☢ test - Í

Ga.App. at 141. Greater speeds by specified increment affect only the punishment and are therefore not material allegations to prove the crime of speeding. See OCGA § 40-6-1(b).’ Jones v. State, 258 Ga.App. 337, 338 (574 S.E.2d 398) (2002). Thus the trial court did not err in limiting the jury to finding only whether Nye exceeded the speed limit or not.” Accord, Porter v. State , 290 Ga.App. 113, 658 S.E.2d 893 (March 7, 2008); Lafavor v. State , 334 Ga.App. 125, 778 S.E.2d 787 (October 8, 2015). Berry v. State, 274 Ga.App. 831, 619 S.E.2d 339 (July 29, 2005). “OCGA § 40-14-8(a) provides: ‘No county, city, or campus officer shall be allowed to make a case based on the use of any speed detection device, unless the speed of the vehicle exceeds the posted speed limit by more than ten miles per hour and no conviction shall be had thereon unless such speed is more than ten miles per hour above the posted speed limit.’ Berry argues that, because he was traveling only ten miles above the posted speed limit, Sergeant Yager had no authority to stop him. This argument is misplaced. Although Berry correctly contends that he could not be convicted of a speeding offense in this case, nothing in OCGA § 40- 14-8(a) prevents an officer from stopping a speeding vehicle in order to warn the driver that he is exceeding the posted speed limit. Therefore, contrary to Berry’s arguments, Sergeant Yager did have a legal reason to stop Berry, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress.” In re: J.D.S., 273 Ga.App. 576, 615 S.E.2d 627 (June 8, 2005). Laser evidence should have been excluded for lack of foundation (list of approved devices), but officer’s estimate that speed was excessive was sufficient to sustain conviction. “Although the Uniform Traffic Citation noted that J.D.S. was traveling at 86 miles per hour, the state was not required to prove that he was traveling at that precise rate of speed in order to obtain a conviction. Jones v. State, 258 Ga.App. 337, 338, 574 S.E.2d 398 (2002). Rather, ‘to be guilty of speeding, one need only exceed the designated speed limit. Greater speeds by specified increment affect only the punishment and are therefore not material allegations to prove the crime of speeding.’ (Citations omitted.) Id.” “Officer Simpson testified that J.D.S.’s vehicle was traveling at an ‘obvious high rate of speed ... faster than the 65 miles per hour speed limit on Georgia 400.’ This testimony supported the juvenile court’s determination that J.D.S. committed the traffic offense of speeding. ‘[A]n officer’s estimate of speed is sufficient to support a conviction on a speeding violation.’ In re: B.D.S., 269 Ga.App. [89, at 91(1), 603 S.E.2d 488 (2004)]. See also Stone v. State, 257 Ga.App. 492, 571 S.E.2d 488 (2002).” Accord, Miller v. State , 307 Ga.App. 701, 706 S.E.2d 94 (February 1, 2011); Frasard v. State , 322 Ga.App. 468, 745 S.E.2d 716 (June 27, 2013) (State not required to prove “precise rate of speed” alleged on citiation to convict); LaFavor v. State , 334 Ga.App. 125, 778 S.E.2d 787 (October 8, 2015) (precise speed alleged need not be proven at trial). Seems to conflict with Hardaway, see below in note on Ferguson (September 3, 2003). See also Nye (April 19, 2006), above. In re: B.D.S., 269 Ga.App. 89, 603 S.E.2d 488 (August 11, 2004). Officer’s visual estimate of speed was admissible, even though “the traffic stop occurred on an unlit county road” at night. Accord, Stone v. State , 257 Ga.App. 492, 571 S.E.2d 488 (2002) (speeding conviction based solely on visual estimate made at 2:00 a.m.). Ferguson v. State, 263 Ga.App. 40, 587 S.E.2d 195 (September 3, 2003). 1. “[A]n officer’s visual estimate of speed is sufficient to support a conviction on a speeding violation.” But note, officer’s testimony “that based upon his experience, [defendant’s] vehicle appeared to be exceeding the speed limit, but [officer] was unable to estimate the [defendant’s] speed [was] insufficient to support the conviction” for speeding, Hardaway v. State , 207 Ga.App. 150, 427 S.E.2d 527 (1993). Accord, Segel v. State , 293 Ga.App. 506, 667 S.E.2d 670 (September 9, 2008) (other evidence, including officer’s observation and defendant’s admissions, supported speeding conviction regardless of admissibility of radar evidence). 2. Failure to show posting of signs warning of use of speed detection devices did not require reversal of speeding conviction; “incomplete compliance with this Code section [OCGA § 40-14-6(a)] does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained by the use of speed detection devices.” Accord, Frasard v. State , 322 Ga.App. 468, 745 S.E.2d 716 (June 27, 2013). King v. State, 262 Ga.App. 37, 584 S.E.2d 652 (June 27, 2003). Where evidence overwhelmingly showed that defendant was exceeding the speed limit, court was not required to charge on OCGA § 40-6-181(b), “which specifies maximum speed limits for particular types of areas.” Trial court “properly charged the jury that no one shall drive in excess of the maximum posted speed limit. The court’s charge on speeding was sufficient.” Farid v. State, 258 Ga.App. 429, 574 S.E.2d 460 (November 18, 2002). Police officer need not be “offered as an expert simply because the officer testifies as to his training in the visual estimation of speed.”