☢ test - Í

(September 3, 2003), below. 3. Laser speed detection device results may be authenticated by means other than the Department of Public Safety list referenced in OCGA § 40-14-17. “Here, the arresting officer testified as to both his training in speed detection, including the use of laser devices, and the Department of Public Safety's approval of the particular device he used. Accordingly, the State introduced evidence sufficient to meet the authenticating procedures of OCGA § 40–14–17, and Frasard's contentions to the contrary lack merit.” 4. Speeding citation wasn’t void because it “failed to specify whether the incident occurred on a two-lane road.” “This citation indicated that Frasard was speeding on Peachtree Road. When the officer left the box indicating ‘2–lane road’ blank, he was complying with OCGA § 40–6–187 by showing that the road consisted of more than two lanes at the location at issue. Thus the citation was not defective, and the indictment based on it was sufficiently specific to put Frasard on notice of the charges against him.” In any event, this allegation, like an allegation of a specific speed, wasn’t essential, citing Byars v. State, 92 Ga.App. 511 (88 S.E.2d 818) (1955). 5. Convictions for speeding 54/35 zone and traveling “in excess of the posted speed limit” should have merged for sentencing, where based on the same act. Jones v. State, 308 Ga.App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (February 24, 2011). Conviction and sentence for speeding and related offenses affirmed, but community service imposed exceeded that statutorily authorized. 1. Jones argues, however, that the enactment of legislation setting lower limits on speeding fines set forth in OCGA § 40-6-1(b), which became effective on July 1, 2001, [cit.] rendered the general misdemeanor punishment statute (OCGA § 17-10-3) inapplicable to speeding convictions. We disagree. OCGA § 40-6-1(b) simply sets limits on fines that may be imposed as punishment for a first offense of speeding. It does not restrict the available punishment for speeding to a fine. See Caputo v. State, 276 Ga.App. 477 (623 S.E.2d 687) (2005) (recognizing that speeding ‘is a misdemeanor and subjects [the defendant] to potential punishment as a misdemeanant,’ including possible imprisonment); Gregg [ v. State, 253 Ga.App. 243, 245(7) (558 S.E.2d 729) (2001)]. Compare Chastain v. State, 231 Ga.App. 225, 228(4) (498 S.E.2d 792) (1998) (holding that violations of OCGA § 40-6-253, which ‘criminalizes the act of operating a vehicle while in possession of an open container of alcohol and also prescribes its own punishment for such an act (i.e., a fine not to exceed $200),’ are punishable ‘by the specific statute, OCGA § 40-6-253(c), and not by the general misdemeanor statute’). Therefore, Jones's sentence to serve 12 months for the speeding charge was within authorized limits. See Caputo, 276 Ga.App. at 477; Gregg, 253 Ga.App. at 245(7).” 2. Jones argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to 400 hours of community service. We agree. OCGA § 42-8-72(a)(1) provides that ‘[c]ommunity service may be considered as a condition of probation’ for traffic violations. The statute further provides, however, that the sentencing court may order ‘[n]ot less than 20 hours nor more than 250 hours in cases involving traffic or ordinance violations or misdemeanors....’ OCGA § 42-8-72(b)(1).” Contrary to State’s position, statute doesn’t authorize 250 hours community service per charge. “The 250-hour maximum limit for community service hours set forth in OCGA § 42-8-72(b)(1) specifically applies to ‘ cases involving traffic ... violations,’ (emphasis supplied), not to each traffic violation or charge as suggested by the State [fn]. Thus, the trial court erred by ordering Jones to perform 400 hours of community service as a condition of his probation.” Porter v. State, 290 Ga.App. 113, 658 S.E.2d 893 (March 7, 2008). In defendant’s speeding prosecution, court’s jury instruction that “no vehicle shall be driven in excess of 65 miles per hour on a highway on the federal interstate system that is inside an urbanized area of 50,000 population or more” was “mere surplusage.” Wilshin v. State, 289 Ga.App. 683, 658 S.E.2d 224 (February 21, 2008). OCGA § 40-14-6, which “provides, in pertinent part, that counties, municipalities, colleges, and universities shall not operate speed detection devices within 500 feet of their boundary line or signs warning of the use of the devices,” did not apply to laser device operated by state trooper. Accord, Hayes v. State , 292 Ga.App. 724, 665 S.E.2d 422 (July 15, 2008). Nye v. State, 279 Ga.App. 347, 631 S.E.2d 386 (April 19, 2006). 1. Accusation charging defendant with speeding but citing wrong code section was sufficient. “In determining whether the instrument is valid, ‘[i]t is the description of the crime, rather than the description and number of the section under which it appears in the Code which furnishes the criterion for determining whether the indictment is good.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rank v. State, 179 Ga.App. 28(1) (345 S.E.2d 75) (1986).” 2. “Nye claims that the trial court erred by limiting the jury to finding only whether he exceeded the speed limit or not, and by making its own determination of how fast he was going for punishment purposes. We find no merit in this enumeration. Nye was charged with speeding, and there is ‘only one manner in which this offense can be committed, i.e., exceeding the designated speed limit.’ Wise v. State, 234 Ga.App. 140, 141 (506 S.E.2d 156) (1998) (no error in trial court’s holding that UTC accused defendant of general speeding charge and not of traveling at a particular speed). The allegation that Nye was traveling 127 mph was not a material averment that had to be proven. ‘[T]o be guilty of speeding, one need only exceed the designated speed limit. OCGA § 40-6-181(b); see Wise, supra, 234