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Klaub v. State, 255 Ga.App. 40, 564 S.E.2d 471 (April 12, 2002). Reckless driving may be established by proving that defendant was driving at an excessive rate of speed, given evidence of the posted speed limit and the driving conditions at the time. Pennington v. State, 254 Ga.App. 837, 564 S.E.2d 219 (April 10, 2002). Evidence supported conviction for reckless driving where truck driver attempted to u-turn his truck, blocking all lanes of traffic on street, including approaching traffic which could not see him because of a tunnel. Because he couldn’t fit through the tunnel, instead of endangering others, he should have waited for police to safely block traffic for him. Ayers v. State, 272 Ga. 733, 534 S.E.2d 76 (September 11, 2000). Interlocutory appeal in vehicular homicide prosecution predicated on reckless driving. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the rationale of Love v. State , 271 Ga. 398, 517 S.E.2d 53 (June 1, 1999) doesn’t apply to charges of reckless driving based on presence of marijuana metabolites in driver’s system. Love “determined that OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6) was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection in that those whose marijuana use was legally sanctioned could not be convicted simply on the basis of the presence of marijuana metabolites in their bodily fluids, while those whose marijuana use was not legally sanctioned could be.” Id . at 402(3). “The violation of equal protection found in Love was grounded in the recognition that legal marijuana users pose the same threat as illegal users when controlling a moving vehicle, making disparate treatment without a rational basis. Love at 403(3), 517 S.E.2d 53 . In prosecution of the two counts at issue, it does not matter whether Ayers consumed the marijuana legally or illegally. The charges merely include the fact that marijuana was found in Ayers’ blood because it is relevant to the jury’s determination that Ayers drove ‘in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property,’ which is what the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” 31. SEAT BELTS/CHILD RESTRAINTS Blitch v. State, 281 Ga. 125, 636 S.E.2d 545 (October 16, 2006). Traffic stop based on failure to wear seat belt could result in consensual search and probable cause for drug arrest. “Citing OCGA § 40-8-76.1(f), [defendant] contends the traffic stop for failure to wear a seat belt could not form the basis for her arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The portion of OCGA § 40-8-76.1(f) upon which she relies states that ‘[n]oncompliance with the restraint requirements of this Code section shall not constitute probable cause for violation of any other Code section.’ In Temples v. State, 228 Ga.App. 228, 230 (491 S.E.2d 444) (1997), the Court of Appeals was faced with a similar assertion and determined the statutory language pertaining to probable cause ‘was added for the purpose of prohibiting a search of a person or a vehicle based solely on the failure of an occupant of the front seat to wear a seat belt’ and ‘does not preclude an officer from conducting a reasonable inquiry and investigation to insure both [the officer’s] safety and that of others.’ (emphasis added). See also Edwards v. State, 239 Ga.App. 44(2) (518 S.E.2d 426) (1999); Davis v. State, 232 Ga.App. 320(1) (501 S.E.2d 836) (1998). Similarly, the statute does not preclude an officer from conducting a search of a vehicle pursuant to the driver’s consent to search obtained during a lawful traffic stop, because a search conducted pursuant to consent is not a search ‘based solely on the failure of an occupant to wear a seatbelt. ’ Cf. State v. Millsap, 243 Ga.App. 519, 520 (528 S.E.2d 865) (2000) (physical precedent only). The trial court did not err when it denied [defendant]’s motion to suppress.” 32. SERIOUS INJURY BY VEHICLE Bray v. State, 330 Ga.App. 768, 768 S.E.2d 285 (February 4, 2015). Convictions for serious injury by vehicle and related offenses affirmed; evidence established element of serious disfigurement to the two elderly victims. 1. “The indictment alleged that the husband was seriously disfigured in that he suffered a fractured sternum and ribs as a result of the collision. According to Bray, the husband's fractures did not constitute serious disfigurement because these injuries were not discernable to the naked eye and were only discovered once a CT scan was performed, and thus did not impair or injure the husband's appearance. But whether fractured bones rise to the level of serious disfigurement turns on the specific facts of the case. See Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 366, 369(2) (612 S.E.2d 557) (2005). And evidence that the victim fractured a bone, combined with photographs showing bruising or other visible injuries in the area of the fracture, can constitute sufficient evidence of serious disfigurement. See Christensen v. State, 245 Ga.App. 165, 167–168(3) (537 S.E.2d 446) (2000); Pollard v. State, 230 Ga.App. 159, 160(1) (495 S.E.2d 629) (1998).” This is so even if the indictment didn’t mention the bruising; “the State was not required to go further and summarize the specific evidence it intended to introduce at trial to prove that the fractures caused serious disfigurement.” 2. “[E]vidence that the wife dislocated her finger and sustained a head laceration requiring staples was sufficient to authorize the trial court to find serious disfigurement. See Ganas v. State, 245 Ga.App. 645, 646(1)(a) (537 S.E.2d 758) (2000) (broken and distended finger could constitute serious disfigurement); Ramsey v. State, 233 Ga.App. 810, 811(1) (505 S.E.2d 779) (1998) (lacerations requiring stitches could constitute serious disfigurement).” 3. Sentence of life without parole as a recidivist was not so