☢ test - Í

excessive and disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. “Although Bray describes his crimes in this case as ‘non- violent,’ he led the police on a dangerous car chase that culminated in his head-on collision with another vehicle, causing severe injury to its elderly occupants. Furthermore, his multiple prior convictions were all theft-related offenses, and in the present case, Bray was again in possession of a stolen vehicle. Under these circumstances, Bray's contention that his recidivist sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his crimes is without merit. See Willis v. State, 316 Ga.App. 258, 268(7) (728 S.E.2d 857) (2012).” Wright v. State, 304 Ga.App. 651, 697 S.E.2d 296 (June 28, 2010). Multiple convictions for serious injury by vehicle as to the same victim, arising from different predicate offenses (DUI, reckless driving), should have merged for sentencing. Wells v. State, 297 Ga.App. 153, 625 S.E.2d 821 (March 27, 2009). “Evidence that [victim] Dennis's eye had been forced out of its socket was sufficient to show that a ‘member of his body [had been rendered] useless.’ OCGA § 40-6-394; see Adams v. State, 259 Ga.App. 570, 571(1) (578 S.E.2d 207) (2003) (to constitute the crime of serious injury by vehicle, there is no requirement that, in addition to being serious, the member of the victim be permanently rendered useless).” Potts v. State, 296 Ga.App. 242, 674 S.E.2d 109 (February 20, 2009). In defendant’s trial for serious injury by vehicle, trial court properly excluded evidence that victim was not wearing seat belt. “OCGA § 40-6-394 … imposes no duty on the victim to prevent or mitigate injuries caused by a reckless or intoxicated driver, nor does Potts identify any authority for such a proposition. Therefore, we decline to do so here.” Hannah v. State, 280 Ga.App. 230, 633 S.E.2d 800 (June 30, 2006). In defendant’s sentence for serious injury by vehicle, predicated upon DUI, trial court could, in its discretion, impose conditions “peculiar to a DUI sentence,” to wit: “probation conditions requiring that he pay a $25 photograph fee, a $25 DUI fee, a $25 crime lab fee, and a $100 brain/spinal cord fee, and that he install an ignition interlock device” (cites omitted). “While we agree with Hannah that the cited conditions are peculiar to a DUI conviction, [cit.] Hannah has failed to cite any authority showing that a court abuses its discretion in imposing them upon a probated sentence for serious injury by vehicle, where DUI was the predicate offense. Hannah also has failed to show that any such condition is unreasonable or fails to serve the main goals of probation. Therefore, we see no reason why the cited conditions may not be imposed upon a probated sentence for serious injury by vehicle. [Cit.]” 33. SPEEDING Klemetti v. State, 334 Ga.App. 513, 780 S.E.2d 346 (September 24, 2015). Speeding conviction affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, state wasn’t required to prove “the engineering and traffic investigation” justifying a reduction in speed limit. “Klemetti’s argument is in the nature of an affirmative defense . … ‘As in other cases where affirmative defenses are involved, we conclude that an affirmative defense ... is a matter for the defendant to raise and not a matter for the state to negate,’ at least until the defendant has presented some evidence to support it. Snelling v. State, 176 Ga.App. 192, 193(1) (335 S.E.2d 475) (1985) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Hill v. State, 261 Ga. 377 (405 S.E.2d 258) (1991) (‘After a defendant presents a prima facie case of [the affirmative defense of] entrapment, the burden is on the state to disprove entrapment beyond reasonable doubt.’). Klemetti presented no evidence to support his affirmative defense that the governing authority was not authorized to change the default speed limit. Moreover, the state introduced into evidence a certified copy of a city council ordinance showing the changed speed limit. And it is presumed that public officials have done their duty in cases involving traffic statutes. Frasard v. State, 322 Ga.App. 468, 469(2)(a) (745 S.E.2d 716) (2013). Contrary to Klemetti’s argument, such a presumption, which does not relieve the state from its duty ‘to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt,’ is not impermissibly burden-shifting. Kidd v. State, 277 Ga.App. 29, 32(2) (625 S.E.2d 440) (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Frasard v. State, 322 Ga.App. 468, 745 S.E.2d 716 (June 27, 2013). Speeding conviction affirmed. 1. To prove speeding, State isn’t required to prove “the existence of signs at the county line indicating that (a) the speed limit was 35 mph and (b) speed detection devices were in use.” “OCGA § 40–6–181(b)(1) provides that the maximum speed in an ‘urban or residential district’ is 30 mph.” Dekalb County here increased the limit to 35 mph on this stretch of Peachtree Road. “Frasard has cited no authority, and we have found none, that requires a governmental unit to prove its compliance with OCGA §§ 40–6–182 or 40–6–183 in order to obtain a conviction for the crime of speeding. See Brooker v. State, 206 Ga.App. 563, 565 (426 S.E.2d 39) (1992) (noting the presumption that a public officer has done his duty in all cases involving the traffic statutes). Given that the variance from the statutory speed limit of 30 mph to the non-statutory limit of 35 mph could only work in Frasard's favor, moreover, Frasard cannot show that he was prejudiced by the State's imposition of a higher, non-statutory speed limit in this case.” 2. As to speed detection device warning, see Ferguson