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Hughes v. State, 290 Ga.App. 475, 659 S.E.2d 844 (March 24, 2008). 1. Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for reckless driving. “Given the particular conditions on the [narrow] street, its location in a residential neighborhood, and evidence from which jurors could conclude that the truck was traveling at an excessive rate of speed, the jury was authorized to find that Hughes drove with reckless disregard for the safety of persons in the area. Accordingly, the evidence supports his conviction for reckless driving. See [ Winston v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 665-666 (607 S.E.2d 147) (2004)]; see also Putman v. State, 257 Ga.App. 902, 903(1)(a) (572 S.E.2d 412) (2002) (‘[R]eckless driving can be established by proving that a defendant was driving at an excessive rate of speed given the legal rate of speed.’).” 2. In defendant’s prosecution for reckless driving, trial court properly charged jury on driver’s duty to exercise due care under OCGA § 40-6-93, “which, at base, ‘establishes that motorists on the highways must exercise ordinary care to discover and avoid persons in the roadway.’ Fountain v. Thompson, 252 Ga. 256, 257 (312 S.E.2d 788) (1984). Its violation may be charged as a crime, but the statute also functions as a general statement of the duty imposed on drivers. See id.; Winston [ v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 666(1)(b) (607 S.E.2d 147) (2004)]. This statement is neither confusing nor misleading.” Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only. “The state presented evidence that Schlanger was legally intoxicated and, by his own admission, was driving his vehicle ‘at some significant rate of speed’ when he took his eyes off the roadway and became unable to ‘handle the speed.’ After ‘fishtail[ing]’ and ‘skidding,’ he began ‘spinning and rolling’ as he exited the roadway. This evidence authorized the jury to find Schlanger guilty of reckless driving beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Fraser v. State, 263 Ga.App. 764, 765-766(1) (589 S.E.2d 329) (2003) (recognizing that speeding alone can form the basis of a reckless driving conviction); Carson v. State, 250 Ga.App. 876(1) (553 S.E.2d 312) (2001) (driver exited the road into a grassy area and hit a pedestrian). The jury obviously chose to disbelieve Schlanger’s claim that his departure from the roadway resulted from the negligence of a second, unidentified driver as opposed to his own and the jury was authorized to do so. See Rylee v. State, 288 Ga.App. 784, 787(3)(a) (655 S.E.2d 239) (2007).” Horne v. State, 286 Ga.App. 712, 649 S.E.2d 889 (July 20, 2007). “Here, while impaired by alcohol, Horne in the midst of other traffic blatantly ran a red light at a busy intersection, exceeded the speed limit by 15 miles per hour, and wove in and out of his lane. We hold that this sufficed to show the elements of reckless driving. See Pinch v. State, 265 Ga.App. 1, 4-5(3) (593 S.E.2d 1) (2003) (speeding, abrupt lane changes, and running stop sign showed reckless driving); Fraser v. State, 263 Ga.App. 764, 765-766(1) (589 S.E.2d 329) (2003) (driving at excessive rate of speed under certain driving conditions and while impaired by alcohol showed reckless driving).” Patton v. State, 287 Ga.App. 18, 650 S.E.2d 733 (July 16, 2007). Defendant’s reckless driving through shopping center justified traffic stop. “The agent testified that Patton’s driving was reckless and dangerous as he fled the parking lot and that a short chase ensued. Another officer testified that Patton was traveling at a high rate of speed in the parking lot and on the highway, and that he was concerned for the safety of officers and others. Patton himself admitted that the parking lot was ‘congested that night.’ All of this evidence establishes that Patton was driving recklessly in the parking lot and on the highway in an effort to flee the scene. … OCGA § 40-6-3(a)(2) provides that ‘[t]he provisions of [Chapter 6- Uniform Rules of the Road] shall apply to a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas which although privately owned are customarily used by the public as through streets or connector streets.’” Rutland v. State, 282 Ga.App. 728, 639 S.E.2d 628 (December 5, 2006). Trial court properly refused defendant’s request to charge on accident in her prosecution for DUI and reckless driving. “It is firmly established that a defendant charged with DUI is not entitled to a jury instruction on accident or misfortune based on the claim that a traffic mishap that occurred while he was operating the motor vehicle was unavoidable, because a DUI charge relates not to the accident but to the defendant’s condition while driving. Stefanell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 412, 413 (587 S.E.2d 868) (2003); compare Moore v. State, 258 Ga.App. 293, 294(1) (574 S.E.2d 372) (2002) (jury instruction on accident or misfortune approved in vehicular homicide/DUI cases, if there is evidence that defendant could not have avoided collision due to circumstances beyond his control). For the same reasons, the defense of accident has been held inapplicable to a charge of reckless driving. Winston v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 670(5) (607 S.E.2d 147) (2004).” Graves v. State, 280 Ga.App. 420, 634 S.E.2d 186 (July 11, 2006). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for reckless driving. “Graves’ conduct in almost hitting a police officer who was standing on the side of the highway constituted a reckless disregard for the safety of others. English v. State, 261 Ga.App. 157, 159(2) (582 S.E.2d 136) (2003) (defendant’s reckless driving forced pedestrians to jump out of the way). ”