the defendant of first-degree vehicular homicide predicated on reckless driving).” Prather v. State, 303 Ga.App. 374, 693 S.E.2d 546 (March 15, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for reckless driving. “The evidence showed that Prather, on the day alleged in the indictment, drove while intoxicated and weaved in and out of his lane, on and off the roadway, ultimately crashing into oncoming traffic and killing the victim.” Griffis v. State, 295 Ga.App. 903, 673 S.E.2d 348 (February 10, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for reckless driving. “Griffis contends that his car was approximately two car-lengths away from Sergeant Curry's car when he was laying drags, and there was no evidence that Griffis was about to hit anyone or anything. Although Griffis is correct that the testimony given at trial shows that the cars were approximately two car-lengths apart, given the evidence of the particular conditions surrounding the incident – Griffis was laying drags in the drive-thru line of a restaurant, which caused his vehicle to swerve, was in close proximity to the drive-thru call-box, and was visibly impaired and smelling of alcohol – the jury was authorized to find that Griffis was driving in a manner that exhibited reckless disregard for people or objects around him.”